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Summary 
 
This dissertation is on general principles of growth, comprising of three chapters and a short introduction. Chapter 1 
analyses the macroeconomic adjustment experienced in IMF/EU-programme countries during the Eurozone crisis by 
creating counterfactuals based on comparable historical or contemporaneous episodes worldwide. It therefore shows 
how crisis management and the institutional framework in which it operates have important implications for the depth 
of the recession. In particular, an incomplete Eurozone institutional setup contributed to aggravate the crisis through 
higher uncertainty. The first general principle that can be drawn is that sustained growth rests not only in preventing 
booms but also in designing institutions that well-manage busts. When growth slows down, calls for deep structural 
reforms multiply. However, estimations of the short- and medium-term impact of these reforms on GDP growth remain 
methodologically problematic and still highly controversial. As such, Chapter 2 estimates the impact of 23 wide-reaching 
structural reform packages (including both real and financial sector measures) rolled out in 22 countries between 1961 
and 2000. It therefore illustrates how large reform packages tend to have on average a positive medium-term impact on 
growth, but these effects were highly heterogeneous across countries. The second general principle that can be drawn is 
that deep economic reforms are no growth silver bullet per se, and rather require careful design, tailored to local conditions. 
Finally, Chapter 3 explores factors behind the largest growth acceleration episodes that took place worldwide between 
1962 and 2002 and identifies general principles that should underlie a successful growth strategy. In particular, it shows 
how accelerations tend to be preceded by a deep recession and major economic policy changes. Once this information 
is combined with a set of counterfactual analyses, it finds that acceleration strategies should not contain off-the-shelf 
approaches or necessarily all-encompassing ‘shock therapy’ solutions. Despite standard growth determinants doing a fairly 
good job at characterising successful accelerations, the quest for take-offs remains elusive, as they seem extremely hard to 
engineer with a high degree of certainty. 
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Preface 
 
This is a dissertation about economic growth. It takes inspiration from two centuries of work that has shed 
light on patterns and divergences between income levels across countries. This is the fundamental question 
Adam Smith founded modern economics with. When he wrote ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations’, the richest country in the world was probably the Netherlands, which was roughly four-
times richer than the poorest country in the world. Today, advanced economies are some 250-times 
wealthier in GDP terms than the poorest country in the world. At the beginning of the 80s, China’s GDP 
was on par with that of California and roughly a tenth that of the US. Today, it is soon set to become the 
largest economy in the world. On a smaller, and yet very relevant, scale, in 2001 Venezuela was the richest 
country in Latin America, with the largest oil reserves in the world. Today, less than two decades later, it 
has become the poorest. Understanding how these phenomena came about is extremely fascinating and of 
tremendous policy relevance, given the huge implications for people’s wellbeing. In the words of Lucas 
(1988): “The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think 
about them, it is hard to think about anything else”. 
The importance of this topic is still celebrated within a narrow group of fellow macroeconomic aficionados. 
However, when illustrating the content of this manuscript to a wider public of non-economist or academic 
professionals in different fields of the ‘dismal science’, the reception has been exceptionally cold. To my 
surprise, economic growth was perceived as a very outmoded concept for the 21st century. Having 
experienced first-hand the deepest global recession since 1929, and its dire social consequences, most would 
recognise that somehow growth matters, but ultimately two were the main types of critiques. The first 
relates to the fact that GDP per capita – the primary metric of a country’s wealth level and main focus of 
this dissertation – is seen as an outworn concept. The second criticism, which is somehow connected, 
downplays the relevance of aggregate output, and instead sees distribution of that output as what truly 
matters.  
Unease with GDP as a metric is not new. Already in 1968, presidential-candidate Robert Kennedy was 
remarking how GDP “does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. 
It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity 
of our public officials. […] it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile”1. While Bob 
Kennedy’s criticism is fair, it is worth remembering that GDP-measured wealth goes hand in hand with 
practically everything “which makes life worthwhile”. Pritchett and Summers (1996) show that wealthier 
nations are healthier nations, as increasing income per capita yields significant improvements in a country’s 
health, infant mortality, and life expectancy. At a global level, wealthier countries also display higher levels 
                                                          
1 https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/RFK-Speeches/Remarks-of-Robert-F-
Kennedy-at-the-University-of-Kansas-March-18-1968.aspx 
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of educational attainment, lower corruption, lower violence, higher investment in culture, better quality of 
research, and so on.  
The second line of criticism takes inspiration from recent work of Piketty (2017), Chen and Ravallion 
(2010), Saez and Zucman (2014) and others, who have been crucially showing how inequality has soared 
over the past decades. In the US, where the problem is particularly acute, the top 0.1% commands more 
than a fifth of total wealth, up from 7% in the late 70s, and this is mostly due to the surge of top incomes 
(Piketty and Saez 2006; Saez and Zucman 2014). Atkinson et al (2011) show how almost 60% of real income 
growth in America between 1976 and 2007 was captured by the top 1%. The criticism therefore reads as 
‘what is GDP growth for, if it is for the benefit only of selected few’. While this argument is relevant within 
advanced economies, although more salient in the United States than in continental Europe (Atkinson et 
al. 2011), worldwide inequality is at the lowest level in recorded history. This is due mostly to the fact that 
China (and to some extent India) have boosted their economic growth, lifting hundreds of millions from 
poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2010).  
Fostering long-term growth can do more to alleviate (or prevent) poverty than any micro-targeted policy. 
In the words of Lant Pritchett (2018): “the poverty reduction gains from large, extended periods of rapid growth are 
larger than from targeted interventions and also hold promise (and have delivered) for reducing global poverty”. The 
magnitude of the gains from reducing the probability of catastrophic economic collapses like that of 
Venezuela are manifold larger than the potential gains of introducing selected poverty-alleviation 
programmes.  
These statements carry some relevance also for advanced economies, where macroeconomic policy 
mistakes have costed a country like Greece 25% of GDP in less than a decade (as discussed in Chapter 1), 
leading to a deterioration of public health (Simou and Koutsogeorgou 2014), higher levels of poverty and 
inequality (Andriopoulou et al. 2017), and youth migration comparable to post-war periods (Labrianidis 
and Pratsinakis 2016).  
While the focus of this manuscript is on general principles of growth, the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis 
shaped my macroeconomic interests and therefore implicitly laid the foundations for the structure of this 
dissertation. Following the revelation of large Greek fiscal deficits in 2010, the Eurozone went through a 
period of financial turmoil that was characterised by sharp macroeconomic adjustment in selected countries 
of the so-called ‘periphery’. Chapter 1 analyses specifically the adjustment experienced in IMF/EU-
programme countries by creating counterfactuals based on comparable historical or contemporaneous 
episodes worldwide. It therefore shows how crisis management and the institutional framework in which 
it operates have important implications for the depth of the recession. The first general principle that can 
be drawn is that sustained growth rests not only in preventing booms but also in designing institutions that 
well-manage busts. 
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After an initial policy reaction that was mainly centred around fiscal austerity measures, the focus of 
Eurozone crisis management shifted to ‘structural reforms’ (Sapir et al. 2014; Terzi 2015), meant as supply-
side measures aimed at boosting productivity and medium-term growth. However, the growth literature is 
perhaps more divided than is often made seem within policy environments, and the short- and medium-
term impact of large reform programmes is still highly controversial. As such, Chapter 2 applies recent 
econometric enhancements in counterfactual analysis to quantify the impact of wide-reaching reform waves 
that took place between 1961 and 2000 worldwide. It therefore illustrates how large reform packages tend 
to have on average a positive medium-term impact on growth, but these effects were highly heterogeneous 
across countries. The second general principle that can be drawn is that deep economic reforms are no 
growth silver bullet per se, and rather require careful design, tailored to local conditions.  
Indeed, notwithstanding wide-reaching economic reforms, Greece’s growth rate continued to disappoint. 
At the same time, however, other crisis-struck countries experienced an astounding turnaround. In the year 
after the end of its IMF/EU financial assistance programme, Ireland grew at a whopping 8.5% and, as of 
today, it still enjoys the highest growth rate in the whole European Union. Chapter 3 therefore explores 
factors behind the largest growth acceleration episodes that took place worldwide between 1962 and 2002 
and identifies general principles that should underlie a successful growth strategy. In particular, it shows 
how they should not contain off-the-shelf approaches or necessarily all-encompassing “shock therapy” 
solutions. On the other hand, careful tailoring to local conditions is warranted. 
As will be evident by this point, an overall theme of the manuscript is the idea that even for advanced 
economies there are important lessons to be learnt from past experiences elsewhere in the world. As 
remarked by Reinhart and Rogoff (2014, p. 54), “Even after one of the most severe multi-year crises on record in the 
advanced economies, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that high-income countries are completely different 
from their emerging-market counterparts”. This complacency, or ‘partial amnesia’ (Rodrik 2018, p. 52), has led 
Eurozone countries to repeat policy mistakes of the past. As discussed in Chapter 2, we knew for example 
that large structural reform programmes have heterogeneous effects and tend to work where the quality of 
institutions is high (as in Ireland) and less so where it is low (as in Greece).  
More broadly, this manuscript respects the now widely-accepted principle that every country is different, 
in terms of its history, economic characteristics, and institutions. At the same time, it is drafted based on 
the idea that if formulated in an appropriately loose way, there are some general growth principles and 
mechanics that are true across the board. This is made particularly evident in Chapter 3, which shows how 
no individual measure consistently predicts a growth acceleration, but at the same time general principles 
like the sub-optimality of all-encompassing solutions can be affirmed.  
These general themes are reinforced by the empirical strategies employed throughout this manuscript. 
While each chapter is methodologically different from the other, there is a common thread. In particular, 
they all build on country-specific counterfactuals that are then analysed in a comprehensive manner to 
identify general trends or principles. In doing so, the manuscript uses micro-econometric techniques (like 
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the Synthetic Counterfactual Method or Propensity Score Matching), to answer macroeconomic questions, 
in line with a recent strand in the literature (Abadie et al. 2010; Jordà and Taylor 2015).  
The ideas exposed in this manuscript eclectically build on various schools of thought in the growth 
literature. However, in a way or another their theoretical foundations can all be traced back to the Harvard 
University Center for International Development (CID). Chapter 1 strongly builds on work pioneered by 
Carmen Reinhart and co-authors, systematically comparing financial crises across time (Carmen M. 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). Chapters 2 and 3 are deeply rooted in the ‘growth diagnostics’ approach that 
was first devised by Hausmann et al. (2007) and later perfected by CID researchers, in order to make it 
applicable by governments worldwide. My research stint at CID has shaped my understanding of economic 
growth in ways that I am probably yet to grasp fully.  
 
Alessio Terzi 
Brussels, Belgium 
30 May 2018  
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Chapter 1. Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area 
By Alessio Terzi 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Macroeconomic adjustment in the euro area periphery was more recessionary than pre-crisis imbalances 
would have warranted. To make this claim, this chapter uses a Propensity Score Matching Model to produce 
counterfactuals for the Eurozone crisis countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain) based on over 
200 past macroeconomic adjustment episodes between 1960-2010 worldwide. At its trough, between 2010 
and 2015 per capita GDP had contracted on average 11 percentage points more in the Eurozone periphery 
than in the standard counterfactual scenario. These results are not dictated by any specific country 
experience, are robust to a battery of alternative counterfactual definitions, and stand confirmed when using 
a parametric dynamic panel regression model to account more thoroughly for the business cycle. Zooming 
in on the potential causes, the lack of an independent monetary policy, while having contributed to a deeper 
recession, does not fully explain the Eurozone’s specificity, which is instead to be traced back to a sharper-
than-expected contraction in investment and fiscal austerity due to high funding costs. 
 
 
Keywords: macroeconomic adjustment, financial crisis, Eurozone, growth, propensity score matching 
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 “The incompleteness of the EMU has made the crisis more severe” 
Mario Draghi, ECB President – 7 September 2017 
I. Introduction 
  
The Eurozone (EZ) crisis meant for several countries sharp current and fiscal account corrections 
accompanied by rising unemployment and a prolonged recession. Most economists would agree that when 
among developed economies a country (Greece) loses in peace times over 20% of its GDP in less than a 
decade, or when over the same timespan the unemployment rate almost triples, as was the case in Spain, 
there had to be a clear macroeconomic policy failure. Where the consensus tends to splinter is on the nature 
of such failure, with opinions usually clustered around two prominent schools of thought. On the one hand, 
10 years of monetary union, combined with short-sighted political practices, led to the creation of 
unprecedented macroeconomic imbalances. As such, the argument goes, sharp recessions of the kind 
observed in some Eurozone countries were unavoidable (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012; Wickens 2016). 
On the other side are those arguing that, while surely imbalances were large, the crux lies in crisis 
management and that such a deep recession was due to an inappropriate crisis response (Baldwin et al. 
2015; Delong and Summers 2012; Krugman 2015; Martin and Philippon 2017) or more in general is to be 
imputed to an institutional setting that aggravates macroeconomic crises.  
These two worldviews carry important implications on how to reform the Eurozone. If the first view were 
true, the problem with the euro was that it allowed large imbalances to develop and therefore all that is 
needed is to prevent this from happening again, either through market mechanisms (credible no-bail-out 
rules) or institutional discipline (macro monitoring and sanctions). According to the second view, deeper 
changes to the Euro Area institutional settings would be necessary, along the lines of greater risk sharing.    
Motivated by these opposing views, this chapter investigates the relationship between macroeconomic 
imbalances, adjustment, and GDP per capita growth over a 5-year horizon. To do so, a novel quantitative 
framework is adopted to identify relevant comparators to the Eurozone crisis. More specifically, a non-
parametric Propensity Score Matching Model (PSM) is employed to produce counterfactuals for the 
Eurozone crisis countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain) based on over 200 past 
macroeconomic adjustment episodes between 1960 and 2010 worldwide.  
For each EZ crisis country, a counterfactual is built as a linear combination of past macroeconomic 
adjustment episodes (so-called “donors”) based on three basic requirements. Aside from displaying 
comparable pre-crisis characteristics such as investment growth, degree of trade openness, and GDP per 
capita, potential donors i) had on average similar pre-crisis imbalances such as high levels of public- and 
private- debt, and low growth, (ii) faced a negative growth shock, and, as a consequence, iii) experienced a 
comparable current account correction. This method is country-specific and as such provides the necessary 
leeway to adjust for the fact that the mix of imbalances at the origin of each EZ countries’ crisis was 
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somewhat different (Lane 2012; Shambaugh 2012). At the same time, however, it allows inspecting for 
common trends across EA crisis countries.  
This novel approach acts as a unified statistical framework aimed at identifying comparable adjustment 
episodes to the EZ crisis countries in a data-driven fashion. As such, it can be seen as a middle-ground 
between a quantitative cross-sectional analysis and a case study. Moreover, this method constitutes a hybrid 
between empirical studies focussed on understanding a particular factor that contributed to the EZ crisis 
(eg Jordà and Taylor 2015), and large-scale DSGE modelling aimed at mapping an overall picture of the 
forces at play (Martin and Philippon 2017). As the latter have recently come under heavy scrutiny 
(Blanchard 2016; Korinek 2015), this chapter can act as a useful empirical complement to these approaches.  
The main findings are as follows: at its trough, between 2010 and 2015 per capita GDP had contracted on 
average 11p.p. more in the Eurozone periphery than in the standard counterfactual scenario, and remains 
below counterfactual 5 years after the crisis began. Likewise, employment contracted on average 5p.p. more 
than pre-2010 imbalances and shocks can explain. In most specifications, 2012 and 2013 emerge as 
particularly negative years, especially as by that time the counterfactual usually had started progressively 
recovering.  
To make the claim that this is a generalised EZ problem, the chapter goes at length to show that the overly 
recessionary character of macroeconomic adjustment in the EZ is not dictated by any specific country 
experience. Most notably, estimates are clearly affected, but not dictated by the Greek crisis.  
These results are robust to alternative definitions of the counterfactual. In particular, alternative 
specifications construct counterfactuals based on a donor pool of past sudden stop episodes, as classified 
by Eichengreen et al (2006), or of systemic banking crises, as classified in the Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
database. The main findings remain unaltered, and reinforce the evidence suggesting that GDP 
performance in EZ crisis countries tracked that of past comparable episodes of macroeconomic crisis and 
adjustment up to 2010, but diverged substantially in the period 2011-2013. 
To attenuate the concerns that the effect identified in the baseline is methodology specific, two alternative 
estimation methods are considered. A non-parametric Synthetic Control Model, adapted from Marrazzo 
and Terzi (2017a), reaches similar conclusions. As this method corrects for time-variant uniform shocks, it 
reduces the standing of claims that we are now living in different times, characterised by slow productivity 
and secular stagnation, and that historical comparisons might therefore be biased.  
To dispel doubts relating to the fact that i) the PSM might not be correctly accounting for the rich dynamics 
of the GDP cycle, or ii) that there might be time-invariant unobservables that are dictating the results, a 
modified version of the parametric fixed effect dynamic panel regression model used by Acemouglu et al 
(2014) is employed as a robustness check. This model reinforces the idea that the pre-2007 boom cycle and 
the 2008/2009 crisis are not sufficient to explain the ensuing deep recession.   
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Having concluded that macroeconomic adjustment in the EZ was more recessionary than pre-crisis 
imbalances would have warranted, the chapter explores within the same framework whether this was due 
to the lack of national monetary policy as a stabilisation tool (Krugman 2012; Lane 2012). Building on the 
Exchange Rate Arrangement Database (Ilzetzki et al. 2017; Carmen M. Reinhart and Rogoff 2001), the 
chapter creates separate counterfactuals for the EZ crisis countries, distinguishing between comparable 
episodes of macroeconomic adjustment in a fixed- and flexible exchange rate.  
As expected, in all specifications considered, adjustment was comparatively less recessionary when carried 
out under flexible exchange rates. However, the EZ performed worse also than its fixed exchange rate 
counterfactual – albeit the gap being smaller than in the baseline case. The PSM model suggests that the 
lack of independent monetary policy contributes to explain just over 25% of the EZ recessionary bias. 
Complementary factors contributing to a deeper recession are to be found in a sharper and more prolonged 
contraction of investment than the relevant fixed exchange counterfactual, and larger fiscal austerity due to 
higher funding costs. Reading through the overall findings, there are reasons to believe that an incomplete 
Eurozone institutional setup contributed to aggravate the crisis through higher uncertainty, something I 
will return to in the conclusions. 
Literature 
 
This chapter relates to two broad strands in the literature. The first looks at the GDP impact of current 
account reversals (sometimes referred to as sudden-stop literature) as in Adalet and Eichengreen (2007), 
and more broadly at the origins and consequences of macroeconomic crises in a historical perspective (see 
for example Schularick and Taylor 2012). The second analyses specifically the EZ crisis, as for instance 
Pisani-Ferry (2014).  
In their seminal study, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) undertake the first comprehensive cross-country 
study of the origins and consequences of sharp current account corrections, and conclude that their impact 
on GDP growth can be highly heterogeneous depending on pre-crisis macroeconomic characteristics. A 
finding later confirmed by Edwards (2002) and Adalet and Eichengreen (2007). Edwards (2004) further 
argues that the negative effect of a current account correction on growth will be sharper when a country is 
under a fixed-, rather than flexible-, exchange rate regime. While these studies focussed mainly on low- and 
middle-income countries, Freund and Warnock (2007) show how current account reversals were associated 
with a slowdown in growth in advanced economies between 1980 and 2003. This finding was confirmed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) when looking specifically at the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its 
aftermath.  
More broadly, several papers have been using a historical perspective to compare current macroeconomic 
crises to past episodes that are deemed similar in nature (Almunia et al. 2010; Cecchetti et al. 2009; C M 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2014; Carmen M. Reinhart and Rogoff 2011) or looking for broader determinants and 
consequences of macroeconomic crises (see for example Eichengreen et al. 2006; Gupta et al. 2007; Carmen 
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M Reinhart and Reinhart 2010). Some have more specifically compared the Eurozone crisis to past crises. 
Cavallo et al (2014) calibrated a model based on the Latin American crises of the 1990s, to adapt it to the 
Eurozone experience. Latin America is taken as an analytical benchmark for the Eurozone also by 
Eichengreen et al (2014). These approaches complement, rather than clash with, the country-focussed 
studies that build on the idea that each country and crisis situation has its own peculiarities. In the end, as 
stressed by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012, p. 229): “crises in emerging and advanced economies have their origins in 
very similar underlying factors”. 
Several authors have focussed their attention on the Eurozone crisis specifically. Early contributions tended 
to be more conceptual (Lane 2012; Shambaugh 2012) or descriptive (Baldwin et al. 2015; Kang and 
Shambaugh 2013). Moreover, some papers took a country-specific approach: on Portugal (Reis 2015), 
Greece (P. Gourinchas et al. 2016; Carmen M. Reinhart and Trebesch 2015), Ireland (Lane 2011), Cyprus 
(Orphanides 2014), and Spain (Jimeno and Santos 2014). As sufficiently long data series have started to 
become available, recent contributions have been more empirical, largely building on DSGE modelling (P. 
Gourinchas et al. 2016; Martin and Philippon 2017).  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section II illustrates the methodology and data, 
Section III discusses the baseline results, while Section IV presents alternative specifications based on 
standard crisis classifications. Section V introduces two alternative estimation strategies to show that the 
results are not methodology-specific, while Section VI discusses some of the factors underlying the 
Eurozone’s recessionary bias. Section VII provides some concluding remarks.  
II. Methodology and data 
 
As discussed in Section I, it is common practice in the literature to benchmark a specific crisis episode with 
respect to past crises of a similar nature. For example, Gourinchas et al (2016, p. 3) perform a macro-
benchmarking exercise to conclude that “Greece’s drop in output was significantly more severe and protracted than 
during the average crisis”. The intuition behind this chapter is to go beyond comparisons to the mean, but 
rather optimise the selection of relevant comparisons based on a set of prominent features of the Eurozone 
crisis. As remarked by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), “The events of the past three years are not without precedent. 
However, those precedents are spread across countries and over time”. To choose the appropriate comparators, the 
chapter adapts a standard Propensity Score Matching Model, as introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), to a macro-setting. It therefore falls into the recent stream of work that extends the use of non-
parametric microeconometric matching techniques to answer macroeconomic questions (Abadie et al. 
2010; Billmeier and Nannicini 2013; Jordà and Taylor 2015).  
In line with the recent empirical literature on the topic (see for example P. Gourinchas et al. 2016), 2010 
will be considered as the beginning of the EZ crisis2, and matching will therefore be performed before this 
                                                          
2 This is just a working assumption, which is however corroborated in Section IV where different start dates are used, 
and once again 2010 is confirmed to be the beginning of a Eurozone specific negative trajectory.  
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date. Moreover, I will focus on the five countries that had to resort to an IMF/EU macroeconomic 
adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus), and therefore experienced first-hand 
the EZ crisis management, starting from a situation of large imbalances3.  
The identification strategy is then organised in two steps. As a first step, we want to identify the potential 
donors, or else macroeconomic adjustment episodes that could potentially serve as a comparator to the EZ 
crisis countries. To do this, a parsimonious rule-based method is adopted, based on the history of the EZ 
experience. More specifically, we will identify a potential donor episode starting at 𝑡 as respecting the 
following conditions:  
I. An adjustment episode is preceded by a negative growth shock at t-1, to mimic the 2009 
recession in the EZ; 
II. following that, only countries that saw an improvement in their current account can be 
considered4; 
III. the run up to macroeconomic adjustment was not characterised by hyperinflation, as this does 
not square with the EZ experience and as such does not provide a reasonable comparison. 
In practice, condition (1) requires GDP per capita (from here onwards “GDPpc”) growth to be -1% or 
lower at t-1. Formally,  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡−2
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡−2
< −1% [C1] 
Condition (2) will be implemented by imposing that the change in the current account (𝐶𝐴) balance during 
[t-2 , t+3] is positive5,  
𝐶𝐴𝑡+3 − 𝐶𝐴𝑡−2 > 0 [C2] 
 
Finally, condition (3) requires that only episodes where inflation (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙) at t-2 was less than 30% be selected6.  
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡−2 < 30% [C3] 
 
Tweaks around the definition of both (1) and (2) are tested in alternative specifications, as discussed in 
Section III and displayed in Appendix 4. Furthermore, I exclude extremely small countries (whose 
                                                          
3 While it is true that Spain had only a partial IMF programme, aimed at its banking sector, the country did experience 
a pronounced macroeconomic adjustment in the aftermath of a credit boom-and-bust cycle. Its inclusions seems 
therefore relevant. However, I will show that results do not depend on the inclusion of any specific EZ crisis country.  
4 This assumption helps to avoid the risk of interpolation bias, or else the idea that the PSM might end up selecting a 
country whose current account is deteriorating, together with one where it is improving, and the average might 
reproduce a EZ country. As such, it makes less likely the selection of extreme cases among the donors. 
5 The selection of this interval is dictated by the fact that for the EZ crisis countries, on average, it is the longest and 
largest period of monotonic current account correction.  
6 This can be considered a conservative estimate when compared to the literature, which usually defines hyperinflation 
as >40% (Giuliano et al. 2013) or >50% (Abiad and Mody 2005). 
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population is under 1 million) due to the high volatility of their GDP series. I also exclude other Eurozone 
countries, as we are precisely aiming at identifying the difference between macroeconomic adjustment 
within the euro and elsewhere.  
In the second step, I match potential donors, so episodes respecting the conditions above, to the five EZ 
crisis countries based on a set of macroeconomic covariates. These include the size of the current account 
correction, together with the degree of trade openness, average pre-crisis GDPpc growth, average pre-crisis 
investment growth, pre-crisis (log) GDPpc, together with pre-crisis levels of public debt- and credit-to-
GDP (see details and data sources in Appendix 1). 
As the matching takes place at the country-level, the PSM is country-specific and as such provides the 
necessary leeway to adjust for the fact that the mix of imbalances at the origin of each EZ countries’ crisis 
was somewhat different (Lane 2012; Shambaugh 2012). This two-step identification strategy will therefore 
generate counterfactuals for each of the five EZ crisis countries. Going beyond the specific country 
experiences, most of the chapter will however be devoted to inspecting for common trends across EA crisis 
countries. The outcome variable of interest is yearly GDP per capita growth (constant prices). Following 
the notation of Caliendo and Kopenig (2005), the Average Treatment on Treated effect (ATT), or, in our 
setting, the average GDPpc growth bias associated with experiencing a current account correction inside 
the Eurozone vis-à-vis those experienced in other potential donors, can be formalised as follows:  
𝜏𝐴𝑇𝑇,𝑡
𝑃𝑆𝑀 = 𝐸𝑡,𝑃(𝑿)|𝐸𝑍=1{𝐸[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡|𝐸𝑍 = 1, 𝑃(𝑿)] − 𝐸[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡|𝐸𝑍 = 0, 𝑃(𝑿)]}         [1] 
 
where 𝑃(𝑿)  is the Propensity Score,  𝑿 is a vector of macroeconomic characteristics, and 𝑡 is the time 
horizon over which we are interested in estimating the EZ crisis impact. Intuitively, the PSM estimator is 
simply the mean difference in GDPpc outcomes, weighted by the Propensity Score. To estimate the 
Propensity Score, a logit regression model is used while a nearest neighbour matching (with replacement) 
algorithm is employed to compute the PSM coefficients. In all estimation, the common support and overlap 
assumption was met, with standard levels of tolerance. The idea of having N-nearest neighbours (with N>1) 
is that while it is true that no crisis will be identical to another along multiple covariates, this is more likely 
to be the case for a linear combination of past crisis episodes7. 
The selection of the macro-covariates composing 𝑿 is based on the literatures to which this chapter relates. 
The sudden stop literature suggests that the GDP impact of a current account reversal is influenced by the 
degree of trade openness of an economy (Edwards 2004) and whether the deficit cumulated in the run up 
to the crisis was used to finance consumption or investment (Adalet and Eichengreen 2007). The Eurozone 
crisis literature instead discusses how the pre-crisis macroeconomic imbalances that developed in the EZ 
                                                          
7 Alternative estimations will show that our results remain robust to different choices of N. 
25 
 
relate in varying degree to a loss of competitiveness (hence low growth), private-, and public- debt (Lane 
2012; Martin and Philippon 2017; Shambaugh 2012)8. 
Crucially, the matching is not performed on ex-post variables, in particular policy variables like interest rate 
changes, import restrictions, or fiscal policy adjustments, as these are endogenous to the GDP process. 
Within our setting, they are also related to crisis management and the euro institutional set up. I do however 
match on the size of the current account adjustment between t-2 and t+3. The reasoning behind it is that, 
in a way, changes in the current account are the broadest minimum common denominator metric that can 
be used to identify a macroeconomic adjustment episode, without however imposing requirement on 
policies adopted.    
III. The EZ adjustment in perspective 
 
This Section will show how the methodology outlined in Section II works in practice, in a simplified 
setting. A discussion of the full set of main results then follows.   
A simple PSM application 
 
Before illustrating the main results, it is worth taking a moment to explore how the methodology works in 
practice. To do so, I ran a simplified version of the PSM discussed in Section II, estimating the results using 
only one nearest neighbour, and for only one EZ crisis country: Cyprus. Intuitively, out of 330 past (or 
contemporaneous) episodes that respect [C1]-[C3], the PSM identifies the macroeconomic adjustment 
episode that mostly resembles the pre-2010 macroeconomic situation of Cyprus, and the current account 
correction that ensued. Iceland (t0=2010) is identified as the most sensible counterfactual. The quality of 
the fit can be seen in Table 1, along the seven covariate dimensions considered (Columns 1 and 2).  
                                                          
8 Even though not identified as individually crucial by the sudden stop literature, there could be reasons to include 
inflation as a covariate, as a complement to Condition (3). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this hardly affects our donor 
selection and main results as discussed in Section III.  
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Table 1. Matching table for Cyprus based on one (ISL) and two (N2) nearest neighbour 
counterfactual 
 
The quality of the covariate match is far from perfect. Iceland experienced a sharper current account 
correction than Cyprus, and had higher levels of debt-to GDP in 2007. It was however less open to trade, 
and had used its current account deficit to finance consumption rather than investment. Both countries 
experienced relatively low growth in the run up to the crisis, and both had a comparatively high level of 
credit-to-GDP, above 160, in 2007.  
That there be divergences is inevitable as no single crisis episode will be identical to another across seven 
macroeconomic dimensions. In the baseline, I therefore use multiple donors (N>1). When setting N=2, 
the PSM selects the two best episodes that combined mostly resemble Cyprus’ experience: Iceland 2010 
and Japan during the Asian Crisis. Column 3 (Table 2) shows how increasing N to 2, rather than using one 
single donor, improves the covariate match along all dimensions (but public debt and trade openness), in 
some cases significantly, as for the current account adjustment or private debt, which is now much more 
comparable to that experienced by Cyprus. 
Figure 1 shows how the GDPpc performance of Iceland and Cyprus differed. As the crisis hit in 2009, both 
countries went into recession. Iceland experienced a deeper GDPpc fall, but by 2011, it was back to growth. 
As Cyprus saw a protracted GDP contraction up to 2013, the gap between the two widened, stabilising 
from 2014 onward. Prima facie, it looks like being in a monetary union initially helped Cyprus buffer the 
shock of the crisis, but ended up amplifying and protracting the recession down the road. This finding is in 
line with the literature (Baldwin et al. 2015). Figure 1 also shows how the counterfactual based on N=2 
tracks almost perfectly the evolution of Cyprus’ GDPpc before 2010. Thereafter, the former had a V-
shaped recovery, while the latter went into a prolonged recession.  This pattern will be confirmed when 
deploying the PSM to cover all EZ crisis countries, something we now turn to. 
covariates CYP ISL N2
C/A adjustment 10.21 29.57 15.03
Public debt-to-GDP 61.30 90.60 111.25
Openness 112.95 84.67 52.36
Pre-crisis investment growth 0.15 -3.08 -1.71
Pre-crisis GDP growth 0.91 1.49 1.26
Log GDPpc 10.34 10.64 10.63
Credit to GDP 236.21 165.56 193.42
Note: Obs=330. Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment 
model, and 1 nearest neighbours (ISL) or 2 nearest neighbours (N2). Matching performed on 
average GDPpc growth during [t-5,t-1], debt to GDP at t-2,size of current account adjustment 
during [t-2,t+3], log GDPpc at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], degree of 
openness to trade at t-2, and credit to GDP at t-2. 
27 
 
Figure 1. Per capita GDP for Cyprus based on one (ISL) and two (M2) nearest neighbour 
counterfactual, index (2007=100) 
 
IV. Main results 
 
In this Section, the main results based on the PSM estimator are illustrated. As argued by Stuart and Rubin 
(2008), before analysing matching results, when using a PSM the key diagnostic to check is covariate 
balance. Table 2 displays average covariate values for the EZ periphery and counterfactual. Columns (1)-
(6) shows average values across the seven covariates for the six main specifications considered in this 
Section. P-values for a standard t-test comparing means is displayed in parentheses. In all instances, 
statistical testing fails to reject that the macroeconomic characteristics of the control differ from those of 
the EZ.  
Table 2. Summary statistics for matching process 
 
Covariates EZ EZ excl GR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C/A adjustment 11.8 11.6 16.5 9.4 9.3 11.7 9.6 14.0
[0.335] [0.655] [0.662] [0.977] [0.476] [0.588]
Public debt-to-GDP 91.3 77.1 85.1 95.5 92.0 66.7 107.2 102.7
[0.907] [0.937] [0.976] [0.579] [0.592] [0.855]
Pre-crisis GDP growth 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.6
[0.880] [0.986] [0.648] [0.809] [0.942] [0.817]
Openness 91.9 100.1 69.5 77.4 68.2 92.1 91.1 72.5
[0.373] [0.587] [0.519] [0.889] [0.988] [0.442]
Pre-crisis investment growth -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.9
[0.702] [0.973] [0.772] [0.681] [0.966] [0.926]
Log GDPpc 10.3 10.4 9.9 10.5 10.3 10.3 10.0
[0.430] [0.747] [0.960] [0.933] [0.572]
Credit to GDP 161.5 159.1
[0.951]
Obs 272 334 293 267 161 272
p-value of χ2 0.914 0.917 0.938 0.991 0.966 0.969
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes
Note : Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model. See Table 3 for details on the individual specifications. χ2 tests the joint significance of 
all regressors. p-values testing significant difference with the EZ in parentheses. 
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Aside from the t- and F- tests, a visual inspection of the average values across matching covariates suggests 
that for all specifications considered, the match is reasonably good. In this respect, Model (3), which is a 
specification excluding Greece, should be compared to the “EZ excl GR” column.  
Table 3 displays the standard PSM estimated coefficients over the time interval [t-2, t+5], which for the EZ 
implies [2008, 2015]. I note that in all specifications, there are no significant differences in growth before 
2010, complementing the information in Table 2 and suggesting a good crisis match9. This is particularly 
relevant for our purposes, as 2008 and 2009 were the GFC years. This therefore suggests that our 
counterfactual faced a similar shock as our EZ crisis countries before 2010. Model 1 is the baseline and 
contains all the macro-covariates discussed in Section II, with the exception of credit-to-GDP10. As we can 
see, 2011-2013 is when the EZ crisis countries underperformed significantly vis-à-vis other comparable 
crisis episodes. By 2015, growth had picked up at a faster pace than in the counterfactual, suggesting a 
potential reverse to the mean effect. However, this positive effect is hardly consistent across specifications, 
so its relevance should not be overplayed.  
                                                          
9 This is not dependent on the inclusion of a co-variate controlling for 5-year average GDP growth. Excluding it leaves 
sign, size, and significance of all coefficients largely unaltered (results available upon request).  
10 In an alternative specification, inflation was also included as a covariate. The inflation difference between the EZ 
periphery and the counterfactual was 1.1% and highly insignificant (p=0.776). The estimated coefficients in Table 3 
and their significance remain practically identical.  
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Table 3. Matching model coefficients  
 
The implied cumulative Eurozone recessionary bias is roughly 11.5 p.p., and this estimate is broadly 
consistent across specifications. Figure 2 graphically illustrates the divergence between the EZ and its PSM 
counterfactual. Five years after the crisis began, EZ crisis countries were still below counterfactual. 
Conversely from standard parametric estimations, the PSM guarantees maximum transparency in the 
construction of the counterfactual, as argued by (Nielsen 2016), and discussed in Appendix 2. Crisis 
episodes identified by the PSM as jointly composing a good counterfactual for the EZ crisis countries based 
on macro-covariates include: Denmark, Switzerland, Latvia, and the US in synchronous with the EZ crisis. 
These are combined with past episodes as the Finnish banking crisis of the 1990s, the twin crisis of 1993 
in Nicaragua, the Swiss recession of the early 1990s due to the strong Franc, and the low oil price shock in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis that forced macroeconomic adjustment in Libya and Saudi Arabia. Some 
of these crisis episodes, particularly the ones involving emerging markets, will surely make some eyebrows 
rise. In the words of Reinhart and Rogoff (2014, p. 54):  “Even after one of the most severe multi-year crises on record 
in the advanced economies, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that high-income countries are completely 
different from their emerging-market counterparts”. The reasoning behind the approach of this chapter is indeed 
that, with due caution, useful information can be sifted out of past crisis episodes, especially those that took 
EZ vs counterfactual at:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t-2 0.40 -0.61 -0.78 0.39 0.06 0.47
(0.458) (0.057) (0.150) (0.476) (0.965) (0.495)
t-1 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.55 0.18 0.08
(0.328) (0.384) (0.219) (0.287) (0.765) (0.873)
t=2010 0.39 -1.05 -1.04 0.50 0.51 -0.41
(0.527) (0.470) (0.374) (0.457) (0.082) (0.556)
t+1 -2.55 -4.91 -4.92 -2.49 -3.34 -2.56
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t+2 -4.49 -5.27 -5.23 -4.48 -4.85 -4.45
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t+3 -4.02 -3.13 -3.05 -4.03 -4.56 -4.89
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
t+4 -0.88 -0.47 -0.71 -0.88 -0.69 -1.11
(0.131) (0.136) (0.118) (0.133) (0.629) (0.149)
t+5 1.23 0.03 0.74 1.25 0.54 1.60
(0.004) (0.976) (0.302) (0.006) (0.667) (0.001)
Cumulative impact by t+4 -11.4 -13.1 -13.3 -11.4 -12.8 -12.4
Obs 272 334 292 267 161 272
N of matches 3 3 3 3 3 2
Include small countries No Yes Yes No No No
Exclude GR No No No Yes No No
Exclude LDC No No No No Yes No
Control for openness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for investment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for GDPpc Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Control for credit No Yes No No No No
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model, and N nearest neighbours. Matching performed on average GDPpc 
growth during [t-5,t-1], debt to GDP at t-2,size of current account adjustment during [t-2,t+3], log GDPpc at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], 
and degree of openness to trade at t-2, unless otherwise specified. Cumulative impact by t+4 is the implied aggregate impact of coefficients between t+1 and 
t+4 in percentage points. p-values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
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place in less-advanced economies. Once a battery of macroeconomic covariates have been optimised, 
differences between advanced and emerging markets crises over a business cycle should not be 
overplayed11. 
Figure 2. Eurozone periphery per capita GDP divergence from counterfactual, index 
 
Model 2 extends the baseline scenario by including credit-to-GDP among the covariates, in line with the 
conclusions of Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) that stress the importance of this variable in the run up to 
a financial crisis in general, and of Baldwin et al (2015) in the EZ crisis in particular. Model 2 is not the 
preferred specification because the large size of the financial sector in some of the EZ crisis countries forces 
us to lift the “small country” restriction, in order to generate a reasonable covariate balance. In particular, 
this is possible thanks to the inclusion in the donor pool of Iceland, which as we saw in the simple 
application of the PSM, serves as a good comparator to the EZ in many respects. I note that sign, size, and 
significance of the key coefficients in the baseline stand confirm and, at most, there are reasons to believe 
that estimates in Model 1 are to be treated as conservative.  
Some authors have argued that the crisis of the Eurozone periphery was to be considered a crisis of external 
debt, more than of sovereign debt in general (Gros 2013; Sinn 2014). Others have shown how the size of 
external indebtedness crucially predicts crisis likelihood and the depth of the subsequent economic 
downturn, both in general (Calvo et al. 2008; Frankel and Saravelos 2012; C. Reinhart and Calvo 2000; 
Carmen M. Reinhart and Rogoff 2011), and for Greece in particular (Carmen M. Reinhart and Trebesch 
2015). Building on data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), I re-ran the standard PSM model including 
the level of external (public and private) debt (in percentage of GDP) at t-2 as a covariate, in place of our 
                                                          
11 For the reader that remains sceptical at this point, I note that successive model specifications in this Section generate 
counterfactuals largely based on advanced economies, as illustrated in Appendix 2. Emerging markets crisis episodes 
take less than 15% weight in the counterfactual to Model 2 and less than 7% in Model 3.  
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generic debt metrics. Results are very similar to those obtained in Model (2), with an implied cumulative 
Eurozone recessionary bias of 12.6p.p., consistent with all our specifications12. 
To show that the main results are not dictated by some peculiar features or classifications of GDPpc, I 
replicated Model (1) and (2) using Employment growth (p.p.) as an outcome variable. Appendix 3 shows 
how the main findings remain unaltered. No statistical difference can be detected during the GFC. 
However, already in 2010 the EZ crisis countries saw a larger contraction in employment than in the 
counterfactuals. 2011-2013 are confirmed to be the most recessionary years, while the employment situation 
stabilises in 2014: the last year for which data was available at global level. Between 2011 and 2014, on 
average employment contracted 5.4p.p. more in the Eurozone periphery than in the standard counterfactual 
scenario. 
Our donor pool selection method is designed to identify episodes that replicate as close as possible the 
macroeconomic situation with which EZ crises countries entered the GFC. As remarked by Baldwin et al 
(2015, p. 2): “All the nations stricken by the [EZ] Crisis were running current account deficits”. We might therefore 
want to impose explicitly this further condition on all potential donors. Model 3 replicates the baseline, 
adding the requirement that the current account balance was negative at t-2. To allow for sufficient degrees 
of freedom, as in Model 2, this specification lifts the “small country” requirement. Results remain broadly 
unchanged. 
In Model 4 I replicated the baseline specification, but excluding Greece to show how results are affected, 
but not dictated by the Greek experience. Appendix 4 extends this Leave-one-out cross-validation, 
excluding one by one each individual crisis country, to convince the reader that the recessionary bias is a 
wider EZ phenomenon and not just a country-specific effect. Towards the same objective, Appendix 5 
shows the country-specific PSM simulations, to illustrate visually how the 2011-2013 Eurozone recessionary 
bias affected all crisis countries vis-à-vis their counterfactual. 
Model 5 is particularly interesting, as it aims to capitalise further on the comparison with past (also non-
advanced) crisis experiences. Instead of minimising the (log) GDPpc distance as in the baseline, this 
specification lifts that restriction. At the same time, Least Developed Countries (UN definitions) are 
excluded from the sample. Interestingly, the counterfactual now includes renowned macroeconomic 
adjustment episodes like the Argentinian crisis of 2001, Bulgaria’s post-communist recession, or Russia’s 
1998 crisis. Individual estimates are slightly more negative than in the baseline, but confirming the general 
direction of results.  
Finally, Model 6 shows how baseline estimates are robust to a reduction of the nearest neighbour to 2. 
Table 1 (column 6) above shows how the quality of the match does not deteriorate substantially.  
                                                          
12 The significant recessionary years for the EZ periphery are confirmed to be 2011 (β=-4.60, p=0.008), 2012 (β=-
5.18, p=0.000), and 2013 (β=-3.50, p=0.000).  
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Appendix 4 features some further alternative specifications, largely aimed at reducing the risk of an 
interpolation bias on key covariates. In particular, it shows how defining the donor pool in a different 
fashion, by imposing a deeper recession at t-1, or a sharper current account adjustment of at least 3 p.p. (in 
line with Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1998), does not substantially alter the baseline results. 
V. Alternative donor pools 
The previous Section used a rule-based methodology to identify past macroeconomic adjustment episodes 
and create a potential donor pool. However, given the novelty of this method, the sceptical reader might 
suspect that crisis episodes, and particularly their inception year, might have been erroneously classified. As 
a robustness check, in this Section I will discuss alternative donor pools based on off-the-shelf crisis 
classifications and episodes.   
Sudden stop specification 
 
In the baseline, the 2009 financial crisis was effectively treated as a negative growth shock, when matching 
it to past episodes of macroeconomic adjustment. A reasonable argument could however be made that 
2009 was not a simple macroeconomic shock for the EZ but rather that it marked the beginning of a sudden 
stop in financial flows (Accominotti and Eichengreen 2016; Baldwin et al. 2015). As a further metric of 
comparable past crisis episodes, in this Section I build on the Eichengreen et al (2006) database of sudden 
stops to identify a sensible donor pool, before performing the standard matching exercise on macro 
imbalances13 (see Appendix 6). In line with Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), I impose a current account 
correction of at least 3p.p., to focus on the largest sudden stop episodes14. For this specification, we set 
t=2009: the time at which the literature identifies the beginning of the euro sudden stop. 
Appendix 7 contains the covariate matching table for this Section. First, it should be noted that to the 
extent that the donor pool produces broadly comparable Propensity Scores with those of the EZ crisis 
countries, and therefore allows a reasonable replication of covariates, the PSM works also in small-n 
settings. Second, the table contains also the simple average of the sudden stop donor pool. This allows 
visualising the benefits of the key intuition behind this paper, i.e. moving beyond historical comparisons to 
the mean, in a transparent and data-driven fashion. For example, we can see that the average current account 
adjustment among sudden stops was around 7p.p., against a EZ crisis country average of 11.8p.p. Based 
on their distribution, a standard t-test rejects that the two might be equal at the 5% level. By selecting 
appropriate counterfactuals within the sudden stop pool, the PSM allows shrinking that distance to less 
than 2 percentage points. Likewise with pre-crisis public debt levels, which were on average 49.7% in the 
donor pool, and improve to 67.4% in the PSM counterfactual, bringing them closer to the 78.1% average 
of the EZ periphery.  
                                                          
13 Due to a smaller sample, this Section replicates Model 5 from Table 3, therefore excluding GDP per capita level 
from the covariates. 
14 The direction of results (available upon request) when this restriction is lifted does not vary substantially.  
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Figure 3 (LHS) shows how striking the overlap between GDP performance of comparable sudden stops 
and that of EZ crisis countries is between 2007 and 2010. More in detail, Table 4 (Panel A) displays the 
estimated PSM coefficients. Due to the small sample size, public- (Model 1) and private- (Model 2) debt 
levels are estimated separately and produce however comparable results. In both instances, the 2008-2009 
recession and the 2010 recovery are in line with historical episodes. Once again, 2011-2013 display strongly 
negative and significant coefficients and, if at all, would suggest our baseline estimates are conservative.   
Table 4. Matching model coefficients based on sudden stop (Panel A) and systemic banking 
crisis (Panel B) counterfactuals 
 
Banking crisis specification 
 
Like in the sudden stop specification, the argument could be made that the EZ faced a systemic banking 
crisis during the GFC and that this is not entirely captured by considering 2009 as just a negative growth 
shock. To this purpose, I built an alternative donor pool using the set of countries experiencing a systemic 
EZ vs counterfactual at:
(1) (2) (1) (2)
t-2 0.29 0.24
(0.742) (0.811)
t-2 0.24 -0.51 t-1 -1.34 -0.93
(0.866) (0.763) (0.084) (0.375)
t-1 -1.03 -2.75 t=2008 -1.56 -1.38
(0.497) (0.277) (0.363) (0.296)
t=2009 0.83 0.99 t+1 0.95 1.02
(0.616) (0.415) (0.398) (0.170)
t+1 -1.09 -0.67 t+2 -0.88 -1.41
(0.590) (0.758) (0.479) (0.336)
t+2 -8.21 -7.95 t+3 -5.44 -6.12
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
t+3 -5.98 -5.57 t+4 -5.30 -5.73
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
t+4 -4.29 -3.87 t+5 -4.35 -4.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.021)
t+5 -1.21 0.31 t+6 -1.30 -0.28
(0.116) (0.904) (0.504) (0.866)
t+6 -0.74 0.26 t+7 1.29 1.73
(0.539) (0.901) (0.428) (0.000)
Cumulative impact -18.4 -16.2 -15.5 -15.3
Obs 17 17 24 21
Include Small No Yes Yes Yes
Control for credit No Yes No Yes
Control for pre-crisis growth Yes No Yes Yes
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes
Panel A: Sudden stops Panel B: Systemic Banking crises
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model, and 3 nearest neighbours. Matching performed on 
average GDPpc growth during [t-5,t-1], debt to GDP at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], degree of openness to trade at t-1, and 
size of current account adjustment during [t-1,t+4] in Panel A and [t,t+5] in Panel B. Cumulative impact is the implied aggregate impact of 
coefficients between t+2 and t+5 in Panel A, and t+3 and t+6 in Panel B, in percentage points. All specifications exclude LDCs and require a 
current account correction of at least 3 percentage points. p-values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold. See text 
for further details
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banking crisis, as identified by Laeven and Valencia (2012). Following the classification of Laeven and 
Valencia (2012), the beginning of the systemic banking crisis for the EZ countries is set at t=2008. Given 
the inclusion of Iceland’s experience seems relevant in this setting, the small-country restriction was lifted 
(see Appendix 6). Model 1 and 2 (Table 4, Panel B) mirror those of the sudden stop specification. Figure 3 
(RHS) once again visually shows how there were no significant differences in GDP performance during the 
banking crisis and the 2010 recovery. Instead, coefficients for the period 2011-2013 are negative and 
significant. Cumulative effects, computed in a comparable way to the baseline, are very aligned with our 
main estimation results.  
Figure 3. Eurozone periphery per capita GDP divergence from counterfactual based on sudden 
stops (LHS) and banking crises (RHS), index 
 
Both the sudden stop- and the systemic banking crisis specification reinforce the idea that countries 
experiencing a comparable macroeconomic shock, being characterised by large macroeconomic imbalances 
(public or private debt, slow growth), and subsequently engaging in comparably steep current account 
corrections, experienced a better GDP performance than the EZ crisis countries. As such, arguing that 
large macroeconomic imbalances needed correction, or that there was a large banking crisis in 2008 
accompanied by a sudden stop in 2009, is not sufficient to justify the meagre GDP performance that EZ 
crisis countries experienced post-2010.  
 
VI. Alternative estimation strategies 
 
All results presented up to here relied on the PSM estimator. Given the novelty of this approach in a 
historical macroeconomic crisis analysis, in this Section, I show how different estimation strategies confirm 
the results of the PSM. In particular, I will consider an alternative non-parametric (Synthetic Control Model) 
method and a parametric method (dynamic fixed effect panel regression).  
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Synthetic Control Method 
 
In this Section, I adapt the Synthetic Control Model (SCM) discussed in Marrazzo and Terzi (2017a) to 
produce an alternative counterfactual for the EZ crisis countries. In a nutshell, the SCM is calibrated over 
the period 2000-2009 to produce a synthetic control for each EZ crisis country as a linear combination of 
countries displaying a similar GDPpc performance and macroeconomic characteristics. More formally, the 
SCM estimates the EZ growth bias 𝛼𝑖𝑡 at a specific time 𝑡 > 2009 as: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑍 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙         [2] 
based on 
min
𝒘
{𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑍 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙}        [3] 
for 𝑡 < 2010 
and 
min
𝒘
{𝒁𝑖
𝐸𝑍 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒁𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙}         [4] 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝑍 and 𝒁𝑖
𝐸𝑍 are GDPpc at time 𝑡 and a vector of covariates of the EZ crisis country of interest 𝑖, 
respectively. 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙   and 𝒁𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 are instead a vector of GDPpc at time 𝑡 and a matrix of covariates of 
the 𝐽 countries belonging to the donor pool for the country 𝑖15. Borrowing from standard uses of the SCM 
in a macro-context, covariates include investment (% of GDP), trade openness, and industry (% of GDP). 
To make it relevant for our uses and comparable to the baseline, we also control for the size of the current 
account, public-, and private- debt levels.  
A benefit of the SCM vis-à-vis the PSM, is that its long calibration period makes it less prone to 
unobservable confounders, as proved by Abadie et al (2010). An important downside is however that it 
does not allow for standard statistical inference16.  
This specification should also put to rest concerns that the recovery from the global financial crisis has 
been slower than normal (Lo & Rogoff 2014), even compared to other financial crises, that we are now in 
a secular stagnation environment (Cecchetti et al. 2009), and that as such historical comparisons might 
generate distorted estimates. This is because the SCM creates the donor pool in synchronous to the EZ 
crisis and therefore accounts for uniform time-variant shocks.  
Figure 4 displays GDPpc for the real and synthetic EZ crisis countries, over the 10-year fitting period, and 
up to 2015. Importantly, the synthetic accurately tracks on average GDPpc of the EZ countries of interest 
                                                          
15 For further details on how the SCM was implemented in practice, see Marrazzo and Terzi (2017a). For further 
details on the econometric theory underlying this approach, see Abadie et al (2010). 
16 While Marrazzo and Terzi (2017a) propose a way to overcome this problem, that solution cannot be applied 
reasonably with only five crisis (treated) countries, as is the case in this paper.  
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also during the 2008-2009 crisis (for individual country calibrations, see Appendix 8). Starting in 2010, 
countries with similar macroeconomic characteristics and facing a comparable shock during the GFC 
returned to growth, while the EZ crisis countries continued to experience negative GDPpc outcomes until 
2013. This picture is strikingly aligned with the simple approach using the PSM and showing how Iceland 
(as a donor) experienced a V-shaped crisis, while Cyprus (as a EZ crisis country) had a U-shaped recession.   
Figure 4. GDP per capita for real and synthetic Eurozone countries, index 
 
Table 5 displays the growth gap vis-à-vis counterfactual resulting from the SCM simulation individually for 
the five crisis countries. Over the period 2011-2012, all crisis countries underperformed their synthetic 
control. Ireland was the only one to be performing better already in 2013. By 2015, all were growing at a 
faster pace than counterfactual, with the exception of Greece. Crucially, the last two columns show 
aggregate estimates for all EZ crisis countries in the SCM and PSM framework. Not only are yearly estimates 
broadly comparable, but the imputed cumulative GDPpc loss vis-à-vis counterfactual is strikingly similar 
(14.7p.p. in the SCM, and 14.2p.p. in the PSM)17.  
                                                          
17 The difference vis-à-vis cumulative estimates presented before is due to the different time horizon of computation. 
See Notes to Table 3 and Table 5 for further details.  
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Table 5. Growth gap between EZ crisis countries and control 
 
Parametric estimation 
 
The previous sections constructed country counterfactuals based on a variety of adapted microeconometric 
techniques. While the selection of the donor pool in these methods was intended to correct for the cycle, 
some readers might remain suspicious that the rich dynamics of GDP were not fully accounted for. I 
therefore resort to a dynamic panel regression model, as introduced by Acemoglu et al (2014), as a 
robustness check. Formally, the model with 𝑝 lags can be expressed as follows:   
 
𝑦𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡+𝑘𝐸𝑍𝑡+𝑘,𝑐𝑡
5
𝑘=−2
 +  ∑𝛾𝑗𝑦𝑐𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 [5] 
 
where 𝑦𝑐𝑡 is the log of real GDP per capita in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡. 𝐸𝑍𝑡+𝑘,𝑐𝑡 is a dummy that takes value 1 
if 𝑐 is a EZ crisis country at time 𝑡 = 2010, and zero otherwise. ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑦𝑐𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1  represents a set of 𝑝 lags of 
log GDP per capita, to control for the dynamics of GDP, whereas 𝛼𝑐 and 𝛿𝑡 are respectively a full set of 
country- and time- fixed effects and 𝜀𝑐𝑡 is an error term.  
All specifications include a full set of time and country fixed effects, and inference is based on clustered 
and robust standard errors. Table 6 reports the 𝛽𝑡+𝑘 estimated coefficients, which are our main parameter 
of interest. Specifications include 2 and 4 lags. Appendix 9 discusses why these seem the most appropriate 
time horizons, and shows how adding further lags does not improve the estimation power of the model. 
All reported coefficients in Table 6 are transformed, so that they can be interpreted as p.p. of GDPpc 
growth, therefore ensuring comparability with previous sections.  
Column 1 shows the divergence of the EZ crisis countries from a “standard” economic cycle over the 
period 2008-2015 with 2 GDP lags. Coefficients before 2010 are not significant. Intuitively, what this 
SCM PSM
Divergence from counterfactual at: GRC CYP IRL ESP PRT EZ EZ
2010 -6.4 -3.9 2.2 -3.3 -0.1 -2.3 -1.0
2011 -10.4 -3.9 -2.1 -2.7 -4.3 -4.7 -4.9
2012 -6.9 -5.5 -1.6 -4.4 -4.8 -4.7 -5.3
2013 -3.5 -7.5 1.8 -3.5 -2.7 -3.1 -3.1
2014 -0.7 -2.6 8.2 0.0 -0.3 0.9 -0.5
2015 -1.0 1.6 7.8 1.8 0.9 2.2 0.0
trough -25.6 -21.8 -3.7 -15.1 -14.5 -14.7 -14.2
SCM
Note: SCM estimates of country divergence from counterfactual, and comparison between SCM and PSM estimates for the EZ crisis 
countries. For PSM, Model 2 from Section III including all covariates was used, to ensure comparability. Trough indicates the 
maximum cumulative gap between real and control over the period [2010-2015]. 
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implies is that once you net out the countries (time-invariant) characteristics, their boom-and-bust cycle, 
and global growth trends, the 2008/2009 crisis was not different in the EZ crisis countries than elsewhere.  
This can be seen particularly in Column 4, which displays (non-significant) coefficients for an extended pre-
2010 horizon. Instead, after 2010, the EZ crisis countries underperformed disproportionately. This remains 
true when 4 lags are employed (Column 2), and also when Greece is excluded (Column 3), albeit with 
smaller coefficients, significant at a 10% level. In line with the other models, 2012 and 2013 emerge as 
particularly negative years. On the other hand, conversely from the baseline, this specification taking into 
account the rich dynamics of GDP suggests, on average, that the recession of 2011 could (just about) still 
be seen as cyclical, especially when Greece is excluded.  
Table 6. Dynamic panel regression model coefficients 
 
year (1) (2) (3) (4)
2006 3.29
(0.204)
2007 2.04
(0.395)
2008 -0.44 -0.64 -0.35 -0.50
(0.815) (0.724) (0.862) (0.796)
2009 -0.70 -0.92 -0.48 -0.78
(0.723) (0.631) (0.826) (0.702)
2010 -2.04 -2.19 -0.57 -2.05
(0.440) (0.401) (0.826) (0.450)
2011 -4.36 -4.60 -2.30 -4.47
(0.145) (0.120) (0.356) (0.144)
2012 -6.81 -7.08 -5.16 -6.95
(0.014) (0.010) (0.042) (0.015)
2013 -6.56 -6.89 -5.35 -6.76
(0.027) (0.021) (0.088) (0.028)
2014 -3.65 -4.01 -2.23 -3.88
(0.306) (0.261) (0.562) (0.288)
2015 -2.12 -2.44 -0.16 -2.31
(0.569) (0.512) (0.967) (0.544)
-21.38 -22.58 -15.04 -22.05
[0.063] [0.049] [0.187] [0.062]
2 4 4 4
[0.011] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
No No Yes Yes
6045 5940 5888 5940
176 176 175 176
0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
Countries in sample
R-squared
Dynamic panel regression specification
Note: This table is based on a fixed effect dynamic panel regression model with p lags. Reported coefficients are 
transformed to growth p.p., to ensure comparability with other specifications. P-values based on robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All specifications include country and time fixed effects. Cumulative impact by t+4 is the implied aggregate 
impact of coefficients between t+1 and t+4 in percentage points, and the p-value of this being different from 0. I report the p-
value based on the inverse normal statistic of a Dickey-Fuller test of unit root. Bold indicates significance at the 5% level. 
See text for further details
Cumulative impact by t+4
p-value
GDP lags
Augmented Dickey-Fuller p-value
Exclude GR
Observations
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Moreover, estimates of the cumulative impact of the crisis are broadly in line with both PSM and SCM 
specifications, placing the loss due to the EZ crisis vis-à-vis counterfactual between 15 and 20 p.p. of GDP 
by 201418. Figure 5 visually displays how parametric estimates are strikingly aligned with those of the PSM19. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated EZ growth bias: panel regression estimates and PSM (baseline) 
 
Several takeaways emerge from this specification. First, we rest reassured that results are not dictated by 
the non-parametric methodologies used in the previous sections. This seems particularly relevant, given 
their novel use within a historical crisis comparison setting. Second, the sharp recession that characterised 
the EZ crisis countries from 2010 onwards cannot entirely be imputed neither to a disproportionately large 
GDPpc boom that preceded the crisis, nor to the 2008/2009 crisis itself. This corroborates the findings of 
the SCM specification and its 10-year model fitting time horizon. Third, we note that once the GDP cycle 
is more fully accounted for, together with global growth trends, the recovery observed in the tail end of our 
time-interval of interest in some of our previous specifications seems less extraordinary. As such, our 
baseline estimates should be treated, at most, as conservative.  
VII. Factors behind the deeper recession 
 
The chapter has gone at length to show how the recession that characterised the EZ crisis countries from 
2010 onwards was deeper than macro imbalances alone would have warranted. The logical ensuing question 
would be why. When trying to disentangle the relative importance of factors that led to a specific outcome 
in a macroeconomic setting, structural modelling is without doubt the most appropriate approach. As such, 
testing the impact of individual policy decisions (e.g. imposing a haircut on private sector creditors in 
Cyprus) or lack of action (e.g. procrastinating debt restructuring in Greece) is unfortunately beyond the 
                                                          
18 The cumulative impact by t+4 estimated for Model 3 is not significant at standard levels of confidence. This seems 
to be due to the different time profiling of the (slow recovery in the) Greek crisis. However, the cumulative impact at 
t+3 is still comparable (12.81 p.p.) and significant [p=0.098].  
19 PSM estimates extracted from Model (2), including all macro-covariates 
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scope of this paper. However, in this Section I will stretch the logic and methodology used hitherto to 
explore in detail one specific overarching argument, namely that the deeper recession was to be imputed to 
the lack of a national monetary policy as a stabilisation tool (Krugman 2012; Lane 2012). To this purpose, 
I exploit the Exchange Rate Arrangement (ERA) Database (Ilzetzki et al. 2017; Carmen M. Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2001) to build separate counterfactuals of macro adjustments, composed of fixed- and flexible- 
ERAs20. The standard matching methodology presented in Section II is then applied.  
At this point, a specific caveat should be mentioned. It must be noted that this slicing exercise is particularly 
demanding on our data, not least because as shown by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) large external corrections 
without nominal devaluations are quite rare. As a result, the donor pool under the fixed ERA is significantly 
downsized. While this does not severely affect the quality of the matching process (as illustrated in 
Appendix 10), results should nonetheless be treated with a degree of caution. With this caveat in mind, the 
main results are displayed in Table 7.  
Model (1) and (2) reproduce previously introduced specifications but restricting the donor pool to fixed 
ERAs. These models control for public debt, together with the other standard covariates, while Model (3) 
controls for the size of private debt. Controlling for both simultaneously, while desirable, was not possible 
within standard tolerance limits of the PSM. Models (4)-(6) mirror the specifications of Model (1)-(3), but 
in a flexible ERA counterfactual.  
                                                          
20 In line with the coarse classification adopted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2001), fixed ERA countries are defined as 
those having no separate legal tender, a pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, a pre-announced 
horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, and a de facto peg. For our purposes, all other ERAs will 
be considered “flexible”, as monetary policy will not be constrained by an exchange rate objective.  
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Table 7. Matching model coefficients for the EZ crisis countries against a fixed- and flexible 
exchange rate arrangements counterfactual 
 
In all specifications, the EZ crisis countries still displayed negative PSM coefficients. This suggests that the 
deep recession cannot be explained alone by the lack of an independent monetary policy, which instead 
seems to account for just over a quarter of the EZ recessionary bias (26.3%). However, all specifications 
suggest that it is indeed harder to adjust without a flexible exchange rate. For example, the implied 
cumulative crisis impact at t+4 was 14.4p.p. in Model (1), against 8.4p.p. in the analogous, but flexible ERA, 
Model (4). This is confirmed when looking at the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) correction: 
Appendix 11 shows how having a flexible exchange rate did help the counterfactual regain competitiveness 
after a shock more quickly than in the EZ setting21. These results are in line with the literature on 
macroeconomic adjustment under fixed- and flexible- exchange rate regimes (Edwards 2004; Eichengreen 
and Rose 2003; Goldfajn and Valdes 1999; P. Gourinchas et al. 2016). Moreover, it looks like the recovery 
in the aftermath of a crisis and adjustment period is faster under flexible ERAs. As a result, 5 years into the 
crisis, the EZ was underperforming more significantly its flexible- rather than fixed- ERA counterfactual 
(see Figure 6).  
                                                          
21 In terms of REER correction, the EZ behaved however similarly to its fixed ERA counterfactual.  
EZ vs counterfactual at:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t-2 0.17 0.14 -1.80 -0.59 0.09 -3.03
(0.851) (0.922) (0.354) (0.677) (0.952) (0.111)
t-1 -0.59 -0.78 1.17 0.53 0.36 0.12
(0.323) (0.139) (0.296) (0.411) (0.571) (0.817)
t=2010 0.55 -0.03 -0.23 0.90 0.54 -0.14
(0.542) (0.975) (0.923) (0.060) (0.245) (0.952)
t+1 -2.99 -3.43 -6.84 -3.66 -3.29 -5.14
(0.001) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068)
t+2 -4.53 -4.72 -4.72 -5.12 -4.87 -5.07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
t+3 -2.56 -2.85 -2.89 -5.04 -4.83 -3.56
(0.123) (0.056) (0.072) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
t+4 1.49 1.41 2.35 -1.36 -1.01 1.13
(0.306) (0.381) (0.296) (0.331) (0.490) (0.622)
t+5 2.80 2.99 1.36 0.02 0.14 0.89
(0.036) (0.000) (0.582) (0.988) (0.919) (0.716)
Cumulative impact by t+4 -8.4 -9.3 -11.8 -14.4 -13.3 -12.2
Obs 20 24 31 96 142 120
Larger C/A adjustment Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Excl small countries Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Control for public debt Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Control for credit No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements Flexible Exchange Rate Arrangements
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model, and 3 nearest neighbours. Matching performed on average GDPpc growth during [t-
5,t-1], debt to GDP at t-2,size of current account adjustment during [t-2,t+3], log GDPpc at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], credit-to-GDP at t-2, and degree of 
openness to trade at t-2, unless otherwise specified. Cumulative impact by t+4 is the implied aggregate impact of coefficients between t+1 and t+4 in percentage points. p-
values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes under:
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Figure 6. Eurozone periphery per capita GDP divergence from counterfactual, index 
 
Building on this finding, I benchmark some key macroeconomic variables between the EZ crisis countries 
and the fixed ERA counterfactual. Specifically, we look at exports, imports, consumption, government 
revenues/expenses and investment, as they are all accounting components of GDP. All variables are 
expressed in percentage point change, and are divided by GDP (see Appendix 1 for definitions and data 
sources). Intuitively, this should net out the diversified recession in the EZ and counterfactual and suggest 
whether some variables contracted more than proportionally. As no structural model underlies this 
framework, I will refrain from trying to pin down these results to a specific policy. Nonetheless, some 
interesting findings do emerge. The period of most interest is clearly [t1,t3], which is the time interval when 
the EZ crisis countries suffered the greatest hit. Standard PSM coefficients are displayed in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Comparison of selected macroeconomic variables between Eurozone crisis countries and 
fixed ERA counterfactual  
 
A first interesting finding is that while export performance shows no significant difference from the 
counterfactual, imports have a positive and large coefficient at 𝑡. What this suggests is that being in a 
monetary union (and having access to ECB liquidity), allowed the EZ crisis countries to correct their current 
account in a less abrupt fashion (see Appendix 12). This finding has been confirmed by the EZ literature 
(Baldwin et al. 2015; P. Gourinchas et al. 2016; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012) and is the flipside of the 
debate on EZ Target2 imbalances (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012), and it is particularly relevant as several 
authors have highlighted how abrupt current account corrections have strong contractionary effects on 
economic performance (Calvo et al. 2008; E. A. Cavallo and Frankel 2008; Edwards 2004). Aside from this 
consideration, it seems the trade dimension did not differ substantially from the counterfactual, at least not 
in the recessionary phase.  
Consumption took a strong hit in 2009, but, after that, it upheld better in the EZ crisis countries than in 
the counterfactual. This suggests that this GDP component did not contribute disproportionately to the 
recession. Public finances are particularly interesting. The change in revenues before 2010 is not different 
from the counterfactual, once again suggesting that the GFC is appropriately controlled for. Expenditure 
instead increased substantially in 2009, as automatic stabilisers and bank rescue mechanisms were activated. 
After that, there is some evidence suggesting that public finances weighed on growth as expenditure was 
cut disproportionately in 2012, and taxes increased in 2013. As no statistical differences are observed when 
comparing the correction in the primary balance between the EZ crisis countries and the counterfactual, 
there are reasons to believe that the sharper fiscal austerity is to be attributed to higher funding costs (see 
Appendix 13). Something already remarked by Martin and Philippon (2017) when employing DSGE-
generated counterfactuals.  
Exports Imports Consumption
Government 
Revenues
Government 
Expenditure
Investment Credit
EZ vs counterfactual at:
t-2 0.71 2.39 1.92 -1.21 1.12 0.09 -1.30
(0.766) (0.095) (0.106) (0.545) (0.582) (0.938) (0.812)
t-1 -1.02 -0.95 -1.49 -0.78 6.21 -0.76 3.92
(0.624) (0.783) (0.002) (0.123) (0.000) (0.067) (0.124)
t=2010 3.73 4.74 1.26 -0.84 1.82 -0.43 -2.89
(0.113) (0.001) (0.139) (0.219) (0.608) (0.541) (0.660)
t+1 0.67 -0.57 1.49 -1.03 -2.18 -1.94 -1.56
(0.659) (0.553) (0.011) (0.147) (0.542) (0.015) (0.736)
t+2 0.21 0.72 3.80 -1.26 -2.28 -1.84 -4.56
(0.880) (0.644) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.149) (0.143)
t+3 2.98 0.13 0.50 1.22 -0.39 -1.96 -4.78
(0.087) (0.853) (0.606) (0.046) (0.620) (0.000) (0.248)
t+4 1.69 3.34 1.56 0.17 -0.27 -0.77 -12.77
(0.335) (0.032) (0.355) (0.896) (0.762) (0.477) (0.039)
t+5 0.65 -2.47 -2.46 -4.08 -4.13 -0.71 -9.50
(0.808) (0.249) (0.294) (0.050) (0.001) (0.219) (0.148)
Fixed ERA counterfactual
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model, and 3 nearest neighbours. Matching performed on average GDPpc growth during [t-5,t-1], 
debt to GDP at t-2,size of current account adjustment during [t-2,t+3], log GDPpc at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], and degree of openness to trade at t-2. p-
values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
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Most notably, investment shrank more than expected and therefore mechanically dragged down GDP. 
Importantly, this finding resonates with DSGE models calibrated for the EZ as a whole (Vogel et al. 2016), 
and for Greece, specifically (P. Gourinchas et al. 2016). A glance at the change in credit-to-GDP suggests 
this investment slump was not necessarily due to a sharper-than-usual credit crunch over the period 2011-
2013. Potential reasons are hard to disentangle beyond this point. Looking at the literature, some authors 
have argued that the drop in investment was an indirect result of austerity policies (De Grauwe and Ji 2016). 
Others have connected it to deeper uncertainty (Baldwin et al. 2015) or the lack of debt write-downs 
(Carmen M. Reinhart et al. 2015; Carmen M. Reinhart and Trebesch 2015), which led to a freeze of (new) 
investment in the private sector. For our purposes, it is worth noting that both explanations are related to 
suboptimal crisis management decisions or, more broadly speaking, to problems with the euro area 
institutional setup that made these suboptimal choices a necessity.  
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The Eurozone crisis that began in 2010 led to sharp contractions of GDP, soaring unemployment, 
involuntary migration, and widespread malaise. Understanding why this happened is a crucial step towards 
preventing its repetition in the future. In the words of Baldwin et al (2015): “It is impossible to agree upon the 
steps to be taken without agreement on what went wrong. Absent such agreement, half-measures and messy compromises are 
the typical outcome. But this will not be good enough to put the EZ Crisis behind us and restore growth”. This chapter 
contributes to this task by introducing a novel methodology to benchmark the EZ crisis with comparable 
adjustment episodes and testing whether the large macroeconomic imbalances that had developed in the 
run-up to the 2010 crisis, and their combination with a large recession as the 2008/2009 Global Financial 
Crisis, are sufficient alone to explain the sharp GDP contractions observed in Greece, Spain, Ireland, 
Cyprus, and Portugal. If this were the case, introducing strong disciplining devices (credible no bailout rules, 
macro monitoring and sanctioning) is all the fixing the Eurozone architecture would need. 
While the large size of macroeconomic imbalances should not be disregarded, the chapter shows how these 
are not sufficient to explain the recession experienced after 2010 in the five crisis countries.  While the lack 
of independent monetary policy contributed to aggravate the recession, the chapter shows how this alone 
cannot explain more than a quarter of the EZ recessionary bias. As such, one should not conclude that 
similarly sharp recessions are a necessity under a shared currency. As a matter of fact, the chapter shows 
how being in a monetary union allowed the crisis countries to avoid a sudden correction of their current 
account. There are however reasons to believe that an incomplete Eurozone institutional setup contributed 
to aggravate the crisis through higher uncertainty that increased government funding costs and froze 
investments.  
The chapter therefore lends empirical backing to the proponents of more wide-reaching reforms of the 
Eurozone architecture. Several steps have been taken during the crisis, as creating a bailout mechanism for 
sovereign debt (the European Stability Mechanism), posing the foundations of a Banking Union, and 
beefing up macro monitoring mechanisms through the European Semester. Likewise, many proposals have 
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emerged to increase risk sharing and attenuate recessionary pressures, ranging from the introduction of 
Eurobonds, to the creation of a Eurozone budget to fund a euro-wide automatic stabilising facility. 
Furthering our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes of the Eurozone recession, and of the 
relative importance of individual reforms, will surely remain an open avenue for further research, helping 
the debate in Europe to progress beyond ideological preconceptions. 
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Appendix 1. Data sources 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION TIME/INTERVAL 
USED WHEN 
MATCHING 
DATA SOURCE 
GDP per capita growth 
Annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP per 
capita based on constant 
local currency 
- World Bank 
Current account balance Percentage of GDP [t-2, t+3] World Bank 
Public debt to GDP Percentage of GDP t-2 
Abbas, S.M. Ali, Nazim 
Belhocine, Asmaa el-
Ganainy and Mark 
Horton (2010)  
Pre-crisis GDP per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP per 
capita based on constant 
local currency 
[t-5, t-1] 
Own calculations based 
on World Bank 
Trade openness 
Exports plus imports (% 
of GDP) 
t-2 World Bank 
Investment growth 
Annual percentage 
growth rate of investment 
(% of GDP) 
[t-5, t-1] 
Own calculations based 
on World Bank 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita at 
constant 2010 US$ 
t-2 World Bank 
Credit to GDP 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
t-2 World Bank 
Industry 
Value added by Mining, 
Manufacturing, Utilities, 
and Construction (% of 
GDP) 
- UN Data 
Exports 
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
- World Bank 
Imports 
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
- World Bank 
Consumption 
Household final 
consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
- World Bank 
Investment (in PSM) 
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP) 
[t-5, t-1] World Bank 
Credit-to-GDP 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
- World Bank 
Employment 
Number of persons 
engaged (% of 
population) 
- 
Penn World Table  
Feenstra, Robert C., 
Robert Inklaar and 
Marcel P. Timmer (2015) 
Government Revenues 
General government 
revenue (% of GDP) 
- IMF WEO 2017 
Government Expenditure 
General government total 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
- IMF WEO 2017 
Primary Balance 
General government 
primary net 
lending/borrowing (% of 
GDP) 
- IMF WEO 2017 
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Real effective exchange 
rate 
Real effective exchange 
rate (CPI-based), 
2007=100 
- Darvas (2012) 
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Appendix 2. List of PSM donors 
 Below is a list of the macroeconomic adjustment episode that compose the counterfactuals for Models (1)-
(6) illustrated in Table 3. While every donor composition can be subject to criticism, the chapter adopts a 
transparent and data-driven approach for their selection. When judging the relevance of individual episodes 
in the donor set, one should bear in mind that each donor is selected to contribute information towards 
the composition of a counterfactual, in combination with other episodes, and not individually. Moreover, 
the variety of episodes considered for the composition of the counterfactual in the six different models 
shows that results are not driven by single idiosyncratic behaviours in the donor pool.  
  
Donors Years Donors Years Donors Years
Denmark 2010 Denmark 2009, 2010 Canada 1991
Finland 1993 Gabon 1988 Equatorial Guinea 1990
Latvia 2009 Iceland 2010, 2011 Iceland 1993, 2010
Libya 2003 Japan 1999 Israel 2003
Nicaragua 1994 Nicaragua 1994 Netherlands 1982
Saudi Arabia 2000, 2003 Switzerland 1994, 2010 Sweden 1994
Switzerland 1994, 2010 United States 2009, 2010 United States 2009, 2010
United States 2010
Donors Years Donors Years Donors Years
Finland 1992, 1993 Algeria 1988 Finland 1993
Kuwait 2009 Argentina 2002 Latvia 2009
Saudi Arabia 2000, 2002, 2003 Bulgaria 1992, 2010 Nicaragua 1994
Singapore 2002 Israel 2003 Saudi Arabia 2000, 2003
Switzerland 1994, 2010 Jamaica 2009, 2010 Switzerland 1994, 2010
United States 2010 Russian Federation 1999 United States 2010
Saudi Arabia 2002
Singapore 2010
Venezuela 1980
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (5) (6)
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Appendix 3. Employment PSM specification 
The table below reports standard PSM coefficients replicating Model (1) and (2) of Table 3 in the main text. 
However, the independent variable in this case is employment growth (percentage points). The main results 
of the GDPpc specifications are confirmed. While the 2009 crisis was somewhat absorbed, from 2010 
onwards employment started contracting vis-à-vis counterfactual, up until 2013. In 2014, the situation 
stabilised.  
  
To allow comparability with the GDPpc-based results in the main text, the table also displays a similarly 
computed Cumulative effect by t+4. This suggests that while GDPpc was contracting up to 11p.p. more 
than in the counterfactual between 2011 and 2013, employment contracted 5.4p.p.   
EZ vs counterfactual at:
(1) (2)
t-2 -0.19 -0.07
(0.513) (0.847)
t-1 -1.43 -1.29
(0.086) (0.158)
t=2010 -0.67 -0.86
(0.000) (0.000)
t+1 -0.97 -1.79
(0.000) (0.000)
t+2 -2.18 -2.51
(0.000) (0.000)
t+3 -1.86 -1.57
(0.000) (0.000)
t+4 -0.52 -0.06
0.11 0.63
Cumulative impact by t+4 -5.4 -5.8
Obs 256 298
Independent variable: Employment growth (p.p.)
Note: Model 1 and 2 replicate those of Table 3 (see relevant Note for further details). Employment time series 
only available up to t+4. Cumulative impact by t+4 is the implied aggregate impact of coefficients between 
t+1 and t+4 in percentage points, computed over this interval to ensure comparability with the GDPpc 
specifications.p-values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
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Appendix 4. Alternative PSM Specifications – Summary statistics for the matching process 
(Panel A) and Matching Model Coefficients (Panel B)* 
 
* Model (4) that excludes Spain seems to paint a more moderate negative bias for the EZ than the baseline. 
This result is however not consistent, and once private debt is also accounted for, the standard results and 
repeated negative coefficients, as in the main text, are found (results available upon request).    
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C/A adjustment 11.8 10.5 13.3 16.0 11.2 15.4
[0.999] [0.744] [0.758] [0.442] [0.991] [0.529]
Public debt-to-GDP 112.5 63.7 62.2 136.2 66.0 95.9
[0.763] [0.209] [0.349] [0.666] [0.343] [0.966]
Pre-crisis GDP growth 0.0 0.1 1.1 -0.2 1.0 0.1
[0.728] [0.831] [0.700] [0.627] [0.626] [0.982]
Openness 97.7 68.7 78.8 98.7 96.1 65.6
[0.894] [0.357] [0.849] [0.968] [0.989] [0.499]
Pre-crisis investment growth -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1
[0.957] [0.606] [0.455] [0.976] [0.830] [0.822]
Log GDPpc 10.1 10.5 10.2 9.7 10.4 9.9
[0.763] [0.690] [0.893] [0.455] [0.948] [0.495]
p-value of χ2 0.957 . 0.350 0.968 0.96 0.943
EZ vs counterfactual at:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t-2 -0.03 0.48 0.40 -1.52 0.16 -0.23
(0.961) (0.411) (0.549) (0.260) (0.916) (0.866)
t-1 0.46 1.50 0.51 0.16 0.02 0.44
(0.351) (0.005) (0.202) (0.437) (0.951) (0.440)
t=2010 0.61 0.35 0.48 1.06 -2.00 -1.00
(0.284) (0.595) (0.510) (0.498) (0.195) (0.350)
t+1 -2.67 -2.71 -2.52 -2.23 -4.91 -4.77
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.273) (0.010) (0.019)
t+2 -4.66 -4.38 -4.48 -4.01 -5.48 -5.18
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
t+3 -3.77 -4.03 -4.02 -3.29 -4.64 -2.97
(0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.084) (0.006) (0.000)
t+4 -1.28 -0.91 -0.87 1.22 -1.00 -0.39
(0.040) (0.147) (0.251) (0.449) (0.582) (0.813)
t+5 0.85 1.45 1.23 2.69 0.74 0.38
(0.046) (0.001) (0.000) (0.122) (0.668) (0.807)
Cumulative impact by t+4 -11.8 -11.5 -11.4 -8.1 -15.1 -12.7
Obs 186 204 271 270 270 271
Larger C/A adjustment Yes No No No No No
Deeper crisis at t-1 No Yes No No No No
Exclude IE No No Yes No No No
Exclude ES No No No Yes No No
Exclude PT No No No No Yes No
Exclude CY No No No No No Yes
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model, and 3 nearest neighbours. Matching performed on average GDPpc growth 
during [t-5,t-1], debt to GDP at t-2,size of current account adjustment during [t-2,t+3], log GDPpc at t-2, average investment growth during [t-5,t-1], and degree of 
openness to trade at t-2, unless otherwise specified. Cumulative impact by t+4 is the implied aggregate impact of coefficients between t+1 and t+4 in percentage 
points. p-values based on robust AI standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes
PANEL A: MATCHING TABLE
PANEL B: PSM COEFFICIENTS
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Appendix 5. Country-specific PSM simulation results 
The Figure below shows country-specific simulation results for the five EZ crisis countries. It can be seen 
the GDPpc divergence widens for all countries between 2010 and 2013. This reinforces the idea that it was 
not only one single country experience driving the aggregate results.  
 
Similarly, the Table below shows GDPpc growth gaps between the EZ crisis countries and their individual 
counterfactual between 2010 and 2015. We can see how 2011 and 2012 were negative years for all crisis 
countries. In 2013, only Ireland had started (marginally) growing faster than its counterfactual. By 2015, all 
countries were growing faster than their PSM-generated counterfactual, with the exception of Greece.  
   
Divergence from counterfactual at: GRC CYP IRL ESP PRT
2010 -9.4 -0.4 2.4 -0.4 4.3
2011 -12.1 -3.9 -1.3 -2.4 -2.9
2012 -9.1 -4.7 -1.9 -3.9 -4.2
2013 -5.0 -6.4 0.9 -2.3 -1.1
2014 1.4 -1.4 7.5 0.1 1.1
2015 -2.2 1.2 6.8 2.7 1.3
trough -28.6 -14.8 -8.3 -9.8 -5.7
Model 2
Note: Country-specific estimates for Model 2 from Section III including all macroeconomic covariates. 
Trough indicates the maximum cumulative gap between real and control over the period [2010-2015]. 
See main text for further details.
52 
 
Appendix 6. Donors based on Sudden Stops and Systemic Banking Crises 
Potential donors are based on the Eichengreen et al (2006) and Laeven and Valencia (2012) databases for 
sudden stops and systemic banking crisis, respectively. Moreover, some of the standard conditions applied 
in main PSM setting were applied. Actual lists of donors considered for Models (1) and (2) in Table 4 are 
reported, for Sudden Stops (Panel A) and Banking Crises (Panel B). The implied weight of each episode in 
the overall EZ counterfactual is also reported. 
  
Potential Donors Years Donors Years weight Donors Years weight
Argentina 2001 Brazil 2002 33% Costa Rica 1982 33%
Brazil 1983 Costa Rica 1982 27% Malaysia 1998 33%
Brazil 2002 Malaysia 1998 33% Thailand 1997 27%
Chile 1983 South Africa 1985 7% Turkey 1994 7%
Costa Rica 1982
Korea 1997
Malaysia 1998
Mexico 1983
Mexico 1995
South Africa 1985
Thailand 1997
Turkey 1994
Potential Donors Years Donors Years weight Donors Years weight
Argentina 2001 Argentina 2001 7% Argentina 2001 7%
Congo, Republic of 1992 Congo, Republic of 1992 13% Congo, Republic of 1992 7%
Colombia 1998 Denmark 2008 13% Denmark 2008 27%
Denmark 2008 Ecuador 1998 13% Finland 1991 7%
Ecuador 1998 Finland 1991 7% Iceland 2008 27%
Finland 1991 Hungary 2008 20% Switzerland 2008 27%
Hungary 2008 Iceland 2008 7%
Iceland 2008 Switzerland 2008 20%
Latvia 2008
Malaysia 1997
Mexico 1981
Mexico 1994
Slovak Republic 1998
Sweden 1991
Switzerland 2008
Thailand 1997
PANEL A: SUDDEN STOP DONORS
Note: Sudden stop episodes are based on Eichengreen et al (2006). Systemic Banking crisis episodes are based on Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
Further conditions impose a current account adjustment of at least 3p.p. and excludes Least Developed Countries. See text for further details.
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
PANEL B: BANKING CRISIS DONORS
 
 
Appendix 7. Matching table for sudden stop counterfactual and systemic banking crisis counterfactual 
Covariates EZ avg PSM avg PSM EZ avg PSM avg PSM
C/A adjustment 11.8 7.0 10.1 7.0 12.6 11.8 8.2 8.8 8.1 12.6
[0.018] [0.480] [0.018] [0.536] [0.260] [0.366] [0.224] [0.877]
Public debt-to-GDP 78.1 49.7 67.4 51.5 63.6 47.4 66.5
[0.074] [0.604] [0.130] [0.349] [0.898]
Pre-crisis GDP growth 1.8 3.0 2.6 2.3 3.4 1.9 3.5 2.4
[0.300] [0.556] [0.438] [0.671] [0.399] [0.937]
Openness 89.8 51.5 88.0 107.7 87.3 83.0 89.2 79.3 84.5
[0.130] [0.963] [0.602] [0.858] [0.946] [0.740] [0.902]
Pre-crisis investment growth -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -0.7 -1.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
[0.592] [0.397] [0.592] [0.278] [0.929] [0.682] [0.817] [0.854]
Credit to GDP 163.1 58.4 104.5 84.1 152.2
[0.002] [0.197] [0.032] [0.878]
p-value of χ2 0.047 0.622 0.010 0.232 0.598 0.950 0.139 0.996
Sudden stops Systemic banking crises
Note : Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model. See Table 4 for details on the individual specifications. Avg indicates the simple average for all 
covariates across the donor pool. χ2 tests the joint significance of all regressors. p-values testing significant difference with the EZ in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
(1) (2) (1) (2)
 
 
Appendix 8. SCM country-specific simulations 
 
 
Appendix 9. Effect of lags on log GDP per capita 
The table below reports standard tests on different lag specifications for the dynamic panel regression 
model introduced in Section V. Going beyond the 4 lags does not seem to increase the estimation power 
of the model. While only the first lag is consistently significant, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test fails to 
reject that there might be a unit root in the panel under the 1 lag specification. Therefore, on balance, the 
2 and 4 lag models seem the most reasonable for our purposes, and are thus those considered in the main 
body of the text.  
 
  
1 lag 2 lags 4 lags 6 lags 8 lags 10 lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log GDP first lag 0.712 0.708 0.702 0.697 0.684 0.683
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log GDP second lag 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.791) (0.685) (0.653) (0.714) (0.961)
log GDP third lag 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.481) (0.425) (0.520) (0.896)
log GDP fourth lag -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 0.000
(0.906) (0.444) (0.426) (0.980)
p-value first four lags - - [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value additional lags - - - [0.761] [0.914] [0.922]
Augmented Dickey-Fuller p-value [0.131] [0.011] [0.000] [0.912] [0.990] [0.996]
Observations 6096 6045 5940 5827 5698 5556
Countries in sample 176 176 176 176 175 175
Notes : This table presents estimates of lagged GDP per capita on GDP per capita. In each column we add a different number of lags 
as specificed in the column table. Only the coefficients of the first four lags are reported. Below each model we report the p-value for 
a test of joint significance of the first four lags, and the p-value of the additional lags. I report the p-value based on the inverse 
normal statistic of a Dickey-Fuller test of unit root. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Appendix 10. Matching table for fixed and flexible ERA counterfactuals 
 
  
Covariates EZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C/A adjustment 11.8 11.2 10.5 15.8 11.7 8.0 13.9
[0.861] [0.732] [0.377] [0.971] [0.176] [0.615]
Public debt-to-GDP 91.3 81.6 88.8 93.8 117.0
[0.670] [0.918] [0.941] [0.388]
Pre-crisis GDP growth 0.2 0.2 0.7 -0.5 0.9 0.8 -0.1
[0.945] [0.711] [0.686] [0.615] [0.698] [0.886]
Openness 91.9 78.8 78.1 98.4 76.3 124.5 109.0
[0.565] [0.572] [0.768] [0.577] [0.616] [0.522]
Pre-crisis investment growth -1.0 -0.5 -0.9 -2.4 -1.1 -1.2 -1.9
[0.576] [0.917] [0.172] [0.880] [0.761] [0.419]
Credit-to-GDP 161.5 74.8 142.8
[0.087] [0.471]
p-value of χ2 0.972 0.986 0.328 0.965 0.448 0.790
Counterfactual based on comparable past macroeconomic adjustment episodes under:
Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements Flexible Exchange Rate Arrangements
Note: Results based on propensity score matching estimator and logit treatment model. See Table 7 for details on the individual specifications. χ2 tests the joint significance of all regressors. p-values testing 
significant difference with the EZ in parentheses. p<0.05 in bold.
 
 
Appendix 11. Real Effective Exchange Rate correction 
To explore further the differential dynamics of price competitiveness adjustment under fixed- and flexible- 
exchange rate arrangements, I accessed annual REER data, based on CPI, for 178 countries from Darvas 
(2012). I then looked at divergences between the EZ and its fixed/flexible ERA counterfactual over the 
period 2010-2015, in line with the approach of Section VI. Beta coefficients22 are displayed in the Figure 
below. First, it is interesting to note that there is no significant difference between the EZ and adjustment 
under other fixed ERAs, at least until 2014. On the other hand, at t+1 (2011) the flexible counterfactual 
was regaining competitiveness at a faster pace than the EZ. Though significant only at the 10%-level, it 
looks like the EZ started successfully regaining price competitiveness at a faster pace than counterfactual 
only from 2014 onwards. We can therefore conclude that having a flexible exchange rate did help the 
counterfactual regain competitiveness after a shock more quickly than in the EZ setting. 
 
  
                                                          
22 Specifically, Model 1 and 4 specifications from Section VI used.  
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Appendix 12. Speed of current account correction 
Echoing the results discussed in Section VI, I look at the current account (CA) balance in the EZ crisis 
countries and the Fixed ERA Counterfactual. The Figure below shows the CA balance at t-3, t, t+3, and 
t+5. It can be seen that before the GFC, the EZ crisis countries and their counterfactual had the same large 
current account deficit (roughly -9% of GDP). Similarly, at the end of period, the EZ crisis countries and 
their counterfactual had a comparable CA surplus. However, the current account correction in the 
counterfactual was much more abrupt, and by the end of t0, the counterfactual had already balanced its 
CA. In the EZ, a balanced CA was reached only in 2013. This reinforces the finding that being in a monetary 
union shielded the EZ crisis countries from having to undergo a sudden current account correction, as is 
often the case in Balance of Payment crises.    
 
It must be noted that the CA improvement between t0 and t+3 was similar for the EZ and the 
counterfactual (roughly 7p.p.) and, once again, this reiterates the finding that the external dimension does 
not contribute significantly to explain the poor GDPpc performance observed in the EZ in 2011-2013.  
  
59 
 
Appendix 13. Fiscal consolidation 
This Appendix discusses differences between the EZ crisis countries and their Fixed ERA counterfactual, 
for what concerns their fiscal policy decisions. First, I test whether EZ crisis countries were running a 
disproportionately loose fiscal policy vis-à-vis counterfactual in 2007, and observe no statistical significance 
within our standard 5% level of confidence (p=0.078). If at all, the (positive) point estimate suggests a more 
conservative fiscal policy on average in the five EZ crisis countries23. This is in line with the arguments 
brought forward by Baldwin et al (2015, p. 2), who stress how “the EZ Crisis should not be thought of as a 
government debt crisis in its origin – even though it evolved into one”. Furthermore, I look at divergences in the change 
in the primary balance. The figure below (LHS) shows the PSM beta-coefficients, in line with Table 8 in 
Section VI. As a robustness check, the RHS panel displays computations for the same beta-coefficients, 
however excluding Ireland, which experienced a very high volatility in primary balance in 2010-2011 due to 
its unconditional bank guarantee. Negative (positive) values indicate a disproportionately expansionary 
(contractionary) fiscal policy decision in the EZ crisis countries.  
 
First, we note that in 2008 there were no clear differences in fiscal policy decisions. In 2009, as discussed 
in the main text, automatic stabilisers and bank rescue mechanisms were activated in the EZ, leading to a 
strongly countercyclical fiscal policy. From then onwards, even if point estimates turn positive, we do not 
observe significant differences between the EZ crisis countries and the counterfactual. This is true also 
when Ireland is excluded, leading to a compression of error terms in 2010-201124. What this suggests is that 
disproportionate fiscal austerity in the EZ crisis countries was likely due to higher financing costs.  
  
                                                          
23 While true on average, this argument must not necessarily apply to all individual crisis countries. 
24 In an alternative specification, I exclude Greece. The main findings stand confirmed. (results available upon request) 
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Chapter 2. Structural reform waves and economic growth 
By Pasquale Marco Marrazzo and Alessio Terzi 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
At a time of slow growth in several advanced and emerging countries, calls for more structural reforms are 
multiplying. However, estimations of the short- and medium-term impact of these reforms on GDP growth 
remain methodologically problematic and still highly controversial. We contribute to this literature by 
making a novel use of the non-parametric Synthetic Control Method to estimate the impact of 23 wide-
reaching structural reform packages (including both real and financial sector measures) rolled out in 22 
countries between 1961 and 2000. Our results suggest that, on average, reforms started having a significant 
positive effect on GDP per capita only after five years. Ten years after the beginning of a reform wave, 
GDP per capita was roughly 6 percentage points higher than the synthetic counterfactual scenario. 
However, average point estimates mask a large heterogeneity of outcomes. Benefits tended to materialise 
earlier, but overall to be more limited, in advanced economies than in emerging markets. These results are 
confirmed when we use a parametric dynamic panel fixed effect model to control for the rich dynamics of 
GDP, and are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, placebo and falsification tests, and to different 
indicators of reform.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Policymakers face a perennial struggle to improve economic outcomes, in both advanced and developing 
countries. Within this context, orthodox economic theory has made a strong case for structural reforms, 
identified as measures aimed at removing supply-side constraints in an economy. This in turn would favour 
efficient factor allocation and contribute to medium- and long-term growth. Such measures include, but are 
not limited to, product and labour market liberalisations, current and capital account openness, and financial 
liberalisation. For a long time, a collection of these policies has fallen under the name of Washington 
Consensus, following their listing in Williamson (1994). According to this policy perspective, which has long been 
held by multilateral organisations, the depth and breadth of reform packages will determine subsequent 
economic performance (Easterly 2005).  
While individually these measures are built on solid workhorse economic models, and well-established 
concepts such as Schumpeterian creative destruction or competitive advantage, the growth literature 
remains divided. Some hold that deep- or wide- orthodox structural reform packages will generally fail to 
produce positive growth effects, as they are often not carefully tailored to the local context (Rodrik 2004). 
Others identify geography and resource endowment as crucially underlying the development of agriculture, 
human capital, transport costs, the spread on knowledge and knowhow, and therefore there is little policy 
change can do to significantly shape medium- and long-term growth (Diamond 1997; Sachs 2001). Finally, 
according to others only high-quality institutions can ensure that the right policies will be identified and 
successfully implemented (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Hall and Jones 1999). 
According to this view, pushing for structural reforms will have only a temporary and limited impact on 
economic growth as it will be like treating the symptoms of the problem, rather than addressing the root 
cause.  
Motivated by the apparently conflicting prediction on the benefits of (orthodox) policy reform in these 
growth theories, we investigate the relationship between a wide range of structural reforms and economic 
performance over a ten-year time horizon. Our novel empirical approach is composed of two steps. First, 
building on a methodology developed by IMF (2015), we identify 23 episodes of wide-reaching structural 
reform implementation (so-called “reform waves”). These are based on a database first assembled by Ostry 
et al. (2009) and later expanded by Giuliano et al. (2013), which provides detailed information on both real 
and financial sector reforms in 156 advanced and developing countries over a 40-year period. Indicators 
considered specifically cover trade-, product market-, agriculture-, and capital-account liberalisation, 
together with financial and banking sector reform. Then, we track top-reforming countries over the 10 
years following adoption and estimate the dynamic impact of reforms by employing the Synthetic Control 
Method (SCM): a technique first developed in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and later refined in Abadie 
et al. (2010, 2015). In a similar vein to matching estimation strategies (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), this 
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non-parametric data-driven approach creates a control for each individual reforming country, as a linear 
combination of other countries displaying similar pre-reform characteristics.  
Crucially, Abadie et al. (2010) prove that once a good match has been established over observable 
characteristics prior to the reform, time-varying unobservable confounders become a second-order 
problem. In a SCM framework, we are therefore somewhat less concerned about the endogeneity of 
reforms, which is instead a persistent issue in standard panel models such as difference-in-difference or 
fixed-effect estimations.    
The SCM allows us to quantify the individual impact of a country’s reform package. Our technique 
therefore caters for the fact that each country and reform package is different, allowing for an in-depth 
discussion of the treatment heterogeneity thereby associated. However, at the same time, it makes it possible 
to aggregate results and draw some general conclusions on the relationship between reforms and economic 
performance. We consider this the major advancement vis-à-vis standard panel regression approaches, 
which ultimately require in-group treatment homogeneity (Brand and Thomas 2013). As discussed by 
Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), the SCM creates data-driven case studies that can be analysed within a 
unified statistical framework, hence effectively constituting a middle-ground between a case study approach 
and standard cross-sectional work. 
Our main findings are as follows: on average, reforms had a statistically insignificant impact in the short 
term. However, reforming countries experienced a growth acceleration in the medium-term, with the result 
that ten years after the reform wave started, GDP per capita was roughly 6 percentage points higher than 
the synthetic counterfactual scenario. Making full use of our novel SCM approach, we highlight how average 
point estimates mask the fact that the impact of reforms is highly heterogeneous, in particular between 
advanced and emerging markets. Benefits tended to materialise earlier, but to be more limited, in the former 
than in the latter. We show how this result is unlikely to be dictated by the macroeconomic conditions in 
which reforms were implemented, but rather suggest that this may be due to a diversified composition of 
the average reform package and overall quality of institutions, affecting policy credibility.  
Given the novelty of our approach in the reform literature, we show that our findings are not model-
specific. In particular, we adapt the dynamic panel regression model used by Acemoglu et al (2014) to 
provide an alternative estimation strategy for the impact of reforms on growth, and illustrate how our 
baseline estimates are at most to be treated as conservative. 
Moreover, we performed extended robustness checks on our main results. These include a placebo test, 
where we fictitiously placed a reform episode ten years before the actual reform wave, and show how the 
impact measured by the SCM is not comparable to that identified in the baseline. This test further suggests 
we are not over-fitting the model. We also doubled the time horizon over which we fit the model to twenty 
years, reducing the likelihood of positive self-selection bias. Moreover, we ran a falsification test on 
countries that did not implement reform waves, effectively showing the forecasting power of our model in 
63 
 
the absence of a reform shock. Finally, we considered alternative indicators of comparable structural 
reforms, and hence an alternative selection of wide-reaching reform episodes. In all cases, our baseline 
results remain broadly confirmed.   
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an account of the existing literature 
on the impact of reform packages on growth. Section 3 explains the theory underpinning the SCM. In 
Section 4, we describe the data and explain the methodology behind our case selection. Our implementation 
of the SCM is presented in Section 5. Section 6 reports the baseline results. In Section 7, we crosscheck our 
baseline estimates with an alternative parametric estimation strategy. Section 8 presents a range of 
robustness checks, while Section 9 is devoted to discussing two specific case studies. Section 10 offers some 
concluding remarks.  
II. Literature on reforms and growth 
 
The body of academic empirical literature we contribute to, namely the one looking at the empirical 
relationship between wide-reaching policy reforms and economic performance, is perhaps more limited 
than the importance of the question would warrant. The overall conclusion that can be drawn is that 
reforms are generally associated with positive subsequent economic performance, but the data displays a 
high degree of heterogeneity, depending on countries and policies considered. This general finding inspired 
us to prefer a matching-type approach to more standard parametric techniques. 
Post-Soviet countries moving towards a market economy have received considerable attention. Fischer et 
al. (1996) looked at 26 transition economies over the period 1989-1994. They conclude that structural 
reforms played a vital role in reviving economic growth. This finding for transition economies was echoed 
by de Melo et al. (1996), and more recently by Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003) and Eicher and 
Schreiber (2010). 
Focussing more broadly on countries implementing wide reform packages covering domestic finance, trade, 
and the capital account, Christiansen et al. (2013) find a strong impact of the former two on growth in 
middle-income countries. Moreover, they show how well-developed property rights are a pre-condition in 
order to reap fully the benefits of structural reforms. The importance of institutions in explaining cross-
country heterogeneity is further remarked by Prati et al. (2013), who illustrate how the positive relationship 
between structural reforms and growth depends on a country’s constraints on the authority of the executive 
power. Distance from the technological frontier seems also to play a role. In line with the spirit and 
methodology of our paper, Adhikari et al. (2018) recently applied the SCM to six cases of reform waves in 
advanced economies. Overall, they find evidence suggesting a positive but heterogeneous effect of labour 
and product market reforms on GDP per capita.  
However, there are some dissenting opinions among scholars. Levine and Renelt (1992) show how policies 
associated with long-term growth have important interaction effects and, when these are taken into account, 
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the strong predictions on their individual positive impact often become fragile or insignificant. Similarly 
questioning past (parametric) methodologies, Rodrik (2012) argues there is little to be learned from 
regressing policies on growth.  Easterly (2001) documents how developing countries experienced a growth 
slowdown over the period 1980-1998, while their extensive reforms would have predicted a growth 
acceleration. Easterly and Levine (2003) show how a broad set of macroeconomic policies becomes 
irrelevant in explaining economic development once institutions, and the geographical factors that underpin 
them, are taken into account. A point echoed by Rodrik et al. (2004). Easterly (2005) subsequently shows 
how the positive relationship established in the literature between national policies and growth is likely to 
be driven by extreme observations.  
III. Econometric theory 
 
The empirical study presented in this chapter is based on the Synthetic Control Method as introduced by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and later extended by Abadie et al (2010, 2015). The SCM proposes an 
innovative way to address one of the main issues in comparative case studies, namely finding a suitable 
counterfactual to a treated unit, or within our setting, to a country. The main idea is to use several countries 
to synthetize a control that resembles as much as possible the “treated” country. In practice, the synthetic 
replica country is a linear combination of several possible comparable countries that deliver a good match 
to the country of interest25. 
In a way, this technique is not far away from the widely accepted difference-in-difference estimation. In 
that framework, studies look for a country that is “similar enough” to the country experiencing a policy 
change before the treatment and then look at the post-reform difference under an assumption of parallel 
trends. The SCM works in the same way, with the difference that it creates a linear combination of “similar” 
countries using transparent weights to produce, year-by-year, the best possible pre-reform match.  
Formalisation of the Synthetic Control Method 
 
Abadie et al (2010) formally show how to identify the effect of an intervention (in this paper, a reform 
wave) by means of a panel dataset and a factor model. More precisely, suppose we start with a panel dataset 
collecting the GDP per capita of 𝐽 + 1 countries and 𝑇 periods, where one country 𝑖 = 1 exhibits a reform 
wave at time 𝑇0, while 𝐽 countries do not exhibit any reform wave during the 𝑇 periods. Moreover, assume 
that the GDP per capita of any country 𝑖 at any time 𝑡  is given by a factor model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝝀𝑡𝝁𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡𝒁𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 [1] 
where: 
• 𝛿𝑡 is an unobservable common factor with unitary loading to all countries 𝑖 
• 𝝀𝑡 is a vector of unobservable common factors with country specific loading 𝝁𝑖 
                                                          
25 In the finance literature, the SCM could be described as a portfolio strategy to replicate one specific asset. 
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• 𝒁𝑖 is a vector of observed covariates uncorrelated with the reform wave  
• 𝜽𝑡 is a vector of unknown parameters for the covariates 
• 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is an indicator that takes a value of one for 𝑡 > 𝑇0 and 𝑖 = 1 
• 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the effect of the reform wave 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an unobservable transitionary shocks with zero mean. 
 
Suppose now to take a vector of 𝐽 non-negative weights 𝑾 summing to one, which effectively define a 
specific synthetic control. Moreover assume there exists a vector of weights 𝑾𝑖
∗ such that:   
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 for 𝑡 < 𝑇0  
and 
𝒁𝑖
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒁𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  
 
[2] 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝒁𝑖
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 are GDP per capita at time 𝑡 and a vector of covariates of the country of 
interest 𝑖, respectively. 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙   and 𝒁𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 represent instead a vector of GDP per capita at time 𝑡 and 
a matrix of covariates of the 𝐽 countries that act as control group for the country 𝑖. 
In absence of non-transitionary shocks, Abadie et al (2010) shows that if the pre-treatment period is large 
relative to the scale of the transitory shocks, it is possible to estimate the effect of the reform wave 𝛼𝑖𝑡 at a 
specific time 𝑡 > 𝑇0 as:   
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙         [3] 
 
The estimation of the synthetic control is purely nonparametric because, as described in Abadie et al (2010), 
it is based on the minimisation of a pseudo-distance between the vector of characteristics of the country 
that experiences a reform wave and the vector of the potential synthetic control26. One of the main benefits 
of the synthetic control method is that, conversely from standard case studies, the selection of the control 
country is data driven, while other approaches have a strong arbitrary element.  Moreover, also the relative 
weight of each covariate is data-driven. This makes the SCM overall a very transparent approach. 
It is interesting to notice that the SCM can be seen as a specific case of a linear regression. In fact, the SCM 
uses a weighting linear combination, where the coefficients are non-negative and sum to one, while a 
regression uses a linear combination that can be normalised to sum to one but that is not restricted to non-
negative coefficient. This restriction comes with two main benefits: first, and foremost, it allows an intuitive 
                                                          
26 From a practical standpoint, given the dual optimisation process, it appears useful to start the estimation of the 
parameters from many points to reduce the chance of running into local, rather than global, minima. We hence start 
the optimisation process from six thousand different points and select the one delivering the best overall pre-reform 
fit. 
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and transparent interpretation of the synthetic as a weighted average of the countries composing the control 
group; second, it avoids the risk of running in an extrapolation bias, as proved by Abadie et al (2015). 
On top of this, there are several reasons that lead us to prefer the SCM with respect to a standard panel 
regression analysis within this setting. Aside from issues of transparency, due to its non-parametric nature, 
the SCM is less subject to issues of misspecification, also allowing us to model more closely the yearly 
impact of reform. Moreover, it is less prone to endogeneity bias originating from time-varying unobservable 
confounders. This is an improvement vis-à-vis difference-in-difference approaches and time fixed effect 
estimations, which only account for time-invariant confounders (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). Finally, 
what is usually considered a disadvantage of the SCM is that it does not allow for standard statistical 
inference. We will show however that within our setting, this problem can be overcome. 
Our methodological contribution 
 
The SCM was originally devised as a single-country data-driven case study method. Within such setting, an 
underlying crucial assumption is that after 𝑇0 there are no significant idiosyncratic non-transitionary shocks 
affecting GDP per capita to neither the country of interest nor any of the countries composing the synthetic 
control. As this assumption cannot be tested, it is treated loosely speaking as the exclusion restriction in an 
Instrumental Variable setting, meaning that the author goes qualitatively at length explaining why there are 
reasons to believe it is satisfied27. In a single country case study, thanks also to the transparency in the 
construction of the control, this argument is made easier. 
We see obvious shortcomings in this discretionary case-by-case approach and suggest an alternative way to 
deal with this problem. In line with standard matching estimations of the average treatment effect (Abadie 
and Imbens 2006), what we propose is to apply the SCM systematically to multiple reform episodes 𝑛, and 
study the average effect across all 𝑛 episodes, therefore assuming that idiosyncratic (i.e. country-specific) 
shocks are broadly symmetric, which would ensure the asymptotic consistency of our estimate. As 𝑛 
increases, the average effect converges towards an unbiased estimate of the average impact of a reform 
wave. More formally, given that condition [2] only holds approximately in most real application, then the 
estimate of the individual treatment effect [3] might be affected by a zero mean idiosyncratic shock 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
turning equation [3] into: 
   
?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾∗𝜺𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 [4] 
 
However, the impact of 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑾∗𝜺𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 on the average treatment effect will tend to zero as 𝑛 
increases, resulting into: 
                                                          
27 Some basic robustness tests are routinely carried out to help this claim, as for example excluding countries 
composing the synthetic control one by one and verifying whether baseline results broadly hold (Abadie et al. 2015; 
Mideksa 2013).  
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?̂?𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
[5] 
 
While this remains a theoretical assumption, a Monte Carlo Simulation lends empirical support to our 
approach, even in a relatively small 𝑛 setting as ours (see Appendix 1). Moreover, we note that this method 
is similar in spirit to recent applications of micro-econometric techniques to macro settings, specifically 
targeted at estimating the average impact of fiscal austerity (Jordà and Taylor 2015), democratisation 
(Acemoglu et al. 2014), or natural disasters (E. Cavallo et al. 2013), on growth. Clearly, while we see standard 
statistical inference as a main advantage of our approach with respect to past applications of the SCM28, 
nothing forbids subsequent zooming into specific reform episodes, therefore offering a finely balanced mix 
between cross-national econometrics and case studies.    
 
IV. Data and Sample 
 
In order to use the SCM, we need first to identify episodes of extensive reform. Our starting point is a panel 
dataset of structural reforms assembled by Giuliano et al (2013) covering 156 countries between 1960 and 
2005, and displaying indicators reflecting the level of regulation in six economic areas: domestic financial 
sector, capital account, product market, agricultural market, trade, and current account (Table 1).   
Table 1. Policy indices 
 Domestic financial sector 
Securities market This indicator assesses the quality of the securities market framework, including the 
existence of an independent regulator and the extent of legal restrictions on the 
development of domestic bond and equity markets 
Banking This indicator captures reductions or removal of interest rate controls (floors or ceilings), 
credit controls (directed credit and subsidized lending), competition restrictions (limits on 
branches and entry barriers in the banking market, including licensing requirements or limits 
on foreign banks), and public ownership of banks. It also captures a measure of the quality 
of banking supervision and regulation, including the power and independence of bank 
supervisors, the adoption of Basel capital standards, and the presence of a framework for 
bank inspections 
  
 Capital account 
 This indicator aims to measure the extent of the external capital account liberalisation. The 
index contains information on a broad set of restrictions including, for example, controls 
                                                          
28 We note that Abadie et al (2010) develop a quasi-p-value for a single-country SCM application building on placebo 
tests.   
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on external borrowing between residents and non-residents, as well as approval 
requirements for foreign direct investment 
  
 Product market 
 This indicator covers the degree of liberalisation in the telecommunication and electricity 
markets, including the extent of competition in the provision of these services, the presence 
of an independent regulatory authority, and privatisation 
  
 Agriculture market 
 This indicator measures the extent of public intervention in the market going from total 
monopoly or monopsony in production, transportation or marketing (i.e., the presence of 
marketing boards), the presence of administered prices, public ownership of relevant 
producers or concession requirement to free market 
  
 Trade 
 This indicator is based on tariff liberalization and is measured by average tariffs 
  
 Current account 
 This indicator captures the extent to which a government is compliant with its obligations 
under the IMF’s Article VIII to free from government restriction the proceeds from 
international trade in goods and services 
Source: This table presents a brief description of the variables. For a more comprehensive treatment, including data 
sources, refer to Giuliano et al (2013). 
Intuitively, we ideally would want to identify points in time when reforms were (i) wide-reaching, (ii) deep, 
and (iii) not immediately reversed. First, for each of the six reform variables, we want to identify large and 
stable jumps, which reflect a positive break (improvement) in the specific policy field. To do so, we adapt 
an approach first detailed by IMF (2015, pp. 59–60). Formally, we look at the three-year differences, Δ𝐼𝑡
𝑖 =
𝐼𝑡+3
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑡
𝑖 where 𝑖 refers to the country and 𝐼 is a specific policy indicator. We pool together the three-year 
differences over the entire time and country sample Α:= Δ𝐼𝑡
𝑖  ∈ Α,   ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡.  We then identify breaks ∀ 𝐼 ∈
[1,6]  based on three criteria:   
 
(i) the three-year difference Δ𝐼𝑡
𝑖  belongs to the top 3rd percentile of the distribution of all Δ𝐼𝑡
𝑖;  
 
(ii) the three yearly difference that compose Δ𝐼𝑡
𝑖 are all non-negative: 𝐼𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑡
𝑖 ≥ 0 ,  𝐼𝑡+2
𝑖 −
𝐼𝑡+1
𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝐼𝑡+3
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑡+2
𝑖 ≥ 0;  
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(iii) if condition (i) and (ii) occur more than once consecutively, we consider only the first 
observation. 
 
We identify reform wave events as years when within a three years interval at least two out of our six 
variables present a break as defined above. Applying such criteria, we obtain a list of events that consist of 
29 episodes distributed over five decades. More precisely, we identify one episode in the 60s, three in the 
70s, thirteen in the 80s, eleven in the 90s, and one in the early 2000s. Reforms implemented in these 29 
instances cover all six economic areas: Agricultural (8), Product Market (6), Trade (6), Capital account (14), 
Current Account (17), and Domestic Financial Sector (13). The full list of countries and reforms is displayed 
in Appendix 2.  
The reform waves identified happened in 28 countries, with the only repetition of Argentina in 1974 and 
1987. Moreover, as is evident from Figure 1, many of our reform episodes come from Latin America. While 
this should not surprise, given the region’s focus on wide-reaching economic reforms in the 80s and 90s, 
we note that more than half of the episodes considered in our dataset includes countries located outside 
Latin America and the Caribbean. As such, we would refrain from considering our results as generated only 
from reform experiences in this part of the world. 
Figure 1. Major reform episodes identified 
 
 
V. Methodology in practice: The synthetic control approach 
 
Having identified major reform episodes is only a first step. In order to construct synthetic controls as 
discussed in Section 3, we assembled a panel dataset of both real GDP per capita and relevant covariates 
for 167 countries from all continent and income group over the period 1950-2011. The variables used for 
the pre-treatment calibration are standard economic growth predictors used in the SCM literature (Abadie 
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et al. 2015; Billmeier and Nannicini 2013). Aside from real per capita GDP in PPP29 (from here onward 
referred to as “GDP”), we considered investment rates, the degree of openness of the economy (exports 
plus imports), secondary and tertiary education, population growth, and the value added of industry, all 
averaged over the fitting period [t-10, t-1] (full details are reported in Appendix 3).  
A necessary condition to be in the donor pool is that for the period of interest the candidate donors should 
not have experienced a reform wave, both in the pre-treatment and in the post-treatment phase. Within 
our paper, we will assume the latter to be 10 years following the reform. As such, for example, a country 
that has experienced a reform wave in 1982 can be a candidate for another country experiencing a reform 
wave in 2000, but not in 1989. 
Extremely small countries are excluded from our analysis because of their limited contribution and high 
volatility in GDP per capita. For practical purposes, the threshold we apply for the exclusion is 1.5 million 
people at 𝑇0. Moreover, using the Correlates of War database (Pevehouse et al. 2004), we excluded from 
the donor pool all countries affected by war in the time period of interest, given that such factor is likely to 
affect in an extreme (negative) way the donor and be unrelated to the reforming country, hence presenting 
the risk of distorting our estimates30.  
Not every country’s performance can be replicated using the SCM. In some instances, the synthetic control 
will simply display a limited replication power of the country of interest in the pre-treatment period. In 
these circumstances, the SCM cannot be used to analyse post-treatment effects, as the parallel trend 
assumption will be openly violated, as explained in Abadie et al (2010). Therefore, in line with Adhikari et 
al (2018), we develop a quantitative selection rule to identify whether a reform event should be dropped 
from our study, based on an arbitrary tolerable error31. We standardise the root mean squared prediction 
error (RMSPE) by GDP per capita at the period before the treatment in the following way:  
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑 =
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡0−1
< 𝛾 
 
where 𝛾 is a threshold. Based on the distribution of the 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑, we identified a sensible threshold 𝛾 = 
7% (see Appendix 4)32. By standardising over GDP per capita at the year before the reform, we make 
different event studies comparable in terms of quality of fit. Moreover, this provides an intuitive 
                                                          
29 In line with standard applications of the SCM in the literature, GDP per capita (level), averaged over the whole 
fitting horizon, is included as a covariate. 
30 In practice, this meant excluding the following countries from selected donor pools: Azerbaijan 1993 – 1994, 
Cambodia 1977 – 1979, Cyprus 1974, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1975 – 1976, Ethiopia 1998 – 2000, Iraq 
1980 – 1988, 1990 – 1991 and 2003, Jordan 1973 and 1991, Rwanda 1994, Sierra Leone 1991 – 2002, South Africa 
1975 – 1976, Syrian Arab Republic 1973, Uganda 1978 – 1979, Vietnam 1979. 
31 We note that a similar approach is used also in portfolio theory, where portfolios at times cannot be replicated due 
to market incompleteness and, as such, an “acceptable” tracking error is used as a threshold for analysis.  
32 Our tolerance index is computed in a slightly different way with respect to Adhikari et al (2018). When we convert 
our 𝛾=7% to make it comparable, our approach results 30% more stringent than theirs. 
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interpretation to the threshold, i.e. we exclude from the analysis six reform episodes in which the average 
fit error is more than a specific fraction of the level of GDP per capita at the period before the event. In 
the remainder of the paper, we apply this “best fit” filter, unless mentioned otherwise. In Section 6, we 
show however how this sample restriction does not significantly alter our results in an alternative parametric 
estimation. 
 
The countries considered in the donor pool of each individual reform episode should be similar to the 
reforming country, to avoid the risk of running in an interpolation bias, as described in Abadie et al (2010). 
Intuitively, what this means is that, for example, it would not be desirable to replicate Greece as a weighted 
mix of Sweden and Angola, which, by averaging, could yield a good pre-reform match, but at the same time 
are more likely to fail the parallel trend assumption.  
A simple way to reduce this risk is to restrict the possible donor pool by income level. An off-the-shelf way 
to do so would be to use standard income classifications of the World Bank or IMF to construct donor 
pools. However, this approach would have the drawback that if the treated country is at the lower (higher) 
edge of its group, all possible donors will have a higher (lower) income, yielding a synthetic control that is 
not close to the treated unit. Therefore, we include in the donor pool only countries that have a GDP per 
capita close to the treated countries, according to the following condition:  𝑌𝑡
𝑗 ∈ [𝑌𝑡
𝑖 −
1
2
𝑌𝑡
𝑖 , 𝑌𝑡
𝑖 +
1
2
𝑌𝑡
𝑖] where 𝑌 is the GDP per capita,  𝑡 is the treatment period, 𝑖 refer to the treated country, 𝑗 refer to the 
untreated countries. Table 2 (column 3) offers an empirical backing to this approach, as donor pools 
constructed in this fashion already start approximating well the economic structure of our countries of 
interest, although obviously four times less precisely on a yearly basis than our SCM (RMSPE of 13 percent 
vs 3).   
While all these transformations and conditions might look arbitrary, we note how they are fully in line with 
standard implementations of the SCM in the literature. For example, Abadie et al (2015) builds a synthetic 
West Germany by restricting the donor pool by income (only member of the OECD in 1990), excludes 
small-sized countries, members with an income level significantly lower than West Germany, and countries 
facing large macroeconomic shocks. 
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Table 2. GDP per capita and covariates means before reform programme implementation 
  
Finally, Appendix 5 shows how there was no statistical difference in the policy stance (or average level of 
liberalisation in the economy) between top reformers and their counterfactual up until t0. At that point, the 
reform wave drew a significant wedge between the two. From t3 onwards, the two policy stances returned 
to proceeding on a parallel trend. This corroborates the selection of the wide-reaching reform episodes, the 
counterfactuals, and the choice of the SCM more broadly.  
VI. The impact of structural reform packages 
 
In this section, we present and discuss our baseline results. Figure 2 (LHS) represents graphically the 
evolution of our interest variable – real GDP per capita – averaged across the 23 reform episodes (real) and 
their respective synthetic controls (synth)33. The close overlap between the lines before t suggests we 
effectively replicated the yearly evolution of GDP in the pre-treatment period, and not only the 10-year 
average – as already indicated in Table 2. This is true also on a country-by-country level (Appendix 15). 
Our baseline results suggest the average reform country experienced a brief slowdown vis-à-vis 
counterfactual following the inception of a reform wave. Figure 2 (RHS) suggests the slowdown lasted for 
roughly 2 years, after which a growth acceleration started. As a result, after 10 years, GDP per capita in the 
average reform country was 6.3p.p. higher than counterfactual.  
 
 
 
                                                          
33 In order to average across reform episodes with a different T0 without assigning a higher weight to larger countries, 
we standardise both the real and synthetic, setting GDP over the period [t-10,t-1]=100. This approach sounds 
reasonable, as both the real and the synth are practically equal over this period, as shown in Table 2. 
Top reformers
Synthetic top 
reformers
Simple average of 
donor pool
GDP per capita 5932.9 5930.3 5434.7
Investment rate 21.9 24.2 22.8
Industry share 30.5 28.0 30.3
Trade openness 43.6 49.4 56.7
Population growth 1.8 2.1 2.3
Secondary education 10.1 9.0 8.5
Tertiary education 3.6 3.2 3.0
Standardised RMSPE 3% 13%
Notes: Covariates are averaged over the 10 years preceding the reform wave [t-10,t-1] and then 
averaged across reform episodes in the first column. The second column averages across synthetic 
controls. The third column averages across all  countries potentially composing the donor pool. See 
text for details.
[t-10,t-1]
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Figure 2. Average trend in GDP per capita: reform countries versus synthetic control (LHS) and 
estimated impact of reforms (RHS) 
 
 
One possible source of concern could be that reforms have spillover effects on countries composing the 
synthetic control, therefore polluting our estimates. To alleviate this concern, we collect bilateral trade data 
from the IMF’s Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database and compute the weight of the reformer 
in the export basket of each respective synthetic control. As displayed in Appendix 6, in 19 out of the 23 
episodes considered, the reformer represents less than 1% of the control’s export basket. As a conservative 
check34, we exclude situations in which the reformer represented more than 3% or 5% of the control’s 
export basket35. The impact of reforms at t+10 remains practically unaltered (6.2 p.p. and 5.8 p.p, 
respectively).   
Another source of concern could be that the methodology might be assigning a high weight to individual 
countries in the synthetic control, hence increasing the risk that post-reform idiosyncratic shocks in the 
control might be disturbing our estimation. In an alternative estimation, we impose a maximum weight 
restriction of 50% for any donor in each synthetic control. Average results at t+10 stand practically 
unaltered (6.5p.p. vis-à-vis 6.3 in the baseline case).  
A further obvious source of concern could be that reforms are more likely to be implemented at a time of 
crisis, as suggested inter alia by Williamson (1994) and others (Drazen and Grilli 1990). If this were 
predominantly the case in our sample, then our short-term estimates could be biased downwards, dictating 
the lack of a positive impact of reform over the short term. Moreover, at least part of the subsequent 
positive effect could be simply imputable to post-crisis recovery or reversion to the mean. 
To address this concern, we would want to identify countries experiencing a large financial or 
macroeconomic crisis that could have later twisted the governments’ arm into reform. While these crises 
could take multiple forms, ranging from sudden stops of capital inflows, to banking crises, or sovereign 
                                                          
34 By comparison, the export basket of the synthetic control for West Germany constructed by Abadie et al (2015) 
depends for 21.0% on (real) West Germany. 
35 Episodes excluded are Great Britain-1976, Belgium-1988 with a 5% threshold, including also Brazil-1987 in the 3% 
threshold case.  
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debt defaults, controlling for all of them would be problematic in a small-n setting like ours. However, the 
financial crisis literature highlights how currency crises have the tendency to manifest themselves in 
conjunction with all the above (Glick and Hutchison 2011). As such, we take a conservative approach, by 
conditioning our estimates on the presence of a currency crisis at t-1, as defined by Laeven and Valencia 
(2012)36. Crucially, however, we cannot control for a simultaneous crisis at t, as this could have been sparked 
by the (financial) reforms themselves, and would therefore be an integral part of the estimation of the 
reform impact. 
Moreover, we develop our own binary measure of negative idiosyncratic shock by identifying countries that 
saw a GDP per capita contraction at t-1, while their synthetic counterfactual experienced positive GDP 
growth. This effectively implies that a factor outside our model has negatively affected the reform country’s 
growth.  
Figure 3 visualises our results, displaying the median impact of reform waves under alternative 
specifications37. Firstly, the short-term muted effects identified in the average results discussed above are 
confirmed when looking at the median, suggesting this was not dictated by outliers. A growth pick-up is 
then observed in the medium term. Looking at our alternative specifications, we can also exclude that the 
positive effect identified is due entirely to a post-crisis recovery38. 
Figure 3. Median impact of reforms 
 
                                                          
36 These included: Argentina – 1987, Bolivia – 1982, Brazil – 1987, Chile – 1973, Egypt – 1990, and Kenya – 1993. 
37 Given we are shrinking our sample to an even smaller n, we decided to focus visually on the median impact rather 
than the mean, to complement Figure 2. This is also due to the median’s lower sensitivity to outliers. As the yearly 
median impact is prone to jumps, we smoothed the data series by taking 3-year averages, hence facilitating a visual 
comparison across the three specifications. 
38 As an extreme crisis scenario, in an alternative specification we excluded countries implementing reforms at a time 
of regime change (e.g. Chile in 1973), identified by using the Polity IV database. Long-term positive results remain 
confirmed, as they do when excluding these instances from the donor pool (results available upon request).  
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Statistical testing 
 
While average or median effects are visually informative, we noted above how the treatment effect of 
reform waves is likely to be heterogeneous. As such, we performed basic statistical testing on these results. 
While the SCM in its original form is non-inferential in nature, the fact that we are applying it serially across 
reform episodes allows us to construct confidence intervals around the effect, building on the multi-country 
evidence we have. 
To read common patterns through the cloud of country-specific results, we adopt a non-parametric kernel 
weighted local polynomial regression model, as proposed by Fan (1992). Within our framework, the model 
is estimated as follows:  
 ?̅?𝑡 = ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗
𝑛
𝑖
 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 are the standardised gaps between real and synthetic control for the country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡0 −
10 , 𝑡0 + 10], 𝑤𝑖𝑡 are the kernel weights. This method seems particularly appropriate for our setting, given 
its good finite sample properties and the fact that it does not force us to over-impose a specific functional 
form. 
As displayed in Figure 4, the difference between real and synthetic is not different from zero in the pre-
reform period, suggesting once more a good quality of SCM calibration. Reforms do not appear to have a 
significant effect in the short term, and hence the average growth slowdown documented above cannot be 
statistically confirmed, as already suggested by our analysis of the medians. Beyond the 5-year horizon, the 
difference between the real and the synthetic level of GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 5% 
level.   
Figure 4. Estimated impact of reforms using a local polynomial regression model 
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We further checked the sign and significance of the divergence between real and synthetic within a simple 
panel random effect (RE) model39, in an SCM variant of match-and-regress (Stuart 2010). More formally, 
we split our sample in before (𝑡 < 0) and after (𝑡 ≥ 0) the reform, and estimated 𝛽1 for: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 [6] 
 
where  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is the standardised gap between real and synthetic counterfactual of episode i at time t, and t is 
a linear time trend40. Results (𝛽1) for the pre- and post-reform period are displayed in Table 3. In line with 
our earlier findings, there is no statistically significant relationship between gaps before reform 
implementation. In the 10 years after t, the impact of reform is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
way to interpret this is that, on average, wide-reaching reforms added 1% to annual growth over a 10-year 
period. As a further check, we exclude extreme outliers41, and show that the sign, size, and significance of 
our measured impact is not substantively affected.  
Table 3. Baseline estimates for a RE model42 
 
In Appendix 7, we re-ran the above model at a country-by-country level. This confirms our suspicion that 
wide-reaching reforms have a heterogeneous impact. However, we can reject (p-value=0.055) that they 
                                                          
39 A standard Hausman specification test suggests within our setting a random effect specification is to be preferred 
to a fixed effect (FE) one. In any case, all results of the paper hold under FE specifications. 
40 An alternative approach would be to run an adapted diff-in-diff panel model, of the sort: 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛿 (𝑡 𝑥 𝐷𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy that takes value 1 for 𝑡 ≥ 0. Our coefficient of interest would be 𝛿 in this case, effectively 
testing whether there is a significant change in the slope of the standardised gap between real and synthetic after the 
reform. This method yields substantially equivalent results to our preferred split sample method, with ?̂?  positive and 
significant (p=0.066) and a 𝛽1 coefficient which is now insignificant, confirming a good model fit.  
41 In the current setting, we define extreme outliers as countries experiencing at any point in time following a reform 
a gap between real and synthetic that is greater of +/- 45p.p., which would suggest the presence of an idiosyncratic 
shock of significant proportions. 
42 The RE model was run using normal standard errors, because of their better small sample properties (Imbens and 
Kolesar 2016). However, our estimates remain robust at the 5% level to the use of cluster-robust or bootstrapped 
(200 repetitions) standard errors, at least in the no-outlier specification. 
pre-reform post-reform
in p.p. [t-10, t-1] [t, t+10]
23 reform episodes: full sample
Divergence between reformers and control -0.013 1.022***
(0.08) (0.38)
15 reform episodes: excluding extreme outliers
Divergence between reformers and control -0.110 0.812***
(0.09) (0.18)
Notes :  β1 coefficients of Model [6] before and after the reform.  Positive values indicate a widening gap 
between reformers and control. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01. See 
text for additional details.
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have been significantly more detrimental to GDP growth than beneficial. Therefore, also in terms of 
proportions, we can confirm the general finding that reform waves have overall worked in the past.  
Reforms in advanced and emerging economies 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the relevant empirical literature has systematically shown how the impact of 
reforms tends to be highly heterogeneous across countries, depending on elements such as the composition 
of reforms or the quality of institutions in a country, as does distance from the technological frontier 
(Christiansen et al. 2013; Prati et al. 2013). Within our empirical setting, these findings cannot be tested 
precisely. This is due to the fact that top reformers are identified as implementing multiple reforms at once, 
but at the same time our small sample setting does not cater for a thorough multivariate regression analysis.  
Building on these premises and caveats, we deem worthwhile exploring whether effects are indeed different 
between advanced43 and emerging markets. Table 4 displays standard RE regression results, now breaking 
down the sample in advanced and emerging, and the effect in short-term and long-term44. Given our sample 
contains only few advanced economies, our results in this respect should be treated with caution.  
With this caveat in mind, we note how the overall positive effect of reforms is confirmed in both instances. 
However, advanced economies seem to have reaped fewer benefits from their extensive reform 
programmes than emerging markets. Moreover, the time profiling of the payoffs seems somewhat different: 
while countries closer to the technological frontier, and probably with better institutions, see benefits from 
reforms reaping already in the first five years, these seem to materialise only in the longer run for emerging 
markets. 
Table 4. Impact of reform estimates for a RE model 
 
                                                          
43 Advanced economy reform episodes are defined here as countries belonging to the OECD in the year the reform 
was implemented. 
44 We divided the post-reform period in half, defining short-term as [t,t+4] and long-term as [t+5,t+10]. While we 
acknowledge that this breakdown is somewhat arbitrary, all our results and significance levels are unaffected by 
changes in the definition of short-term. 
post-reform effect
short term long term
in p.p [t, t+4] [t+5, t+10]
23 reform episodes: full sample
Divergence between reformers and control 1.022*** -0.336 1.556**
(0.38) (0.68) (0.63)
18 reform episodes: emerging markets
Divergence between reformers and control 1.123** -0.651 1.831**
(0.48) (0.86) (0.79)
5 reform episodes: advanced economies
Divergence between reformers and control 0.656*** 0.796** 0.570
(0.18) (0.40) (0.38)
Notes :  β1 coefficients of Model [6] after the reform, subdivided in short- and long term. Positive values indicate a widening gap 
between reformers and control. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01. See text for additional details.
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One argument that could be brought forward to explain this heterogeneous result is that emerging markets 
have a higher propensity of experiencing a financial or macroeconomic crisis (Eichengreen and Hausmann 
2005), leading us to erroneously conclude that reforms only pay off in the longer term in emerging markets. 
We check for this possibility in Table 5. Independently of the definition of short term adopted, or whether 
one excludes countries experiencing a financial- or idiosyncratic crisis, emerging markets do not display a 
similar (positive) effect as the one identified for advanced economies45.  
Table 5. RE Model, short-term impact of reforms in emerging markets 
 
A more plausible explanation for this heterogeneous effect could be that the type of reforms implemented 
were different in nature. While our framework is not appropriate to test the impact of individual reform 
categories, we qualitatively observe indeed a different composition in the average reform package between 
advanced and emerging markets over the analysed period (see Appendix 8). This intuition is further 
confirmed by our case studies, in Section 8. 
In particular, we see that the reform waves of the advanced economies considered: (i) did not contain trade 
liberalisations, (ii) were relatively more skewed towards the liberalisation of the capital account and of 
current account transactions, and (iii) were less characterised by agriculture-, domestic finance- and network 
liberalisation-reforms.  
At the same time, the higher quality of institutions in advanced economies could be playing a role not only 
in the design of country-specific reform packages that are more effective from the onset, but also in 
determining policy credibility. This in turn is crucial to shift private sector incentives and rapidly affect 
growth46. We will return to this discussion in our concluding remarks.  
                                                          
45 Advanced economies in our sample had no experience of currency crisis. While one of them was affected by a 
negative idiosyncratic shock (Norway – 1988), its exclusion does not change the sign and significance of the results 
displayed in Table 4.  
46 Partially lending support to this claim is the fact that following a reform wave, we observe 4 instances of policy 
reversal over the relevant 10-year horizon, all of which were located in emerging markets. Excluding these cases leads 
to a slightly larger positive effect of reform at t+10 (10.1 p.p. vs 6.3 in the baseline).  
in p.p [t, t+4] [t, t+3] [t, t+2]
18 reform episodes: emerging markets
Divergence between reformers and control -0.651 -1.227 -1.861
(0.86) (1.04) (1.52)
12 reform episodes: emerging markets excluding currency crisis at t-1
Divergence between reformers and control -0.797 -1.126 -1.813
(0.83) (0.97) (1.46)
15 reform episodes: emerging market excluding idiosyncratic crisis at t-1
Divergence between reformers and control -0.154 -0.748 -1.054
(0.96) (1.14) (1.66)
short term
Notes :  β1 coefficients of Model [6] for emerging markets only under alternative definitions of short term and macroeconomic 
conditions at t-1. Positive values indicate a widening gap between reformers and control. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, 
** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01. See text for additional details.
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VII. Alternative parametric estimation strategy 
 
In the previous section, we presented our baseline estimates of the impact of wide-reaching reforms on 
growth, based on the non-parametric SCM. Given the novelty of this approach in the literature, in this 
section we show that our findings are not model-specific. In particular, we follow Acemoglu et al (2014) 
and adapt their dynamic panel regression model to provide an alternative estimate of the impact of reforms 
on growth.  
Our alternative parametric estimation model hence takes the form:  
𝑦𝑐𝑡 =  𝛽𝑅𝑐𝑡 + ∑𝛾𝑗𝑦𝑐𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 [7] 
 
where 𝑦𝑐𝑡 is the log of real GDP per capita in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡. 𝑅𝑐𝑡 is a dummy that takes value 1 if 
country 𝑐 is a top reformer and 𝑡 ∈ [𝑇0; 𝑇10], and zero otherwise; while 𝛼𝑐 and 𝛿𝑡 are respectively a full 
set of country- and time- fixed effects and 𝜀𝑐𝑡 is an error term. The specification further includes 𝑝 lags of 
log GDP per capita, to control for the dynamics of GDP.  
In line with Acemoglu et al (2014), we use the standard fixed effect estimator to estimate equation [7]. Table 
6 reports our main results, controlling for different GDP lags. In all specifications, the coefficient of reform 
(?̂?) is multiplied by 100, to ease reading, and standard errors are clustered and robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 6. Effect of reforms on GDP per capita 
 
Column 1 shows the impact of reforms on growth, controlling for one GDP lag. In this specification, we 
are considering all 29 reform episodes identified in Section 4, while from Column 2 onwards we focus only 
on the 23 “best fit” reform episodes to ensure comparability with our baseline SCM results. We note how 
GDP persistence is very high, although a standard t-test excludes a unit root in the empirical process of log 
GDP. Importantly, the impact of reforms is positive and significant, for both specification 1 and 2, 
suggesting our sample restriction in the baseline came without loss of generality. For the same sample of 
wide-reaching reforms considered in the baseline, the implied aggregate impact of reforms at t+10 is 17 
percentage points of GDP (and the p-value below this estimate suggests this result is significant at the 5% 
level). In column 3 and 4, we increase the number of GDP lags, accounting for the rich dynamics of GDP. 
The level of GDP persistence remains comparable to the 1-lag specification in column 2. Moreover, the 
long-term aggregate effect of reform is reduced to 10.3 p.p. (significant at the 10% level), bringing it 
strikingly close to our baseline estimates.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
reform 1.133* 1.536** 1.152** 0.930* 0.853*
(0.585) (0.656) (0.560) (0.515) (0.510)
log GDP first lag 0.962*** 0.962*** 1.146*** 1.140*** 1.122***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035)
log GDP second lag -0.189*** -0.131*** -0.126***
(0.040) (0.037) (0.037)
log GDP third lag -0.049 0.040
(0.033) (0.035)
log GDP fourth lag -0.077***
(0.019)
Long-run effect 12.5 17.0 12.7 10.3 11.3
p-value [0.054] [0.020] [0.041] [0.072] [0.081]
GDP persistence 0.962 0.962 0.957 0.960 0.959
p-value (test<1) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
SCM baseline sample no yes yes yes yes
Reform expectation effect no no no no yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5595 5595 5531 5466 5400
Countries in sample 118 118 118 118 118
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.997
Notes : This table presents estimates of the effect of reform on log GDP per capita using a fixed effect dynamic panel 
regression model. The reported coefficient on reform is multiplied by 100. Long-run effect is the implied aggregate impact 
of reform at t+10, expressed in percentage points, and p-value for this being different from 0. We report the estimated 
persistence of the GDP process and the p-value of this being less than 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See text 
for further details.
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Column 5 displays our preferred specification, including four lags of log GDP47. Within this setting, we 
also control for potential expectation effects in the year anticipating the reform48. The coefficient of reforms 
remains positive and significant, pointing towards a long-term increase in GDP per capita of 11.3 p.p. 
following a reform wave49.  
Finally, in order to trace the yearly dynamics of the impact of reform, we slightly modified equation [7] as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑘,𝑐𝑡
10
𝑘=0
 + ∑𝛾𝑗𝑦𝑐𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 [8] 
 
where  𝑅𝑘,𝑐𝑡 is a dummy that takes value 1 in the kth-year following a reform wave in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡, 
and zero otherwise. Estimated coefficients for various specifications are detailed in Appendix 10. Figure 5 
displays the imputed impact of reform (for the most sensible p=4 specification) and compares it with our 
baseline SCM estimates. Several key takeaways emerge. First, reassuringly, we note that this alternative 
estimation strategy points to strikingly similar reform impact dynamics with respect to our baseline, 
excluding the possibility that our SCM results are entirely a methodological artifact. Second, a panel model 
designed to thoroughly account for the GDP cycle confirms our suspicion that the negative short-term 
dynamics of GDP initially identified by the SCM are not to be imputed to a negative impact of reforms per 
se. Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are reasons to believe that our SCM estimates of the positive 
impact of reforms on GDP per capita are to be treated, at most, as conservative.  
                                                          
47 As illustrated in Appendix 9, four lags seems like the most appropriate specification to map the rich dynamics of 
GDP. An F-test on further lags (up to 10) does not result in a significant improvement in the specification. 
48 Practically, this implied in the estimation of equation [7] introducing on the right-hand side a dummy taking value 
1 for reforming countries in the year preceding a reform. Further reform lags were not significant, suggesting this was 
not to be interpreted as reforming countries displaying substantially different GDP dynamics vis-à-vis the other 
countries in the world, which would point in the direction of some sort of self-selection.   
49 Within this specification, we also found that non-robust standard errors are quite similar to the clustered ones (0.508 
vs 0.510 for reform), which lends support to the conclusion that we are correctly modelling GDP dynamics.  
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Figure 5. Estimated impact of reform: dynamic panel and baseline SCM 
 
Note: bars indicate 95% confidence interval. See Appendix 10 for more details. 
VIII. Robustness checks 
 
Standard statistical testing and alternative specifications omitting outliers or countries experiencing large 
macroeconomic shocks ahead of the reform wave show how our baseline results are stable. In this section, 
we adopt a placebo test, an extended fitting horizon, a falsification test, and alternative indicators of reform 
to show how our results remain robust under a variety of conditions.  
Placebo study  
 
In line with previous SCM studies (Abadie et al. 2010; Mideksa 2013), we carried out an in-time placebo. 
What this test effectively does is pretend there was a reform at time t-10. The fitting of the synthetic control 
therefore takes place over the interval [t-20, t-11] for each country. After that, the two are allowed to 
fluctuate freely. Figure 6 displays the main results. 
As can be seen, the quality of our pre-fictitious-reform fit is inferior to that of the baseline specification. 
However, it must be noted that here we are not applying a “best-fit” filter, but rather displaying results for 
the 23 countries contained in the baseline, for the sake of comparability. Despite some noise, on average 
no clear changing pattern can be observed before and after the fictitious reform at t-10. This is particularly 
true when compared to the effect observed between t and t+10. The divergence between real and synthetic 
measured at t+10 is more than twice larger than any gap observed over the 20 years preceding the reform. 
This specification should therefore put to rest potential concerns related to overfitting in the baseline, or 
else the idea that the reform effect previously identified is just noise that develops as soon as the fit between 
real and synthetic is no longer imposed by the SCM minimisation. Moreover, the delayed positive effect of 
reforms is confirmed. 
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Figure 6. Placebo experiment with fictitious reform wave at t-10  
 
Note: data fit over the 10 years preceding the placebo reform [t-20, t-11], subject to data availability 
In line with the statistical testing presented in the baseline section, we employ our standard RE panel 
regression model to estimate the overall impact of reform in the in-time placebo experiment. Table 7 
presents the baseline and placebo results side-by-side, also breaking the sample between advanced and 
emerging markets. Following the fictitious reform, we do not observe any statistically significant pattern of 
divergence between the real and synthetic control. This contrasts with the baseline case. Moreover, we ran 
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which effectively rejects at the 10% level that the distribution of gaps 
following reform is the same in the case of the baseline and the placebo for both advanced and emerging 
markets.  
Table 7. RE model, impact of reform comparison between alternative specifications 
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baseline placebo
in p.p. [t, t+10] [t-10, t-1]
23 reform episodes: full sample
Divergence between reformers and control 1.022*** -0.352 0.093
(0.38) (0.23)
18 reform episodes: emerging markets
Divergence between reformers and control 1.123** -0.328 0.131
(0.48) (0.27)
5 reform episodes: advanced economies
Divergence between reformers and control 0.656*** -0.439 0.249
(0.18) (0.40)
Notes:  Columns 1 and 2 display β1 coefficients of Model [6] after the reform in the baseline and placebo 
specifications. Positive values indicate a widening gap between reformers and control. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01. Italics denote significant differences in the K-S test at the 10 
percent level. See text for additional details.
K-S maximum 
difference
post-reform 
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Extended fitting time horizon 
 
As with all macroeconomic studies related to estimating the impact of important policy changes across 
countries, one of the key concerns could be that of self-selection into the sample. Ultimately, it could be 
that there are some unobservable characteristics, which make reforms possible and at the same time have 
an impact on subsequent GDP realisations. Within our empirical setting, while not fully dissipated, there 
are reasons to believe these concerns are of somewhat minor order with respect to alternative estimation 
techniques.  
Abadie et al. (2010) formally show that once a good match has been established over GDP and observable 
covariates, the bias originating from time-varying unobservable confounders tends to zero as the fitting 
horizon tends to infinity. Intuitively, if the synthetic replicates correctly the yearly evolution of GDP of our 
country of interest, then the likelihood that factors – both observable and unobservable – that have an 
impact on GDP will be matched by the control increases as the time span of the fitting horizon widens. 
To diminish concerns related to potential unobservable characteristics, we double the fitting horizon from 
10 to 20 years before the reform wave. As can be seen in Figure 7, our standard results remain unaltered 
for both the short- and medium term. The final t+10 impact is entirely proportional to what is observed in 
the baseline scenario (5.9p.p. vs 6.3p.p. in the standard specification). The quality of the pre-reform fit is 
slightly worse than in the baseline scenario, for the same reasons remarked in the in-time placebo case. 
Nonetheless, we note that the final reading of the average reform impact at t+10 is over five standard 
deviations above the pre-reform mean.   
Figure 7. Average trend in GDP per capita: reform countries versus synthetic control with extended 
20yr pre-reform fitting period 
 
Note: based on baseline countries, subject to data availability 
Falsification test 
 
Another form of placebo test consists in applying the SCM to countries that have not had significant reform 
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waves, and observing how their gap evolves vis-à-vis our baseline. This gives us a sense of the forecasting 
power of our SCM, in the absence of reform waves (a topic we analyse in further depth in Appendix 11). 
Generalising the approach of Abadie et al (2015) to a multi-country setting, we systematically applied the 
SCM as if a reform wave had happened in every country in each donor pool, using the others to build a 
counterfactual. After applying our standard “best fit” filter, we were left with 232 fictitious reform episodes 
and their respective synthetic control, which we then aggregated as in the baseline.  
Figure 8 shows how, in the absence of a common reform episode across the countries considered, our 
model accurately tracks GDP on average. Moreover, this result lends a strong hand to the assumption that 
lays at the heart of our cross-country application of the SCM, namely that idiosyncratic shocks will be 
broadly symmetric and therefore that our average impact estimator is asymptotically consistent.  
Figure 8. Placebo experiment with fictitious reform wave at t for all controls 
 
Building on these results, we decided to exploit this setting to get a further inferential sense of how 
significant our baseline results are. We hence computed the average gap at t+10 of a random draw of 23 
fictitious reform episodes from the whole control pool50. By means of bootstrapping (with over 60,000 
repetitions), we obtained a distribution of this average impact of a fictitious reform, which intuitively gives 
us a sense of the precision of the SCM within our setting. The resulting p-value of our baseline impact of 
reform was 0.07. The intuition behind this is that there is less than a 7% probability that a result as large as 
our baseline impact of reform at t+10 was simply random (Appendix 12).  
                                                          
50 The donor pool for each control was built using the standard +/-50% of income rule we used in the baseline. We 
further imposed the condition that episodes randomly drawn could not be from the same country. 
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Alternative indicators of structural reforms  
 
A last overarching element of concern with our empirical estimation could be that the database used for 
our baseline specification does not correctly capture episodes of wide-reaching structural reform or 
improperly identifies the year of inception of a reform wave. To dissipate at least partially these concerns, 
we apply our methodology to an alternative, but comparable, list of wide-reaching reform episodes, as 
identified by IMF (2015). In this setting, the list of policy reform indicators used to identify reform waves 
is wider, going beyond the Giuliano et al (2013) variables, to include elements such as: (i) legal system and 
property rights, (ii) hiring and firing regulations, (iii) collective bargaining, (iv) infrastructure, and (v) R&D 
spending. It is hence unsurprising that IMF (2015) obtains a longer list of reform episodes (as reported in 
Appendix 13).  
Notwithstanding having some appealing characteristics, including reform breadth and a larger n, there are 
valid reasons that led us to avoid using this database for our baseline analysis. First, the IMF database 
includes variables that are not commonly referred to as “structural reforms”, like expenditure in 
infrastructure or R&D. Second, while some of the indicators are the same as those used by Giuliano et al 
(2013), part of the variables are based on opinion surveys (hiring and firing, for example), which are 
notoriously exposed to subjective biases and tend to be highly correlated with the business cycle more than 
policy change. This could in turn lead to a fuzzy identification of the reform wave’s inception year. Third, 
as part of the indicators used is based on proprietary data, using this database would have forced us to take 
the list of reform episodes as given, without allowing in depth analysis of the specific cases and variables 
(as we did in Appendix 5). Nonetheless, this alternative list contains information that can prove useful to 
build a robustness check for our analysis.  
After applying our standard filters to the IMF reform wave list, excluding countries experiencing wars, with 
a population under 1.5 million, and reform episodes that are less than 10 years apart from each other, we 
remain with 29 episodes. Once we further apply our RMSPE-based “best fit” filter, to ensure the SCM is 
successfully replicating GDP per capita in the pre-reform period, this number comes down to 22. Finally, 
in order to ensure a relevant robustness check to our baseline specification, we sift out the countries that 
implemented reforms in the fields that are covered by the Giuliano et al (2013) database. This leaves 13 
episodes for 12 countries.  
First of all, it is interesting to note that more than 60% of the reform episodes identified in such a way 
correspond to those considered for our baseline, though the exact inception years tend to vary somewhat 
for the reasons discussed above51.  
                                                          
51 We considered the episode identified using IMF data to be the same as that using Giuliano et al (2013) data if the 
inception dates were at most three years apart from each other. The choice of this interval is intuitively based on the 
methodology we originally adopted to identify reform waves, as discussed in Section 3.  
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Table 8. RE model, impact of reform for episodes based on IMF (2015) 
 
Table 8 displays our standard RE model estimations of the impact of reforms, for episodes comparable to 
our baseline. It also zooms in specifically on the episodes that were not captured by our baseline setting52. 
All main results from our baseline specification are broadly confirmed: the post-reform effect is positive 
and significant. In particular, reform benefits tend to materialise over the longer term. This is true also when 
focussing on the reform waves missed by our baseline specification. The fact that point estimates are 
somewhat higher should come as no surprise given these countries were by IMF definition all 
simultaneously implementing complementary measures to the ones identified in the baseline. The visual 
display of these results further confirms that top reformers identified with a slightly modified methodology 
experienced broadly similar subsequent growth patterns to our baseline cases (see Appendix 14).   
IX. Economic reform: focus on two case studies 
 
When speaking of the SCM, Billmeier and Nannicini (2013, p. 985) refer to it as “a methodology that builds 
data-driven comparative case studies within a unified statistical framework”. A great advantage of our approach vis-à-
vis standard panel regressions is that it allows us to look in detail at individual countries to explore their 
reform history and subsequent GDP evolution. In the words of Rodrik (2003, p. 10), this can be particularly 
valuable when speaking about growth processes as “case studies and cross-national econometrics are not substitutes 
for each other. […] Any cross-national empirical regularity that cannot be meaningfully verified on the basis of country studies 
should be regarded as suspect”.  
In this section, we therefore look at two specific episodes of deep reform, to put in a specific context the 
general findings identified above. In particular, we look at the reform episodes starting in the Dominican 
Republic in 1989, and in Belgium in 1988. The choice of these two countries is based on several grounds. 
First, they represent an emerging and advanced economy. Second, they are located in two different 
continents. Third, the reforms took place broadly at the same time. Finally, while the Dominican Republic 
undertook broad reforms touching on deregulation, liberalisation, and macroeconomic stabilisation, 
Belgium focussed on financial reforms of the exchange rate and banking sector.  
                                                          
52 These are specifically: Bolivia – 1988, Chile – 1984, Cameron – 1993, Hungary – 1993, and Slovakia – 1999. 
pre-reform post-reform
[t-10, t-1] [t, t+10]
short term long term
in p.p. [t, t+4] [t+5, t+10]
13 reform episodes: full comparable sample
Divergence between reformers and control -0.113 2.177*** 1.245 2.437**
(0.12) (0.55) (0.93) (1.00)
5 reform episodes: not captured by baseline
Divergence between reformers and control -0.227 1.787*** 0.344 2.351***
(0.21) (0.28) (0.55) (0.62)
Notes :  β1 coefficients of Model [6] before and after the reform, further subdivided in short- and long term. Positive values indicate a 
widening gap between reformers and control. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01. See text for additional 
details.
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For both countries, our synthetic control reproduces very closely GDP per capita in the pre-reform period 
(Appendix 15). As shown in Appendix 16, also the covariates are reproduced in a satisfactory manner, 
possibly with the exception of Belgium’s extraordinary degree of openness to trade. Moreover, the 
composition of the synthetic sounds intuitively sensible, with neighbouring Panama and Guatemala 
together composing more than half of “synthetic Dominican Republic”, and France having a strong 
presence in Belgium’s control.  
In line with our cross-country empirical evidence, Figure 9 and 10 below illustrate how in the Dominican 
Republic short-term losses were followed by medium term gains. On the other hand, Belgium experienced 
a positive reform impact from the onset of reform, though the gap stabilised in the medium run. Ten years 
after the reforms were implemented, the GDP per capita gains in the Dominican Republic were more 
significant than in Belgium (18p.p. above counterfactual, versus 13p.p.). In the remainder of this section, 
we detail the historical, economic, and political context characterising the two countries, and detailing what 
reforms were exactly implemented. 
A Latin American story: Dominican Republic in the 1990s53 
 
Under the first term of President Joaquin Balaguer, the Dominican Republic of the late 80s was a country 
characterised by both monetary and fiscal imbalances. At the turn of the decade, the economy deteriorated 
sharply due to a combination of exogenous shocks: a drop in the price of ferronickel (the country’s main 
export) and a rise in oil prices, in the run up to the Gulf War. This squeezed government revenues. At this 
point, in an effort to secure the support of the business community ahead of the 1990 elections, Balaguer 
embarked on a wide-reaching reform programme (Espinal 1995).  
The “New Economic Program”, as it was known, was later supported by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement 
from August 1991 onwards. Aside from price and interest rate liberalisations, deregulation, financial sector 
reform, a tax reform, and an exchange rate devaluation, it rested heavily on fiscal consolidation. The primary 
balance went from a deficit of about 5 percent of GDP in 1989 to a surplus of almost 2 percent in 1991-
92 (IMF 2001). Moreover, to bring inflation under control, monetary policy was tightened. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Figure 9 shows how this policy mix led to short-term losses. However, reforms did lead to 
considerable gains in the medium run.  
                                                          
53 This section draws heavily from IMF (2001). 
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Figure 9. GDP per capita: Dominican Republic (Real) and synthetic control (Synth) 
 
In 1994, the country held once more a presidential election and an interim government was formed. While 
the new administration lacked the necessary support to push forward on further reforms, it did refrain from 
reversing the previous ones. As noted by IMF (2001), by the mid-1990s, the Dominican Republic ranked 
among the world’s fastest-growing countries. 
Financial reforms in Europe: a case study of Belgium54  
 
Towards the end of the 80s, Belgium implemented significant financial sector reforms, which had the 
appealing empirical characteristic of being exogenously imposed from an EU directive, but at the same time 
being specifically targeted at Belgium’s peculiar financial system arrangement. This is important as it implies 
that although France has a large weight in the synthetic control, and is equally an EU member, it did not 
face a similar reform shock because of the directive.  
Externally, as reported by Grilli (1989), important steps were being taken in terms of European integration. 
The Single Market Act was signed in February 1986, establishing 1992 as the deadline for completing the 
internal market. This is of particular relevance to Belgium as, since 1955, it had been operating a dual 
exchange rate system together with Luxembourg. Because of the way the system was designed vis-a-vis 
current account transactions, Wyplosz (1999, p. 5) argues that it was a form of “market-based capital 
control” which insulated the monetary authorities from international flows. As such, a 1988 European 
directive designed to liberalise fully capital movements in the community, explicitly required the abolition 
of the Belgian-Luxembourgish dual exchange rate system. In compliance with European law, this was 
abandoned in March 1990.  
At the same time, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, Belgian banks had been separated in two 
categories: deposit- and investment banks. The former were only allowed to collect deposits and invest 
                                                          
54 This section draws heavily from Wyplosz (1999). 
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them in short-term loans, with the result that by 1945 they had specialised in rolling over government debt. 
In exchange, the government effectively allowed these banks to form a cartel.  
Just as in the case of the Dominican Republic, the (exogenous) oil price shock set in motion a process that 
led to the reform episode defined by Wyplosz (1999, p. 6) as the “big bang of the 1989-91” and the end of 
the banking system cartel. As the debt to GDP ratio hovered above the 100% mark, the government needed 
to find urgent ways to cut the cost of debt service. To do so, it effectively started borrowing at cheaper 
rates from foreign investors, rather than making use of direct deals with domestic banks. At this point, the 
separation of banks in two categories lost its meaning and was effectively scrapped. At the same time, the 
oligopolistic setting of deposit rates was abolished. Ultimately, in line with the requirements of the Single 
European Act, the Belgian banking system was fully liberalised and integrated in the common market for 
financial services.     
Figure 10. GDP per capita: Belgium (Real) and synthetic control (Synth) 
 
The impact of these reforms is displayed in Figure 10. Financial reforms had an immediate and progressively 
growing impact on the Belgian economy over the short run. After this acceleration, growth stabilised in line 
with the synthetic control. Ten years after the reforms were implemented, the country was doing 
significantly better than in the counterfactual scenario.  
X. Conclusions 
 
“Structural reforms” are very much the buzzword of the moment, often presented as the silver bullet to 
reignite growth both in advanced and emerging markets. But have they worked in the past? Our novel 
empirical approach suggests that, over a period of four decades and across continents, on average, they did. 
Countries implementing wide-reaching reform programmes have seen their GDP per capita expand over a 
10-year horizon, with an average reform effect of 6.3 percentage points. To put this into perspective, over 
the past decade, at a time of so-called “great convergence” (Baldwin 2016), the GDP per capita gap between 
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high- and upper-middle-income countries55 has shrunk by a comparable 5.9 percentage points. As such, the 
policy perspective presented in the introduction seems vindicated. 
This finding however does not clash necessarily with the view that reform packages only work when tailored 
to the local context. Average point estimates mask a large degree of heterogeneity in their impact. Within 
our sample, in three out of ten instances, wide-reaching reforms ended up having a detrimental impact on 
average GDP growth. As such, a deep understanding of country-specific factors seems all the more 
important to increase the chances of designing a successful reform strategy.  
Reforms also had a heterogeneous effect across advanced and emerging economies, with the former 
observing significant benefits materialise already over the first five years. Reading this result within the 
context of the relevant institutional literature on the subject, suggests a potential important role for policy 
credibility. As discussed by Rodrik (2000), the success of reforms in fostering growth crucially hinges on 
shifting the expectations of the private sector. By protecting more strongly property rights and enjoying the 
legitimacy originating from participatory and decentralised political systems, high quality institutions as 
observed in advanced economies are better placed to produce credible policy changes, refrain from policy 
reversals, and generate changes in incentives more rapidly.  
It could be argued, as done by Rodrik (2000), that policymaking is to be seen as an exercise of continuous 
problem-solving, and therefore that high quality institutions are better placed to identify the “right policies” 
to respond to ongoing challenges. However, having a shorter horizon over which reforms pay out could 
also be increasing the political return to reforms, hence making their systematic adoption more likely, and 
therefore contributing to explaining the lack of long-term convergence observed in the past. This 
interpretation of the results suggests new channels through which high-quality institutions might be a crucial 
catalyser for growth, while reconciling that with the other growth perspectives.   
Analysing the interaction between policy reform, quality of institutions, political incentives, and long-term 
growth will surely remain a prosperous avenue for further research.   
                                                          
55 World Bank definitions. 
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Appendix 1. Monte Carlo experiment supporting multi-country application of the SCM 
To support our methodological contribution, as described in equations [4] and [5], we designed a Monte 
Carlo experiment to study the speed at which the average treatment effect becomes less affected by 
transitionary shock as 𝑛 increases.  
First of all we collected a matrix of effects of reforms 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 for our baseline set of results 
over the ten year horizon analysed. We subtracted to this matrix the average treatment effect of each period 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾𝑖
∗ 𝒀𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) − ?̂?𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑡 obtaining a country specific effect additive to the average treatment 
effect for each period; such value might be interpreted as an estimate of the difference between the 
transitionary shocks of the treated and the synthetic country (𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑾∗𝜺𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙). Once we obtained 
these estimate of the transitionary shocks, we calculated the standard deviation for each treated unit and 
inputted such standard deviations into a Monte Carlo experiment. 
For each one of the 23 cases that compose our baseline results, we generated ten thousands simulation with 
as mean the average treatment effect ?̂?𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑡 and a standard deviation calculated as described above. Finally, 
we randomly sampled from the simulation and calculated the average treatment effect increasing the sample 
size, with 𝑛 going from 1 to 50. The fan chart of such experiment shows how the uncertainty associated to 
a transitionary shock shrinks rapidly as 𝑛 increases. At a 95% confidence level, the average treatment effect 
would not be different from zero up to 𝑛 = 12, while with our sample size 𝑛 = 23, the 95% percentile 
interval ranges from 2% to 11%. This suggests that it is very unlikely that the positive average effect of 
reform at T+10 that we observe in the baseline can be entirely dictated by transitionary shocks. 
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Appendix 2. Full list of reform wave episodes based on Giuliano (2013) database 
Country Year Agriculture Network 
utilities 
Trade 
liberalisation 
Capital account Current 
account 
transactions 
Domestic 
finance 
Albania 1991 
    
X X 
Argentina 1974 
   
X X X 
Argentina 1987 
   
X X 
 
Belgium 1988 
    
X X 
Bolivia 1982 
    
X X 
Brazil 1987 X 
 
X 
   
Bulgaria 1997 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Chile 1973 
  
X 
  
X 
Colombia 1988 
   
X X X 
Dominican Republic 1989 
 
X 
   
X 
Ecuador 1989 
  
X 
  
X 
Egypt 1990 X 
    
X 
El Salvador 1995 
 
X 
 
X 
  
Ghana 1996 X X 
    
Jamaica 1988 X 
  
X X 
 
Kenya 1993 
  
X X 
  
Mexico 1988 
   
X 
 
X 
New Zealand 1981 X 
  
X X 
 
Norway 1988 
 
X 
  
X 
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Peru 1987 
  
X 
 
X 
 
Philippines 1961 
  
X 
 
X 
 
Portugal 1990 
   
X X 
 
Romania 2000 
 
X 
 
X 
  
Sri Lanka 1991 X 
   
X 
 
Tanzania 1991 X 
   
X X 
Tunisia 1992 
   
X 
 
X 
Uganda 1990 X 
   
X 
 
United Kingdom 1976 
   
X X 
 
Venezuela 1987 
   
X X 
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Appendix 3. Data sources 
Variables Description Unit Source 
GDP per capita 
Expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPP (in mil. 2005 
US $) divided by Population 
2005 International dollar 
per person Penn World 
Table 8.1 Population Population  Millions 
Population growth Population growth Annual % 
Investment 
Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 
2005 constant prices 
% of GDP Penn World 
Table 7.0 
Openness Exports plus imports at 2005 constant prices % of GDP 
Secondary Completion ratio for secondary education 
% of population aged 25 
and over 
Barro and Lee 
(2013) 
 Tertiary Completion ratio for tertiary education 
Industry 
Value added by Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities, and 
Construction  
% of GDP UN Data 
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Appendix 4. Standardised RMSPE  
Figure 1 displays the standardised RMSPE of each reform episode over the period [t-10,t-1]. It is evident 
that the GDP of some reforming countries is poorly replicated by their respective synthetic control.  In 
particular, we can see that the 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑 are already somewhat clustered between good matches 
(𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑 < 7%) and bad matches (𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑑 > 11%). As such, it looks reasonable to impose a 
threshold 𝛾 = 7%. We note that changes around this level would not alter the selection of countries.  
Figure 1. Quality of the fit over [t-10,t-1] 
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Appendix 5. Policy stance of top reformers and controls 
In selecting the counterfactual, we imposed that countries in the donor pool could not have experienced a 
reform wave over the time horizon of interest [t-10, t+10]. However, that does not require that the treated 
and control unit had a similar policy stance (or level of liberalisation) before the reform wave. Moreover, it 
could be that also the control was carrying out liberalisation at the time, just not in a wave. To dispel 
potential concerns in this respect, the Figure below displays the average difference in policy stance 
(computed as the average of the six policy indicators in the original Giuliano et al (2013) database) between 
treated and control, and 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Before t0, we fail to reject at any standard level of confidence (see Table below) that there was a statistical 
difference in the average level of liberalisation between treated and control. At t0, a reform wave drew a 
wedge between treated and control. Most importantly perhaps, after that, the gap between the two was not 
reversed, as the policy stance of treated and control proceeded on parallel trends.  
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time Real Synth diff p-value
t-10 1.35 1.14 0.21 0.218
t-9 1.45 1.20 0.25 0.176
t-8 1.54 1.29 0.25 0.216
t-7 1.57 1.31 0.26 0.199
t-6 1.59 1.32 0.27 0.170
t-5 1.58 1.39 0.19 0.370
t-4 1.60 1.43 0.17 0.442
t-3 1.72 1.51 0.21 0.343
t-2 1.72 1.58 0.15 0.503
t-1 1.80 1.71 0.09 0.655
t0 1.75 1.81 -0.06 0.751
t1 2.04 1.88 0.17 0.463
t2 2.39 2.00 0.39 0.103
t3 3.13 2.09 1.04 0.000
t4 3.27 2.18 1.09 0.000
t5 3.43 2.29 1.14 0.000
t6 3.38 2.23 1.15 0.000
t7 3.42 2.34 1.08 0.000
t8 3.44 2.37 1.08 0.000
t9 3.47 2.42 1.05 0.000
t10 3.44 2.37 1.07 0.000
Average policy stance
Notes : Policy stance computed as the average among the six 
policy indicators from Giuliano et al (2013). P-values<0.05 in 
bold.
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Appendix 6. Composition of synthetic controls 
 
 
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Peru 0.46 1.6% Thailand 0.78 0.0% France 0.9 9.2% Morocco 0.47 0.0%
Sri Lanka 0.29 0.0% Chile 0.17 3.8% Singapore 0.06 0.6% Mongolia 0.35 0.0%
Romania 0.22 0.0% China 0.05 0.0% Greece 0.04 2.8% Zimbabwe 0.13 0.0%
Zambia 0.03 0.0% 0.6% 8.4% Ghana 0.04 0.0%
0.8% 0.0%
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Costa Rica 0.25 0.2% Mexico 0.47 1.4% Costa Rica 0.41 0.1% Guatemala 0.32 0.8%
Morocco 0.25 1.0% Uruguay 0.31 2.9% South Africa* 0.27 0.0% Romania 0.19 0.0%
Korea, Rep 0.18 0.1% Peru 0.11 1.4% Zimbabwe 0.13 0.0% Panama 0.19 0.2%
Uruguay 0.17 27.2% Hong Kong 0.1 0.0% Thailand 0.08 0.0% Philippines 0.18 0.0%
Zimbabwe 0.16 0.1% Romania 0.01 0.0% Uruguay 0.08 0.4% Zimbabwe 0.11 0.0%
5.0% 1.7% Turkey 0.03 0.0% 0.3%
0.1%
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Iran 0.43 0.0% Lesotho* 0.32 0.0% Mali 0.58 0.0% Pakistan 0.47 0.0%
Panama 0.42 0.8% Lao 0.27 0.0% Nepal 0.22 0.0% Honduras 0.17 0.0%
Thailand 0.15 0.0% Mongolia 0.16 0.0% Burundi 0.11 0.0% Lesotho* 0.17 0.2%
0.3% China 0.13 0.1% Central African Republic 0.08 0.0% Zambia 0.1 0.0%
Congo, Rep. 0.08 0.0% 0.0% Benin 0.09 0.1%
Honduras 0.03 0.0% 0.0%
0.0%
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Mauritania 0.44 0.0% Australia 0.46 4.7% Switzerland 0.51 0.7% Morocco 0.35 0.0%
Côte d'Ivoire 0.26 0.0% Sweden 0.22 0.1% Italy 0.3 0.6% Philippines 0.35 0.0%
Cambodia 0.21 0.0% Uruguay 0.21 0.0% Singapore 0.12 0.2% Chile 0.3 1.6%
Benin 0.1 0.0% Israel 0.1 0.1% Japan 0.06 0.4% 0.5%
0.0% 2.2% 0.6%
Trade link between real and synthetic
Dominican Republic 1989
Trade link between real and synthetic
Trade link between real and synthetic
Argentina 1987 Begium 1988
Trade link between real and synthetic
Bolivia 1982
Trade link between real and synthetic
Brazil 1987
Trade link between real and synthetic
Chile 1973
Trade link between real and synthetic
Colombia 1988
Trade link between real and synthetic
Argentina 1974
Ghana 1996
Trade link between real and synthetic
Kenya 1993
Trade link between real and synthetic
New Zeland 1981
Trade link between real and synthetic
Norway 1988
Trade link between real and synthetic
Peru 1987
Trade link between real and synthetic
Ecuador 1989
Trade link between real and synthetic
Egypt 1990
Trade link between real and synthetic
El Salvador 1995
Trade link between real and synthetic
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*indicates data for the overall Southern African Customs Union was used 
 
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Brazil 0.82 0.0% Spain 0.47 6.2% South Africa 0.62 0.0% Pakistan 0.44 1.2%
Thailand 0.13 0.1% Poland 0.33 0.0% Peru 0.29 0.1% Morocco 0.32 0.0%
Paraguay 0.05 0.0% Korea, Rep. 0.14 0.1% China 0.08 0.1% China 0.21 0.2%
0.0% Singapore 0.04 0.1% 0.1% Mongolia 0.03 0.0%
Turkey 0.01 0.2% 0.6%
3.0%
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Country
Weight in the 
synthetic
Weight of reformer in 
the export basket at t-1
Thailand 0.54 0.0% Mozambique 0.29 0.0% Denmark 0.57 18.8%
Panama 0.15 0.0% Malawi 0.22 0.0% Uruguay 0.39 4.7%
Indonesia 0.15 0.0% Nepal 0.19 0.0% Australia 0.04 4.5%
South Africa* 0.15 0.0% Cambodia 0.15 0.0% 12.7%
0.0% Mali 0.14 0.0%
0.0%
Sri Lanka 1991
Trade link between real and synthetic
Tunisia 1992
Trade link between real and synthetic
Uganda 1990
Trade link between real and synthetic
Great Britain 1976
Trade link between real and synthetic
Philippines 1961
Trade link between real and synthetic
Portugal 1990
Trade link between real and synthetic
Romania 2000
Trade link between real and synthetic
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Appendix 7. Country-level estimates 
Taking full advantage of the granular nature of our SCM application, in this Appendix we explored the 
heterogeneity of reform waves impact. To do so, we computed the diff-in-diff estimator discussed in 
Section 5 for each reform episode.  
 
The bottom part of the table shows the proportion of reform episodes displaying a positive and significant 
impact at the 5% level. We then tested and rejected (p=0.055) that reforms were significantly detrimental 
to growth more often than they were beneficial.  
epsd
Diff-in-diff     
estimator
p-value
EGY1990 14.22 0.000
ARG1987 12.06 0.000
ROU2000 7.30 0.000
LKA1991 2.71 0.000
TUN1992 2.64 0.001
GBR1976 2.13 0.000
DOM1989 2.40 0.005
BEL1988 1.20 0.011
NZL1981 1.08 0.016
UGA1990 2.13 0.032
NOR1988 2.04 0.034
ARG1974 1.25 0.083
SLV1995 0.66 0.168
GHA1996 -0.21 0.743
COL1988 -1.00 0.002
PRT1990 -0.85 0.082
BRA1987 0.78 0.605
KEN1993 -2.65 0.000
PHL1961 -4.20 0.000
CHL1973 -3.59 0.006
PER1987 -3.20 0.028
BOL1982 -4.87 0.000
ECU1989 -5.85 0.000
proportion
success 0.48
failure 0.30
diff 0.17 0.055
Notes: Diff-in-diff estimator for each reform wave episode. Bold 
indicates significance at the 5% level. Success/failure defined as 
positive/negative and significant impact, over all reform wave episodes. 
See text for further details.
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Appendix 8. Relative composition of reform waves in advanced and emerging markets 
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Appendix 9. Effect of lags on log GDP per capita 
 
  
4 lags 6 lags 8 lags 10 lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP first lag 1.122*** 1.117*** 1.122*** 1.119***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.042)
log GDP second lag -0.126*** -0.141*** -0.157*** -0.170***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.045)
log GDP third lag 0.040 0.065* 0.081*** 0.102***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.026) (0.032)
log GDP fourth lag -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.082***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
p-value first four lags [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value additional lags [0.330] [0.198] [0.486]
Observations 5400 5272 5156 5040
Countries in sample 118 118 118 118
Notes : This table presents estimates of lagged GDP per capita on GDP per capita. In each 
column we add a different number of lags as specificed in the column table. Only the 
coefficients of the first four lags are reported. Below each model we report the p-value for a test 
of joint significance of the first four lags, and the p-value of the additional lags. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 10. Estimated yearly impact of reform 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
reform impact at:
t0 0.0141 0.00913 0.00747 0.00689 0.00756
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
t1 0.012 0.00767 0.00524 0.00476 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
t2 0.000264 -0.00296 -0.00825 -0.0105 -0.00985
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
t3 0.0235** 0.0223*** 0.0187** 0.0158** 0.0163**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
t4 0.0303* 0.0247 0.0205 0.0188 0.0193
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
t5 0.0273** 0.0212 0.0163 0.0153 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
t6 0.0199 0.0147 0.0143 0.0117 0.0123
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
t7 0.0270*** 0.0235*** 0.0232*** 0.0220** 0.0226**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
t8 0.016 0.0114 0.0115 0.0107 0.0112
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
t9 0.011 0.0086 0.00816 0.00797 0.008
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
t10 -0.0114 -0.0128* -0.0142** -0.0151** -0.0147**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overall reform effect 17.2 12.9 10.4 8.9 11.4
p-value [0.021] [0.040] [0.070] [0.099] [0.078]
Number of GDP lags 1 2 3 4 4
SCM baseline sample yes yes yes yes yes
Reform expectation effect no no no no yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5595 5531 5466 5400 5400
Countries in sample 118 118 118 118 118
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.997 0.997
Notes : This table presents estimates of the yearly effect of reform on log GDP per capita using a fixed effect 
dynamic panel regression model. Long-run effect is the implied aggregate impact of reform by t+10, expressed in 
percentage points, and p-value for this being different from 0. We estimate this for different numbers of GDP lags 
(coefficients not reported). In all specifications we include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 11. Forecasting power of the SCM 
Given the novelty of the SCM approach in the literature, we compared the forecasting quality of our model 
vis-à-vis more standard techniques used to create long-term GDP growth counterfactuals. In doing so, we 
build on Pritchett et al (2016), and their ‘no regression to the mean’ and ‘full regression to the mean’ 
scenarios. In practice, we forecasted GDP for the 232 non-reform episodes identified in the main text using 
the long-term (10-year) average growth rate in the period [t-10, t-1]. Alternatively, we used the world average 
growth rate as counterfactual. As a further comparator model, we used a standard AR(1) process56. The 
table below shows the RMSPE – as a measure of aggregate forecasting error – for the SCM, and the 
difference from this baseline model, over the next 11-year horizon used in this paper. From t3 onwards, 
the SCM produces a higher-quality forecast than any of the three other models. To check this statistically, 
we used a standard Diebold-Mariano test. From t7 onwards, we can reject at the 5% level that the 10-year 
average model and the AR(1) were producing an equal-quality forecast vis-à-vis the SCM. This becomes 
true also for the world-average model at t10.   
  
                                                          
56 Given two non-reform episodes displayed non-stationarity, the AR(1) process was applied only to 230 episodes. 
SCM 10y avg AR(1) World avg
t0 455 -83 -97 -132
[0.992] [0.996] [1.000]
t1 660 40 25 -60
[0.202] [0.308] [0.947]
t2 825 99 84 -8
[0.087] [0.129] [0.560]
t3 999 105 100 51
[0.118] [0.128] [0.271]
t4 1165 142 151 109
[0.084] [0.073] [0.162]
t5 1338 115 134 84
[0.124] [0.085] [0.247]
t6 1522 160 176 126
[0.086] [0.055] [0.179]
t7 1682 267 244 179
[0.029] [0.024] [0.123]
t8 1886 310 257 154
[0.023] [0.020] [0.173]
t9 1973 500 433 222
[0.003] [0.003] [0.113]
t10 2108 652 578 418
[0.000] [0.000] [0.022]
Difference from baseline
Notes : Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) estimates for the SCM baseline model run over 
232 non reform-wave countries, and differences from this for alternative models. P-values based on 
Diebold-Mariano test. Bold indicates significance at the 5% level. See text for further details. 
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Appendix 12. Distribution of placebo impact of fictitious reform at t+10 
The aim of this exercise was to generalise the construction of a pseudo-p-value (as in Abadie et al. 2015) to 
a multi-country setting. To do so, we selected all the possible donors of the 29 case studies and, excluding 
duplicates, we obtained 345 control cases. We then ran the SCM on all the controls and applied our standard 
“best fit” filter, bringing the number of control cases to 232. We then constructed a large number of random 
sub-samples composed of 23 units, sampling (60,000 repetitions) with replacement but excluding the sub-
samples where a country was present more than once within a time window of 20 years (for example, the 
same sub-sample of 23 units could not contain simultaneously Italy-1990 and Italy-1998). Once this rule 
was applied, this resulted in eight thousand sub-samples of 23 controls, of which we took the average t+10 
gap between real and synthetic control. The distribution of gaps is displayed below. The intuition behind 
this is that there is less than a 7% probability that a result as large as our baseline impact of a reform wave 
at t+10 (6.3 percentage points) was simply random. 
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Appendix 13. Full list of reform episodes as reported in IMF (2015)  
Country Year Ba
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Argentina 1988 X X X 
         
Bolivia 1988 X X 
 
X 
        
Brazil 1985 X X X 
         
Bulgaria 1995 X 
     
X X 
    
Cameroon 1993 X X 
   
X 
      
Chile 1974 X X X 
         
Chile 1984 
 
X X 
       
X 
 
Colombia 1987 X X X 
         
Colombia 2000 
       
X X X 
  
Czech 
Republic 
1995 
      
X X 
 
X 
  
Dominican 
Republic 
2002 
   
X 
    
X X 
  
Ecuador 1988 X X X 
         
Egypt 1999 
  
X 
     
X X 
  
El Salvador 1988 X X 
 
X 
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Estonia 1992 X X 
        
X 
 
Guatemala 1988 X X 
 
X 
        
Guatemala 2000 
   
X 
    
X X 
  
Honduras 2001 
   
X 
    
X X 
  
Hungary 1993 X X 
        
X 
 
Indonesia 1982 X X X 
         
Indonesia 2000 
   
X 
   
X X X 
  
Indonesia 2002 
       
X X X 
  
Israel 2001 
        
X X X 
 
Korea 2001 
   
X 
    
X 
  
X 
Madagascar 1986 X X 
   
X 
      
Nigeria 2002 
  
X X 
     
X 
  
Peru 1986 X 
 
X 
 
X 
       
Peru 1989 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
      
Poland 1995 
      
X 
  
X X 
 
Slovakia 1999 
       
X X 
 
X 
 
Sri Lanka 1989 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
      
Uganda 1989 X 
  
X 
 
X 
      
Venezuela 1974 
 
X 
 
X X 
       
Venezuela 1987 X X X 
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Appendix 14. IMF Robustness check: (Panel A) Average trend in GDP per capita: reform 
countries versus synthetic control (Panel B) estimated impact of reforms  
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Appendix 15. Real (bold line) and synthetic (thin line) GDP per capita trends (in USD millions at 2005 prices) 
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Appendix 16. Matching table (Table 1) and Synthetic control composition (Table 2) for Dominican 
Republic (1989) and Belgium (1988) 
 
Table 1. Matching table 
 
 
Table 2. Synthetic control composition 
 
 
  
Dominican 
Republic
Synthetic 
Control
Belgium
Synthetic 
Control
GDP per capita 4149.3 4145.3 18838.7 18822.7
Investment rate 17.2 20.7 21.4 21.0
Industry share 34.2 34.2 22.4 22.4
Trade openness 60.5 60.5 91.6 46.9
Population growth 2.3 2.3 0.1 0.6
Secondary education 3.8 10.4 14.5 10.1
Tertiary education 1.3 4.3 8.2 4.6
1979-1988 1978-1987
in %
Dominican Republic 
1989 in %
Belgium 
1988
Guatemala 32 France 90
Romania 19 Singapore 6
Panama 19 Greece 4
Philippines 18
Zimbabwe 11
Donor pool size 13 23
RMSPE 123 430
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Chapter 3. Growth acceleration strategies 
By Michele Peruzzi and Alessio Terzi 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Setting a country’s structural growth rate on a higher path, i.e. sparking and sustaining a growth acceleration 
can have quantitatively huge implications for national income and, more broadly, for people’s wellbeing. We 
develop a novel statistical framework to identify systematically the set of binding constraints that were unlocked 
before the 135 growth acceleration episodes that took place between 1962 and 2002 worldwide. We employ 
this information to characterise the acceleration process, which tends to be preceded by a deep recession and 
major economic policy changes. Once we combined this information with a set of counterfactual analyses, we 
find however that successful acceleration strategies should not contain off-the-shelf approaches or necessarily 
all-encompassing “shock therapy” solutions. On the other hand, they call for a careful tailoring to local 
conditions. Richer countries tend to experience fewer accelerations, but once these have been ignited, they are 
better positioned to make the most out of them. Despite standard growth determinants doing a fairly good job 
at characterising successful accelerations, we note how take-offs remain extremely hard to engineer with a high 
degree of certainty. 
 
 
Keywords: growth accelerations, economic growth, economic reform, structural breaks 
JEL Classifications: B41, E02, E65, F43, O11 
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I. Introduction  
 
Achieving and sustaining high growth has been and remains the single most pressing economic policy priority 
for elected officials all over the world. It is then not surprising that understanding how and why some countries 
developed faster than others has been on top of economists’ minds for now over two centuries.    
Over the past three decades, starting with Barro (1991), the economic literature has been characterised by 
quantitative cross-country analyses that looked for correlates of growth or GDP per capita, and issued blanket 
policy advice calling for trade liberalisation (Sachs and Warner 1995), domestic financial liberalisation (Levine 
1997), opening the capital account (Quinn 1997), improving institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001), and the likes.   
Around the same period, some authors were taking the contrarian view that there is little to be learned from 
cross-country regressions, because (i) long-term averages hide the fact that growth is highly unstable over time 
(Easterly et al. 1993; Pritchett 2000); and (ii) growth determinants are highly dependent on specific country 
circumstances (Rodrik 1995). Addressing (i), Hausmann et al (2005) moved on to analysing structural breaks in 
growth. Turning to (ii), Hausmann et al (2007) crafted a “diagnostics” framework to identify the binding 
constraints that hold back a country’s growth.  
Twenty years later, the research approach of multilateral organisation can be characterised as a tendency to 
acknowledge the findings of the latter school of thought, only to then engage in (more modern/sophisticated 
versions of) the old-school cross-country approach (see for example IMF 2015). In this paper, we attempt to 
strike a better balance between the two world views. To do so, we build a novel cross-country statistical 
framework, firmly grounded in the principles of growth diagnostics.  
Our intuition is simple. Growth accelerations are ultimately structural breaks in growth patterns. As such, in 
these countries we would expect to observe significant fluctuations in standard growth determinants around 
the acceleration years, flagging which growth channel was unlocked or category of binding constraint relaxed. 
For this reason, we call our approach Systematic Diagnostics Framework (or SDF). We then use this 
information to inform our knowledge about the 135 growth acceleration episodes that took place between 1962 
and 2002 worldwide. 
The SDF caters for a high degree of country specificity, in both type of policies and growth channels. At the 
same time, it allows us to win the relativism that could stem from a strict application of the “every country is 
different” tenet, and scout instead for general principles that a successful acceleration strategy should respect.  
In line with the literature (Berg et al. 2012; Hausmann et al. 2005), we analyse the factors contributing to igniting 
and sustaining an acceleration separately. Relating to the first, we illustrate how take-offs are generally preceded 
by disproportionate changes in standard growth determinants, in particular significant economic policy changes, 
and sharp recessions. Using an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, we show how the most frequent 
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combination of factors preceding an acceleration is a large increase in the exploitation of natural resources, 
supported by other demand-management or supply-side policies, as was the case for example in Vietnam in 
1989.  
However, once we build a counterfactual analysis, taking into account not only how often acceleration episodes 
were preceded by certain conditions/policies, but also how often those conditions/policies materialised over 
time, we note that there is no strictly dominant strategy to ignite a take-off. In general, increasing the number 
of growth constraints that are relaxed increases the probability of experiencing a take-off only in selected 
instances, and even then, it represents a somewhat marginal and insignificant probability improvement. Despite 
standard growth determinants doing a fairly good job at characterising successful accelerations within our 
framework, we note how take-offs remain extremely hard to engineer with a high degree of certainty. 
Simply sparking a growth acceleration is not the whole story. Its capacity to improve a country’s economic 
outcomes, which is what ultimately matters, crucially depends on whether it was sustained and how large the 
shift in structural growth rates was. In order to quantify the strength of a take-off, we propose a novel 
application of a matching method that allows us to compare the GDP performance of an accelerating country 
with a counterfactual based on geographical and production structure proximity. This approach is 
parsimonious, highly transparent, and can be shown to perform quite well in tracking pre-acceleration growth.   
This leads us to our main results. First, no one specific growth strategy seems to prevail on the others in 
determining acceleration strength. Second, we find that the most successful growth accelerations follow the 
relaxation of few binding constraints in key dimensions, rather than jointly unlocking several growth channels. 
We therefore conclude that a successful acceleration strategy should not contain off the shelf approaches or 
necessarily all-encompassing “shock therapy” solutions. On the other hand, it will call for a careful tailoring to 
local conditions. Third, our quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that institutions have a potential role 
to play in making the most of accelerations, once these have been ignited. 
Throughout the paper, we show how these results are robust to a series of alternative formulations of the 
counterfactual, including by deploying a comprehensive Synthetic Control Model, as in Marrazzo and Terzi 
(2017b). Moreover, we validate our novel SDF approach qualitatively by means of comparison with selected 
country-specific case studies, and quantitatively by means of simulations aimed at showing that the method is 
not simply picking up noise, and instead it is detecting characteristics that are specific to the growth acceleration 
process. 
Literature review 
 
Our chapter relates most to the strand in the literature that was opened by a seminal contribution by Pritchett 
(2000), who illustrated how looking at long-term average growth rates is misleading, as countries tend to 
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experience sharp up and down breaks in their growth time-series. A few years after that, Hausmann et al (2005) 
were the first to employ a Bai-Perron multiple structural break analysis to identify these turning points, and 
correlate them with standard growth determinants. Since then, the acceleration literature has focussed on a) 
improving the structural break methodology to identify turning points (Jong-A-Ping and De Haan 2011; Kar 
et al. 2013; Kerekes 2007); b) exploring different econometric techniques to predict and understand their 
occurrence, such as panel- or binary regressions (Aizenman and Spiegel 2010; Dovern and Nunnenkamp 2007; 
Hausmann et al. 2006; Jones and Olken 2008; Jong-A-Ping and De Haan 2011; Prati et al. 2013), Markov 
switching models (Jerzmanowski 2006; Kerekes 2012), and survival analysis (Berg et al. 2012); and c) focussing 
on specific world regions (Arbache and Page 2009; Imam and Salinas 2008; Timmer and de Vries 2009). Most 
recently, Pritchett et al (2016) have attempted to quantify how large the GDP implications of accelerations are 
vis-à-vis various counterfactuals. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section II introduces our novel Systematic Diagnostic 
Framework and shows how it passes several validation tests. Descriptive statistics and a hierarchical cluster 
analysis are employed in Section III to illustrate key features of the acceleration process. In Section IV, we set 
up a series of counterfactual analyses to formulate some general principles about growth acceleration strategies. 
Section V provides some concluding remarks.  
II. Methodology 
 
The aim of this section is to introduce our novel Systematic Diagnostic Framework, and to explain its 
mechanics. We will then proceed to validate our results by means of qualitative comparison with selected 
country-specific case studies, and quantitative simulations aimed at showing that the method is not simply 
picking up noise and instead it is detecting characteristics that are specific to the growth acceleration process. 
 
a. Introducing the Systematic Diagnostics Framework (SDF) 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, we start from the central tenet of growth diagnostics, as spelt out in Hausmann, 
Rodrik, and Velasco (2007), i.e. the idea that, in each country, growth is ultimately constrained by certain factors. 
For some it is a current account constraint, for others the lack of infrastructure, and so on. If and when the 
“binding constraints” are relaxed, growth accelerates. Because these binding constraints are extremely hard to 
identify ex ante, much of the subsequent efforts in this strand of literature have focussed on developing heuristic 
techniques to identify them (Hausmann et al. 2008).  
 
Our intuition is simple. Growth accelerations, as first defined in Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), are 
structural breaks in growth patterns. As such, in these countries we would expect to observe significant 
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fluctuations in standard growth determinants around the acceleration years, flagging which category of binding 
constraint was relaxed. The central finding originating from the growth acceleration literature is that growth, 
particularly in non-advanced economies, is not a smooth process (Pritchett 2000).  By the same token, we want 
to scout for relatively large sudden changes in variables that the literature has found to be crucial for predicting 
(medium-term) growth. We then want to explore whether there is a significant co-occurrence between the two 
classes of breaks and, if so, to what extent. This will inform our knowledge about characteristics of the 
acceleration process and, implicitly, allow us to draw some general principles about potential growth 
acceleration strategies. 
 
While preserving the country specificity that underlies growth diagnostics, we want to be able to carry it out 
within an integrated framework to draw general lessons about the growth acceleration process, and not only 
understand the specific economic situation of a country. For this reason, we call the statistical framework to do 
so, Systematic Diagnostics Framework (or SDF). In a sense, our challenge is harder than running a standard 
country-specific growth diagnostic exercise, because we want to do it in a systematic, and therefore, entirely 
data-driven framework. However, at the same time, it is also easier, because it should be simpler to identify 
what triggered a sharp change in growth ex post, rather than speculating on the potential bottlenecks in a stagnant 
economy.  
 
b. The SDF in practice 
 
Our SDF is composed of three steps. First, we select relevant growth determinants, second, we identify breaks 
in these variables, and third, we pair this information with growth accelerations. We begin by identifying some 
of the predominant growth theories, and the key variables that they predict as being crucial determinants of 
(short- to medium-term) growth. In doing so, we build on the growth acceleration literature (in particular 
Aizenman and Spiegel 2010; Hausmann et al. 2005; Jones and Olken 2008; Jong-A-Ping and De Haan 2011), 
and the growth determinants literature more broadly (Barro 2003; Durlauf et al. 2008; Moral-Benito 2012; Sala-
i-Martin et al. 2004). While understandingly making overt simplifications, we categorise them along the 
following families57:  
 
1. (Political) institutions: Over the last few decades, several growth theories have placed institutions at the 
centre of the growth process, in particular democracy/political rights (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2014; 
Gwartney et al. 1999; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Persson and Tabellini 2006; Rodrik and Wacziarg 
2005). Moreover, the growth (acceleration) literature has looked at the impact of (the end of) conflict 
                                                          
57 We note that this is not an uncommon practice in this strand of literature. See for example Jones and Olken (2008), or 
Hausmann et al (2005) 
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situations, both civil- and external (Paul Collier and Hoeffler 2004a, 2004b; Hausmann et al. 2005; Hoeffler 
2012; Hoeffler et al. 2010). We therefore include the Freedom House Index as a standard measure of 
democratic institutions, and data on conflicts from the Correlates of War project (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010).  
 
2. Economic policy: A view particularly cherished by multilateral organisations is that economic policy is 
paramount in determining a country’s growth trajectory (P. Collier and Dollar 2001; Easterly 2005). 
Unsurprisingly, practically all papers looking for the determinants of take-offs include indicators of 
economic reform or policy. We build on Mussa and Savastano (1999), who explain how the IMF’s 
approach for countries in need of a boost out of recessionary situations is a combination of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, often in the form of demand-restraining measures, and structural reforms. 
In most cases, this is combined with exchange rate devaluations, to jump-start the economy. For the 
purpose of our SDF exercise, we will focus on inflation reduction (as in Bruno and Easterly 1998) and 
effective exchange rate devaluations (from Darvas 2012), on the demand side. On the supply side, we 
make use of the comprehensive structural reforms database recently developed by Giuliano et al (2013), 
which covers trade-, product market-, agriculture-, and capital account- liberalisation, together with 
financial and banking sector reform.  
 
3. Endowments: Some authors in the literature have shown the important role that natural resources can 
play in fostering growth spurts, particularly over the short and medium run (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
2008; Deaton and Miller 1995; Manzano and Rigobon 2001; Mideksa 2013; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004). We 
therefore include in our analysis the World Bank’s natural resource rent variable, which is quite 
comprehensive, including the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents.  
 
4. Luck: Observing how growth is particularly volatile, while economic policy and institutions are relatively 
stable, Easterly et al (1993) opened a new strand in the literature that wonders whether “good luck” is an 
important growth determinant, perhaps more so than “good policies” (Blattman et al. 2007; Hamann and 
Prati 2002). To explore whether this applies to growth accelerations, we focus on two variables: (positive) 
terms of trade shocks, in line with the original Easterly et al (1993), and export demand58, building on 
Prasad and Gable (1998) and Hamann and Prati (2002).  
 
                                                          
58 Starting from bilateral UN COMTRADE data, for each country 𝑖, we build this variable as the increase in world weighted 
imports of the goods that 𝑖 exports, net of 𝑖’s exports. 
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5. Solow-Swan: In what is perhaps the most standard neo-classical model of long-term growth, Solow (1957) 
and Swan (1956) show how an acceleration in the rate of growth in GDP per capita (GDPpc) can be 
achieved in the short run by means of an increase in capital investment. It therefore comes as no surprise 
that the main papers in the growth acceleration literature all look at the role of investment. For our 
purposes, we make use of the World Bank’s (public and private) investment variable, which encompasses 
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including 
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.  
 
Table 1. Growth determinants considered in the SDF 
 
Table 1 summarises the theories, variables, and the direction with which we expect them to impact GDP, based 
on the literature59. Some of these will not be controversial, as for example investment or terms of trade. Others, 
like various forms of economic liberalisation or democratic transition, are more moot. As discussed later on in 
the paper, all alternative heterodox theories or worldviews are not necessarily incompatible with the SDF and 
will simply be subsumed by the unexplained category of our model.  
 
To identify key “breaks” in these growth determinants, we take inspiration from the statistical approach 
introduced in IMF (2015) and later employed by Marrazzo and Terzi (2017b) to detect large structural reform 
waves. More specifically, for each variable and country, we look at the whole distribution of one-year 
                                                          
59 We include Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate shocks separately and under different theories. It has been shown 
that the two do not necessarily co-move, especially in the short-run (Edwards and Van Wijnbergen 1987). Factors such as 
the currency regime and whether the shock is perceived as temporary or permanent will affect the relationship between 
the two.  
Theory Sub-theory Variable Direction
Freedom House Index +
Conflict (domestic/external) -
Inflation -
Effective Exchange Rate -
Agriculture market liberalisation +
Product market liberalisation +
Trade liberalisation +
Capital account liberalisation +
Current account liberalisation +
Domestic financial liberalisation +
Endowments Natural resource rent +
Terms of Trade +
Export demand +
Solow-Swan Investment (public and private) +
Institutions
Demand-side
Supply-side
Economic Policy
Luck
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positive/negative changes, depending on the variable’s direction, and identify as “breaks” those that fall in the 
top 5th percentile. This approach has the appealing property of not forcing us to make any assumption on the 
distribution of these changes. Moreover, it detects shocks in a country-specific fashion, based on the country’s 
history, rather than imposing fictitious absolute thresholds for all countries.  
 
For example, inflation reductions are likely to benefit growth through a shift in investor (foreign and domestic) 
and consumer expectations. A deviation from historical trend is more likely to predict a shift in expectations 
than the absolute size of the change per se. If South Africa sharply reduces inflation in one year from 13.9% in 
1992 to 9.7% in 1993 in a country that has barely seen inflation rates above 15% over the past 50 years, this is 
likely to affect expectations and growth. On the other hand, international investors are unlikely to react if a 
similar 4 p.p. change took place in Mexico, where inflation has been over 15% for over two decades, and sudden 
inflation reductions of a larger size have been observed eleven times since 196260. Imposing large arbitrary 
thresholds (e.g. at least 10 p.p. reduction) or searching for breaks at world-level would yield to a loss of 
interesting country-specific trends (see Appendix 1 for a more in-depth discussion and Appendix 3 for a 
robustness check on results introducing global thresholds). 
 
Clearly, our percentile method does not apply to a stable dichotomic variable like conflict. In this specific 
instance, we adopted the following rule: a break is characterised by at least two years of peace following a 
situation of conflict that had lasted for at least two years.  
 
We then merged this data with the database of growth accelerations of Kar et al (2013), who eclectically build 
on several methods introduced since the initial contribution of Hausmann et al (2005). In particular, using a 
Fit-and-Filter approach based on the Bai-Perron multiple structural break analysis on 125 countries between 
1950-2010, the authors identify 135 growth acceleration episodes.  
 
We flag a variable if a “break” occurred in years [t-2, t] of a growth acceleration ignited at t, and consider it as 
a signal that the triggers or channels through which the ensuing growth acceleration occurred pertain to a certain 
growth theory. We choose the interval [t-2, t] after looking at the time profiling of GDPpc growth for the 
average growth acceleration episode.  
                                                          
60 Empirically, Mexico had a variance that was 40-fold that of South Africa (841 vs 20.7). We would then expect different 
definitions of large “break” from trend.  
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Figure 1. Average GDPpc growth rates for Growth Acceleration countries 
 
As is clear from Figure 1, t-1 and t are clear generalised recession years, breaking a longer trend of around-zero 
average growth (95% CI). This leads us to think that our key variables’ breaks are to be located around this 
time interval. Understanding whether a sudden policy change, say tightening demand policy, at t-2 caused the 
recession, or the recession prompted a policy change, for example along the lines of the “crisis hypothesis” for 
structural reforms (Agnello et al. 2015; Lora and Olivera 2004; Williamson 1994), is beyond our interest for this 
study61. We simply note that our baseline timeframe [t-2, t] caters for both62.  
 
Clearly, some of the variables considered are more related to triggers (e.g. liberalisations), others to channels 
(e.g. investment). This is perhaps because some growth theories are more interested in the former (e.g. 
quantifying the impact of economic reforms, irrespective of the channel), others in the latter (e.g. the Solow 
model, where investment increase is key, irrespective of what triggered it). The SDF allows for both to be 
flagged independently, or simultaneously, then suggesting both trigger and channel.    
 
The key output of our SDF exercise is what we call a diagnostics table, displayed in Appendix 2, identifying the 
variables experiencing a large change in the immediate beforemath of the 135 growth acceleration episodes 
identified in Kar et al (2013)63. The next three sections are aimed at validating these results. 
                                                          
61 As a side note, our case study analysis in Section II.c seem to lend more credibility to the idea that crisis situations led 
to policies that paved the way for the growth acceleration, rather than policies led to a short-term recession. 
62 As a robustness check, all the results of the paper were replicated for an alternative (longer) 4-year window [t-3,t0]. All 
findings were confirmed. Results available upon request. 
63 We note that our SDF method and the resulting flag table somewhat resembles the scoreboard used by the European 
Commission when monitoring macroeconomic imbalances developing in Member States.  
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c. Validation through case studies 
 
In the words of Rodrik (2003, p. 10), “any cross-national empirical regularity that cannot be meaningfully verified on the 
basis of country studies should be regarded as suspect”. As such, as a first validation test for our novel SDF, we 
benchmark the performance of the diagnostics table with case studies, for six growth acceleration episodes, 
spanning five different World Bank regions and four decades (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Diagnostics table for six growth acceleration episodes 
 
 
For Guinea, the SDF flags the end of a long-lasting conflict just ahead of the growth acceleration that took 
place in 2002. Dixon and Sarkees (2015) confirm that following the 1995 elections, and an attempted coup in 
1996, a group of rebels known as Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (or RFDG) attacked several cities near 
the border with Liberia and Sierra Leone. They managed to spread fighting almost up to the capital Conakry, 
but following a series of battles, hostilities came to an end in 2001. Moreover, Zamfir (2016) argues how 
reduction of conflict for West African countries since the early 2000s has been “without doubt a central contributor 
to growth”. 
 
Table 2 shows how for Finland, the SDF suggests that ahead of the 1993 growth acceleration, the country 
experienced a historically large exchange rate depreciation, structural reforms, and a supportive external 
environment. According to  Seppo et al (2009), Finland entered into a twin crisis in 1991-93, due to the collapse 
of an important export partner like the Soviet Union (representing roughly 15% of total exports), a credit boom 
and bust cycle, fuelled by earlier financial liberalisations in the 1980s, and restrictive monetary/fiscal conditions. 
Following that, Andersen et al (2015) note how the recovery began in 1993 and was mainly export led. They 
Theory Variables GIN2002 FIN1993 JOR1974 KOR1982 IND1993 IRL1987
War end
FHI
Inflation
EER shock (-)
Supply side
Structural 
reforms
Endowments
Natural resource 
extraction
ToT shock (+)
Boost in export 
demand
Solow-Swan
Investment 
(public and 
private)
Note : Table reports data from the Systematic Diagnostics Framework for 6 growth acceleration episodes. Ticks indicate a top 5th 
percentile increase in the variable over the period [t-2,t0]. See text for further details.
Institutions
Policy
Demand side
Luck
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further underline how “Exports were boosted by exchange rate depreciation and the recovery in the rest of the world”. A point 
also made by Dornbusch et al (1995). Furthermore, Seppo et al (2009) note how “the huge structural change in the 
Finnish economy was largely a result of the rapid rise of the ICT industry” and “the early liberalisation of telecommunication 
caused a breakthrough in digital communications”. In the early 1990s, “the Finnish telecom markets were fully liberalised as 
one of the first in the world” according to Hirvonen (2004). Finally, Jonung et al (2009) comprehensively remark 
how “Finland made a qualitative leap from an economic structure dominated by mostly resource-based heavy industries to one with 
knowledge-based, mostly ICT, industries as a leading sector”. All this seems very aligned with the picture pained by the 
SDF.  
 
For Jordan, the SDF identifies a large change in natural resource rents as preceding the 1974 growth 
acceleration.  In analysing the country, Krieger (2001) remarks how “Jordan enjoyed an economic boom for over a decade 
after the 1973 war, thanks largely to soaring oil prices”. Note that in this case the SDF did not flag war as a crucial 
pre-acceleration break, because the 1973 war lasted less than 20 days. We therefore see some confirmation also 
of our rule-based approach for the conflict variable in Krieger’s growth analysis.  
 
Our SDF suggests that behind the 1982 growth acceleration of South Korea were large changes in demand and 
supply policy. Collins and Park (1989) come to similar conclusions, when they note how “in 1981, South Korea 
was the world’s fourth largest debtor country and in the midst of an economic crisis”. The country engaged in a sharp 
macroeconomic adjustment programme based on demand-restraining measures and liberalisations. More in 
detail, they remark how the “stabilization plan included monetary and fiscal restraint plus the gradual reduction of price 
controls, import restrictions, and financial market interventions”. 
 
India experienced a renowned growth acceleration at the beginning of the 1990s and our SDF methodology 
detected wide-reaching structural reforms, supported by an exchange rate depreciation, just ahead of it. 
Ahluwalia (2002) notes how, while some reforms were implemented in the 80s, “it was not until 1991 that the 
government signalled a systemic shift to a more open economy with greater reliance upon market forces, a larger role for the private 
sector including foreign investment, and a restructuring of the role of government”. This, combined with a sharp rupee 
depreciation during the 1991 balance of payment crisis, paved the way for a strong 1990s growth performance. 
A point also made by Panagariya (2004). 
 
There are many specific explanations as to why Ireland became known as the “Celtic tiger” in the late 80s and 
throughout the 90s. Most importantly for our purposes, all explanations given tend to fall in the category 
identified by the SDF of structural policies, from tax- and education reform, to liberalisation of airlines and 
telecommunications, as discussed by Burnham (2003), or specifically financial liberalisation (Kelly and Everett 
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2004).  
 
While having no pretence of being comprehensive, our brief qualitative case study analysis suggests that indeed 
our diagnostics table does a fairly good job at quantitatively flagging variables that country-specific experts have 
argued were at the origin of the ensuing growth accelerations. 
 
d. Random sampling method  
 
Going beyond individual case studies, on a more aggregate level, a potential concern could be that what we are 
picking up with the SDF is only noise, and that while it is true that we detect large breaks in key variables, these 
are somewhat endemic to the decades and world regions we are looking at, and not specifically clustered before 
growth acceleration episodes.  
 
To dispel this concern, we compare the breaks identified in our diagnostics table before growth acceleration 
episodes with those preceding a random sample of 135 country-year combinations (so-called “simulated growth 
accelerations”, or SGAs), picked to reflect: 
1. the empirical distribution of regions and decades of the real growth acceleration 
episodes; 
2. the fact that in the original Kar et al (2013) study, growth accelerations could not be 
less than eight years apart from each other. 
More formally, we compute the matrix 𝑺𝒓𝒅 containing the count of growth acceleration episodes occurring in 
each region 𝑟 and decade 𝑑 as: 
 
𝑺𝒓𝒅 = [
𝑆𝑟𝑑 ⋯ 𝑆𝑟𝑑
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑆𝑅𝑑 ⋯ 𝑆𝑅𝐷
] 
 
for 𝑟 ∈ ℛ and 𝑑 ∈ 𝒟. This tells us for example that there were five take-offs in Latin America in the 70s, two 
in South Asia in the 80s, and so on. We then randomly extract an SDA with 𝑟 and 𝑑, remove the 8-year window 
before and after that SGA, and proceed by extracting the next SGA with the same 𝑟 and 𝑑. We continue until 
𝑆𝑟𝑑 SGAs have been extracted for all ℛ and 𝒟, for a total of 135 SGAs. 
 
We repeat this random extraction 500 times, to obtain a full distribution of the average number of breaks, and 
benchmark it with our real growth acceleration episodes (see Figure 2, RHS). A standard t-test (p-value = 0.002) 
categorically rejects that growth accelerations are orthogonal to breaks, or else put, that growth accelerations 
are random events vis-à-vis breaks in standard growth determinants. We also look at the share of simulated 
growth accelerations preceded by no breaks along all variables considered. In all 500 instances, we obtained a 
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higher share of zero breaks than in our real growth acceleration episodes, suggesting breaks and growth 
accelerations are indeed associated (Figure 2, LHS).  
 
Figure 2. Share of zero breaks (LHS) and average number of breaks (RHS) preceding simulated 
growth accelerations 
 
 
Finally, as an alternative way to test the same hypothesis without looking at averages, but retaining the full 
distribution of breaks, we ran separate Pearson 𝜒2 tests on the contingency tables of the number of breaks for 
the 135 simulated- and real- growth acceleration episodes, repeating it for all 500 instances. In 493/500 cases 
we rejected at the 5% level that the two were independent, giving us a Fisher p-value=0.014.  
 
All these tests suggest that indeed breaks in key growth determinants and growth accelerations do not happen 
independently but are rather highly correlated events.  
 
e. Comparison to cyclical growth rebounds 
 
Another potential concern could be that breaks do cluster before acceleration episodes, but because growth 
accelerations are generally preceded by recessions (as evident in Figure 1). They could then be a characteristic 
of the business cycle, more than strictly associated with a structural change in growth patterns.  
 
To test whether this is the case, we referred back to the original growth acceleration chapter by Kar et al (2013), 
and replicated a basic version of the fit-and-filter methodology they describe, stripping it however of the 
“structural” component. More specifically, we identify instances where, excluding our real growth acceleration 
episodes:  
 
1. growth rates accelerated in one year by at least 3 percentage points (for e.g. from -1% 
to 2.5%); 
126 
 
2. these episodes are at least 8 years apart; 
3. if there is more than one such instance in an 8-year window, we select the largest. 
 
This process led us to identify 143 episodes, which we call “growth rebounds” (GRs), having a cyclical, more 
than structural, component to them given they did not make the cut for fully-fledged accelerations in Kar et al 
(2013). Figure 3 shows how the GDPpc growth profiling of GRs differs from that of growth accelerations, by 
means of a nonparametric kernel-weighted local polynomial fit. While the former are clearly cyclical fluctuations 
around a long-term average, the latter were growing below average, experienced a deep recession, and sprung 
to a higher structural growth rate.  
 
Figure 3. Average GDPpc growth rate, divergence from long-term average 
 
 
We then apply our standard Pearson 𝜒2 test to the contingency tables of the number of breaks preceding GRs 
and growth accelerations. We firmly reject (p-value=0.003) that GRs experience a comparable break pattern in 
medium-term growth determinants as growth acceleration episodes. The average number of breaks was 25% 
lower for GRs vis-à-vis accelerations, and they were preceded by no breaks 36% more times than real take-offs.  
 
III. Characterising growth accelerations 
 
Reading through the evidence stacked up in the last three data validation sections, it looks indeed like breaks in 
growth determinants identified by the SDF methodology are specific characteristics of growth take-offs. In this 
Section, we will look for patterns in these characteristics, by means of descriptive statistics and a basic 
unsupervised machine learning clustering algorithm. 
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a. Descriptive statistics 
 
Before engaging in more quantitative analyses of effective growth acceleration strategies, we start by reviewing 
some descriptive statistics originating from the diagnostics table. In doing so, we will focus on an indicator that 
we call “incidence”, defined as the percentage of growth acceleration episodes displaying large breaks in a 
variable that falls under the umbrella of a certain theory, as described in Section IIb and Appendix 2. Note that 
incidence levels do not necessarily add up to 100%, as an acceleration episode can be preceded by breaks in 
multiple dimensions. 
 
i. Theories 
 
First, we look at how different theories stack up against each other in characterising growth acceleration 
episodes. Table 3 displays the number of take-offs that were preceded by large breaks in variables pertaining to 
a specific theory, and its incidence.  
 
Table 3. Incidence by growth theory 
 
At first sight, the policy perspective seems vindicated. Large economic policy changes precede almost 60% of 
growth acceleration episodes. The multilateral view seems therefore vindicated. Within our framework, and 
with a larger dataset of episodes, the finding of Hausmann et al (2005) that “most growth accelerations are not preceded 
[…] by major changes in economic policies” does not seem confirmed64. To be sure, their finding had already been 
questioned by the literature (Jong-A-Ping and De Haan 2011; Prati et al. 2013). Moreover, this should not 
surprise given our emphasis on country-specific breaks and the fact that we are employing a more granular and 
wide-reaching economic reform database.   
 
Economic policies are followed at a distance by strikes of luck, which precede slightly more than one fourth of 
take-offs. Prima facie, at least for sparking growth accelerations, the Easterly et al (1993) finding that “good luck” 
                                                          
64 To be sure, this finding had already been questioned by Jong-A-Ping and De Haan (2011).  
Theory Count Incidence
Policy 80 0.59
Luck 37 0.27
Endowments 31 0.23
Institutions 18 0.13
Solow-Swan 13 0.10
Unexplained 27 0.20
Note : Table contains absolute number and 
percentages of growth acceleration episodes 
displaying a break in each theory. 
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matters more than “good policy” does not seem vindicated.   
 
Endowment shocks follow suit. Large moves towards democracy or end of a conflict do not seem to have a 
predominant role in anticipating growth accelerations. This finding is in line with Jones and Olken (2008) for 
example, who finds a role for conflict only in growth collapses but not accelerations, and a non-significant role 
for institutional variables like democracy and rule of law.  
 
Finally, large sudden investment programmes seem to precede only one in ten growth acceleration episodes. 
Again, this confirms the statistical findings of Jones and Olken (2008), who were using a more canonical binary 
regression methodology. We note that 20% of our growth accelerations was not preceded by any large break 
in standard growth determinants. We call these “unexplained” (within the SDF framework) and could 
potentially encompass countries that resorted to other tools, to heterodox policies, or to small incremental 
changes.  
ii. Geography 
 
We further slice the data along the geographical dimension, to see whether some theories are more associated 
with growth accelerations than others in different areas of the world, based on World Bank classifications. 
From here onwards, we split demand- and supply-side policies, as it is also interesting to get a better sense of 
the incidence of each. We consider this (sub-) theory level as the one striking the most appropriate balance 
between allowing for country-specific differences, in line with Hausmann et al (2007), and drawing some general 
lessons about the acceleration process.   
 
Table 4. Incidence by growth (sub-)theory and geographical grouping 
 
 
East Asia & 
Pacific
Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle East 
& North 
Africa
South Asia
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Demand-side policy 0.55 0.56 0.49 0.40 0.25 0.28
Supply-side policy 0.40 1.00 0.49 0.40 0.63 0.34
Luck 0.30 0.44 0.17 0.40 0.38 0.26
Endowments 0.15 0.44 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.26
Institutions 0.15 0.22 0.06 0.20 0.13 0.15
Solow-Swan 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.38 0.09
Unexplained 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.26
count 20 9 35 10 8 53
share 0.15 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.06 0.39
Note : Table contains percentages of growth acceleration episodes within each region displaying a break in 
each (sub-)theory. Bold indicates a share higher than 50%. 
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While large demand policy changes often anticipated growth accelerations taking place in East Asia, Europe, 
Latin America and the Middle East, this was less true in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Large structural 
reforms were implemented around every growth acceleration episodes taking place in Europe (Cyprus in the 
70s, UK, Portugal and Ireland in the 80s, Poland, Albania, Finland, and Bulgaria in the 90s), while only roughly 
in a third of Sub-Saharan Africa’s take-offs.   
 
European and the Middle Eastern growth accelerations display some commonalities. Luck had a high incidence 
in both, as did institutional variables and natural endowments. No growth acceleration taking place in South 
Asia was preceded by endowment shocks, and only a handful of Latin American acceleration episodes was 
preceded by large institutional shocks. Interestingly, investment shocks were rare, as we had identified already 
at the aggregate level in Table 3, in most instances, with the exception of South Asia (specifically, in Bangladesh 
and India).  
iii. Decades 
 
Another interesting angle that we felt worthwhile exploring, was to look at how the incidence of different (sub-
)theories changes across time (Table 5). Possibly due also to issues of limited data availability, Kar et al (2013) 
do not identify many acceleration episodes in the 60s. Among those few, structural reforms display the highest 
incidence.   
 
Table 5. Incidence by growth (sub-)theory and decade 
 
 
In the 70s, during years of the oil price boom, it is perhaps not surprising that endowments played the lion 
share. The 80s, and particularly the 90s, were the years when worldwide high inflation was progressively brought 
under control. Most growth accelerations were indeed preceded by large demand-policy changes. Finally, in the 
2000s, demand-policy loses relevance, while structural reforms take the lion share.  
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Supply-side policy 0.33 0.19 0.46 0.59 0.52
Institutions 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.22
Solow-Swan 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.17
Luck 0.20 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.13
Demand-side policy 0.13 0.24 0.49 0.68 0.13
Endowments 0.00 0.48 0.23 0.27 0.09
Unexplained 0.40 0.29 0.18 0.08 0.22
count 15 21 39 37 23
share 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.27 0.17
Note : Table contains percentages of growth acceleration episodes within each decade 
displaying a break in each (sub-)theory. Bold indicates the largest share in the decade. 
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iv. Income level 
 
Highly related to the different geographical patterns is the incidence of the various theories by income level. 
We split growth acceleration episodes based on their global income per capita quartile. One overall interesting 
finding is that least-developed- and lower middle-income countries seem to have resorted to all sorts of policies 
when they were successful in spurring a growth acceleration, while upper-middle-income countries and 
advanced economies tended to be more focussed on structural reforms and, in any case, less focussed on 
institutional changes and investment boosts (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Incidence by growth (sub-)theory and income quartile  
 
 
A famous quote from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina is “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way”. This seems to apply well also to growth acceleration episodes, where wealthier countries seem to have 
few similar growth channels, while poorer countries do not display a clear pattern. The question could however 
be whether poorer countries’ acceleration episodes are characterised by a combination of multiple breaks, while 
rich countries have followed more targeted approaches. This is a matter we now turn to. 
 
v. Number of breaks 
 
In this section, we look at the number of theories that are flagged by the SDF in the pre-acceleration period 
(Table 7). At an aggregate level, we notice that aside from the 20% not experiencing a break (what we had 
characterised as “unexplained” above), a third of accelerations was preceded by only one break, 23% by two 
and 20% by three. Only few episodes went beyond that. Looking at the disaggregation by income quartiles, we 
see that this general pattern is broadly confirmed across all wealth groupings.  
 
Quartiles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Supply-side policy 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.75
Demand-side policy 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.25
Luck 0.30 0.31 0.22 0.25
Endowments 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.25
Institutions 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.00
Solow-Swan 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.00
Unexplained 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.25
counts 63 32 32 4
share 0.48 0.24 0.24 0.03
Note : Table contains percentages of growth acceleration episodes within 
each income quartile displaying a break in each (sub-)theory. Bold 
indicates values of 50% or above. 
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Table 7. Number of breaks by income quartile  
 
  
b. Hierarchical clustering 
 
As a first descriptive analysis of growth strategies, we want to see whether certain growth-associated variable 
breaks tend to cluster together, and therefore whether there are packages that are more frequently associated 
with the inception of a growth acceleration (e.g. structural reforms and strikes of luck). We therefore ran a 
hierarchical cluster analysis as a form of unsupervised machine learning on growth acceleration episodes (or, 
strictly speaking, on the diagnostics table in Appendix 2). We set the number of clusters = 7, the idea being that 
if the six theories (plus the residual “unexplained”) were fully independent, they would cluster exactly along 
those lines.  
 
More formally, consider two growth acceleration episodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝔼 = {1,… ,135}. Each of them can 
be explained by one of seven options, i.e. we can define 𝐺𝑖 = {𝑠1, … , 𝑠7} where 𝑠ℎ is an indicator function and 
therefore takes values in {0,1} for the six theories that can display breaks in our SDF, plus the residual 
“unexplained”. By this logic, we can define a measure of similarity between two growth accelerations as: 
 
𝐽𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑀11(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑀01(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝑀10(𝑖, 𝑗) + 𝑀11(𝑖, 𝑗)
 
 
where 𝑀ℎ𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) is the number of theories that are ℎ in growth acceleration episode 𝑖 and 𝑘 in growth 
acceleration episode 𝑗. This is formally known as the Jaccard similarity coefficient between binary vectors. For 
example, Albania 1992 is preceded by breaks in all theories but one, and therefore 𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐵 = {1,1,1,1,0,1,0}. 
Botswana 1982 is preceded by breaks in demand policy and luck, hence 𝐺𝐵𝑊𝐴 = {1,0,0,1,0,0,0}. The Jaccard 
similarity between these two episodes is thus 𝐽𝐴𝐿𝐵,𝐵𝑊𝐴 = 0.4 computed as: 
 
𝐽𝐴𝐿𝐵,𝐵𝑊𝐴 =
2
5
 
 
# of breaks perc. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
0 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.25
1 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.25
2 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.19 0.25
3 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.25
4 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00
5 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00
tot 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Quartiles
Note: Table contains percentages of growth acceleration episodes grouped by numer of 
breaks displayed, overall and subdivided by income quartile groups.
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The distance between growth acceleration episodes (𝑑𝑖,𝑗 = 1 − 𝐽𝑖,𝑗) is then used on a complete-linkage 
hierarchical clustering algorithm, where the distance between two groups 𝒜 and ℬ is defined as the maximum 
distance between their elements:  
 
𝑑(𝒜,ℬ) = max (𝑑𝑖,𝑗 ∶  𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, 𝑗 ∈  ℬ) 
 
The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 8. The first three cluster encompass almost 70% of all take-
offs. Cluster 1 is composed by countries whose acceleration was preceded by a sharp increase in natural resource 
rents, generally supported by other economic policies: demand or supply. An example of this is Vietnam 1989, 
where the government launched a wide-reaching reform package in 1986 known as Doi Moi (renovation), 
designed to “transform the economy from a central planning subsidy economy towards a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ that 
would combine state intervention and free-market incentives and rules, where private businesses and foreign-owned enterprises were 
to be encouraged” (Nguyen et al. 2014, p. 5). At the same time, the authors note how “new industries emerged, especially 
with the discovery of oil (made possible through joint ventures between the state and foreign oil companies) which increased government 
revenues and accounted for the greatest share of Vietnamese exports”. 
 
Table 8. Incidence of growth (sub-)theories by cluster 
 
 
Cluster 2 could be considered the “economic policy cluster”, centred around a combination of demand and 
supply measures. An example of this is Korea 1982, as discussed in the case study section above. Cluster 3 is 
characterised by a combination of economic policy and luck. A poster child for this cluster would be Portugal 
1985, where high inflation was brought under control and important liberalisation reforms were implemented. 
All of this was supported by external export demand. Among the less frequent combinations, Cluster 4 was 
broadly centred around luck, and Cluster 5 was characterised by a combination of institutions and structural 
reforms, of the sort investigated by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005). Finally, Cluster 6 was centred around 
combinations of investment and reforms. As a side note, it should come as no surprise that Cluster 7 contains 
all the “unexplained” cases, as these are by construction orthogonal to all other cases. 
Clusters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Endowments 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.00
Demand policy 0.57 0.56 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.00
Supply policy 0.43 1.00 0.32 0.29 0.58 0.63 0.00
Luck 0.36 0.00 0.53 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.00
Institutions 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.00 0.25 0.00
Solow-Swan 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Unexplained 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
counts 28 27 19 14 12 8 27
share 0.26 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.25
Note : Table displays percentages of growth acceleration episodes displaying a break in each theory, for 
each hierarchical cluster. Bold indicates values of 50% and above. See text for further details.
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IV. Growth acceleration strategies 
 
In this Section, we move beyond simple descriptive statistics, to analyse successful growth strategies while 
taking into account different forms of counterfactuals. In line with Hausmann et al (2005), we look separately 
at igniting growth accelerations, and making the most out of them i.e. sustaining them.   
 
a. Igniting a growth acceleration 
 
In the previous Section, our primary metric for descriptive statistics was incidence. Thinking through an 
analytical framework of necessary and sufficient conditions, incidence relates to the extent to which a growth 
channel is ‘necessary’ to explain an acceleration process but says little about whether it is ‘sufficient’. This is 
what we aim to address in this section, therefore adding a layer of basic counterfactual analysis. Specifically, we 
compute a new metric that we call ‘effectiveness’, which takes into account not only how often take-off episodes 
were preceded by a certain break, but also how often that type of break took place overall in the time-series of 
acceleration countries. 
 
More formally, for each of our six sub-theories ℎ, we computed the total number of breaks for each country 𝑐 
that experienced at least one acceleration. ∀ 𝑐, ℎ, we then calculated how many breaks were followed by a 
growth acceleration within two years, i.e. in the period [t, t+2], for a break occurring at t. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of sub-theory ℎ can be measured as the proportion of breaks that were followed by a growth 
acceleration.  
 
At this stage, the attentive reader will have realised that the denominator in our effectiveness score defines an 
implicit counterfactual, and therefore the assumptions underlying its definition are worth a brief discussion. In 
particular, we are focussing on breaks in growth acceleration countries. The reason for this is that one could 
sensibly assume that not all world countries can exhibit a growth acceleration. As a matter of fact, Pritchett 
(2000) already detailed how take-offs are not a typical characteristic of advanced economies.   
 
Table 9 compares the ranking of different (sub-)theories based on incidence and effectiveness. The way to read 
this is that demand breaks preceded 40% of acceleration episodes, but only 11.4% of demand breaks were 
followed by a growth acceleration.   
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Table 9. Incidence and effectiveness by (sub-)theory 
 
 
An interesting comparison comes from endowment and luck. Looking at incidence only, 27% of accelerations 
were preceded by breaks in variables pertaining to luck: a higher number than the break in natural resource 
rents. However, a high number of luck breaks occurred without a growth acceleration following suit. As such, 
the effectiveness score of endowments is actually almost twice as large as that of luck. Translating this table in 
the language of policymaking, based on past acceleration cases, an authoritarian government with the sole 
objective of quickly sparking a growth acceleration is, ceteris paribus, better off boosting natural resource 
extraction than improving the country’s democratic credentials.   
 
The sceptical reader could be concerned that the country-specific way in which we have identified breaks in the 
baseline could be distorting our results. In particular, a concern could be that because we refrained from using 
arbitrary thresholds (e.g. at least 10 p.p. inflation reduction), in some instances what we identified as a “break” 
were changes that were large in relative historical terms, but actually small in absolute terms. Appendix 3 
introduces as a robustness check a quantitative threshold, imposing that “breaks” fall in the top quartile of 
variable changes ever recorded in our database. Both incidence and effectiveness results are largely preserved, 
confirming the solidity of our SDF approach.     
 
Pushing the logic of Table 9 further in the direction of growth acceleration strategies, we comprehensively 
looked at the two-way interaction between growth channels, and their effectiveness (Table 10). On the diagonal, 
we have breaks in one dimension followed by breaks in the same dimension, e.g. large liberalisations, followed 
by a further deep liberalisation break. The most successful combinations to spark a growth acceleration seem 
to be (1) demand-side policies followed by a boost in natural resource extraction, (2) an increase in resource 
extraction followed by structural reforms, (3) democratisation/end of conflict followed by a boost in natural 
resource extraction, (4) structural reforms followed by demand-side policies, or (5) structural reforms followed 
by democratisation/end of conflict. While these top acceleration strategies carry what looks like a small 
effectiveness, we note that they represent roughly an 8-fold increase vis-à-vis the unconditional probability of 
Supply 0.452 Endowments 0.124
Demand 0.400 Demand 0.114
Luck 0.274 Supply 0.109
Endowments 0.230 Institutions 0.107
Institutions 0.133 Luck 0.070
Investment 0.096 Investment 0.056
Incidence Effectiveness
Note : Incidence indicates the share of growth acceleration episodes displaying 
that (sub-)theory break. Effectiveness is computed as the ratio between the 
number of growth accelerations preceeded by a specific break, and the number 
of times such a break occured over the whole time series. See text for further 
details.
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experiencing a take-off in a given year65 (1.43%). A further sign that standard growth determinants are relevant 
for growth accelerations. 
 
While there are no strictly dominant strategies in Table 10, reading through the general results of this analysis, 
in most instances structural reforms seem to be the best bet as a first move to ignite a growth acceleration, if 
supporting measures will follow suit; while a boost in natural resource extraction seems the best complement 
to support ongoing relaxations of binding constraints. 
 
We note how this type of analysis links very well with discussions related to sequencing (Murrell 1996; Nsouli 
et al. 2002), specifically of demand- and supply measures. For example, our analysis suggests that structural 
reforms followed by demand-side policies like an EER depreciation to kickstart the economy, were more 
effective than the converse. This analysis can also connect to the literature on the relationship between 
institutional quality and natural resources (see for example Mehlum et al. 2006). With the goal of sparking an 
acceleration, Table 10 seems to confirm the general patterns in the literature, as it is (roughly three times) better 
to move towards democracy first and have a natural resource extraction boom later, rather than the converse.  
 
Table 10. Effectiveness by combination of (sub-)theories 
 
 
As discussed above, Table 10 is built by comparing the occurrence of break combinations before growth 
accelerations, with their occurrence over the whole time-series in countries that experienced at least a growth 
acceleration. In Appendix 4, as a robustness check, we expand the latter, to include their occurrence across all 
countries worldwide and show that our assumption on the counterfactual is not crucial. While individual 
numbers obviously differ, the overall ranking and therefore the key messages conveyed by Table 10 are 
preserved. 
 
                                                          
65 Assuming no acceleration took place in the preceding eight years. 
Effectiveness 
Demand-side 
policy
Endowments Institutions Luck Investment
Supply-side 
policy
Demand-side policy 4.64 10.39 3.92 3.92 5.63 10.00
Endowments 9.71 0.00 3.57 2.52 3.92 11.24
Institutions 5.88 11.54 1.79 1.56 0.00 7.58
Luck 5.33 3.26 1.92 1.33 2.56 7.09
Investment 5.26 0.00 3.57 4.11 0.43 4.72
Supply-side policy 12.31 10.29 10.34 6.06 3.66 3.76
Note : Table displays effectiveness probability values, computed as the ratio between the number of growth accelerations preceeded by specific 
break combinations, and the number of times such a break occured over the whole time series. Diagonal axis implies two breaks within the same 
dimension occurred in sequence. Top-5 growth strategies in bold. See text for further details.
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Figure 4 summarises graphically the findings of this section, displaying the effectiveness of individual theory 
breaks, and those of the combinations that allow to increase that effectiveness scoring. In probability terms, 
experiencing an endowment break carries a 12.4% probability of sparking a growth acceleration. A large supply-
side reform wave, a 10.9% probability. However, having implemented reforms, subsequently implementing 
demand-side policies like depreciating the exchange rate or bringing inflation under control, can push that 
probability up to 12.3%, and 18.8% if that is then followed by a boost in investment. The p-values in 
parentheses test whether each effectiveness score is larger than that in the previous stage66. In general, it looks 
like increasing the number of growth constraints that are relaxed increases the probability of experiencing a 
take-off only in selected instances, and even then, it represents either a marginal probability improvement or 
one that is not statistically significant. This is a pattern that we will observe also in the next section, when 
looking at the “strength” of accelerations. 
 
Figure 4. Effectiveness by individual and combined (sub-)theory 
 
Note: Coefficients indicate the effectiveness score, p-values in square brackets originate from a one-sided binomial 
probability test to check whether the effectiveness improvement in statistically significant vis-à-vis the previous stage. For 
stage 1, the improvement is tested against the unconditional probability of experiencing an acceleration. * p<0.10 ** 
p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
As a concluding remark to this section, we point out that looking at the sheer numbers of growth acceleration 
episodes identified by their methodology, Hausmann et al (2005, p. 328) concluded that “achieving rapid growth 
over the medium term is not something that is tremendously difficult”. Judging from the small size of the effectiveness 
coefficients attached to the most well-established growth theories, which seem necessary but hardly sufficient 
conditions for accelerations, we would come to a different conclusion. While it might be true that these episodes 
occurred relatively frequently, our analysis suggests that igniting them with a high degree of certainty remains 
an elusive quest, making them inherently difficult to achieve.  
 
 
                                                          
66 For stage 1, it tests whether the effectiveness is larger than the unconditional probability of experiencing an acceleration: 
prob=0.0143. 
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b. Sustaining a growth acceleration 
 
Simply sparking a growth acceleration is not the whole story. Its capacity to improve a country’s economic 
outcomes, which is what ultimately matters, will crucially depend on how ‘large’ the acceleration was, namely 
whether it was sustained and how large the shift in structural growth rates was. This is the issue we aim to tackle 
in this session, building on our SDF approach. 
 
Perhaps with the recent exception of Pritchett et al (2016), one of the limits of the literature hitherto has been 
the lack of a clear and credible counterfactual when trying to quantify the size of growth accelerations, in order 
to link it to underlying country characteristics. In line with the underlying spirit of the whole paper, we aim to 
bridge this gap, employing a method that is country-specific, but at the same time allows for aggregation, to 
reach widely applicable growth findings. 
 
In a nutshell, we propose to use as a counterfactual to a growth acceleration episode the country within the 
same region that has the most similar production structure to the country of interest. Our intuition is firmly 
rooted in the work of Hausmann et al (2007), and the idea that export specialisation patterns will strongly 
determine your growth performance. Moreover, thanks to the work pioneered by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) 
and followed up by others (Cadot et al. 2013; Cadot, Carrère, and Strauss-kahn 2011; Cadot, Carrère, and 
Strauss-Kahn 2011), we also know that income per capita and export specialisation are closely intertwined. This 
means our parsimonious approach allows us with a unique metric to detect the country within the same region 
that has the most similar production structure and a similar income level to the country of interest, providing a 
credible counterfactual. Our transparent approach also allows to visualise the counterfactual for each 
acceleration episode, qualitatively assessing its appropriateness.  
 
More formally: consider a growth acceleration episode 𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝔼 = {1,… ,135}. Let us define 𝝓𝑖,𝑡 as the vector 
of the export shares of 𝑖𝑡. Hence, the vector  
 
𝝓𝑖,𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝓍𝑝,𝑖𝑡
𝒳𝑖𝑡
…
𝓍𝑃,𝑖𝑡
𝒳𝑖𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contains the ratios of total exports of product 𝑝 (𝓍𝑝,𝑖𝑡) over total exports (𝒳𝑖𝑡), for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We 
then look for a country 𝑗𝑡 that solves the following problem: 
 
max
𝑗
𝜌(𝝓𝑖,𝑡−3, 𝝓𝑗,𝑡−3) 
s.t. 
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𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ 
𝑗𝑡 ∉ 𝔼 
 
where 𝜌 is the Pearson correlation between export share vectors, and ℛ is the set of countries belonging 
to the same World Bank region classification of the growth acceleration episode under analysis. As an 
example based on a case study presented in Section IIc., our entirely data-driven procedure identifies as a 
counterfactual for Finland’s 1993 growth acceleration, Sweden. We find it reassuring that when Seppo et 
al (2009) trace their case study of the Finnish experience, they select precisely Sweden as a growth 
performance benchmark for Finland. The full list of counterfactuals resulting from this exercise is available 
in Appendix 5, combined with a characterisation of the country-specific acceleration process in Appendix 
6.  
 
Figure 5. GDPpc in the average growth acceleration episode, and counterfactual 
 
Also on an aggregate level, our counterfactual approach seems validated. Figure 5 shows the GDPpc growth 
of the average acceleration episode, and counterfactual. Up to t-5, the counterfactual perfectly tracks our 
countries of interest67. This is particularly remarkable as, conversely from other standard matching approaches, 
we did not impose this by construction. At t-4, acceleration countries seem to enter into a period of stagnation 
vis-à-vis their counterfactual, followed by the recession we had already highlighted in Section II. Following that, 
growth takes off at a faster pace than in the counterfactual.  
 
Before proceeding with the quantitative analysis of what makes accelerations sustained, we want to tackle two 
obvious potential critiques. The first relates to the fact that geographical proximity could mean that also our 
                                                          
67 This is true not only on average, and does not depend on the rebasing of the index at t-9. No difference can be detected 
in the growth rates between the two over the period [t-8, t-5] at a 99% CI level, see Appendix 6. 
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counterfactuals are experiencing significant breaks in growth theories. This could relate to the fact that because 
they have a similar export specialisation, they could be exposed to the same strikes of luck – given our definition 
of the latter. Alternatively, they could be similarly implementing structural reforms, as the relevant literature has 
shown how these tend to progress in geographical waves (see for example Abiad and Mody 2005). We therefore 
apply our standard Pearson 𝜒2 test to the contingency tables of the number of breaks preceding real acceleration 
episodes and the counterfactuals built on trade similarity and statistically reject (p=0.000) that the two were 
undergoing comparable breaks. The average number of breaks in the counterfactuals was not different 
(p=0.464) from our random sampling simulation in Section II. In other words, we cannot exclude that the 
counterfactual episodes are random based on their breaks: something we could affirm with a high degree of 
certainty about real growth accelerations. 
 
Another potential critique could be that because we are using counterfactuals in the same region, there could 
be evident growth spillovers between neighbours68. Prima facie, we note how the country-specific recession in 
the accelerating countries before t0 did not affect the growth trajectory of the counterfactual. As growth 
dependence should be a symmetric relationship, we then find it unlikely that this occurred in the acceleration 
phase. On a deeper level, we calibrate as a robustness check the Synthetic Control Model (SCM) discussed in 
Marrazzo and Terzi (2017b) to create alternative counterfactuals and compare them to our parsimonious 
baseline approach. As these SCM counterfactuals are based on linear combinations of multiples countries 
anywhere in the world, rather than only one regional neighbour, this model is significantly more robust to 
potential spillovers, albeit at the cost of being more demanding on our data. Moreover, given the wide range of 
covariates used, it also addresses the potential claim that export specialisation alone is not a good predictor of 
long-term growth. Reassuringly, Appendix 8 shows how SCM counterfactuals are neither quantitatively nor 
statistically different from those of our baseline. 
 
Aside from the taxonomy of growth acceleration episodes illustrated in Figure 4, we are interested in 
understanding what determines their strength. To do so, we need a comprehensive “strength” indicator. 
Building on Figure 4, our primary metric of choice for this will be computed in line with a diff-in-diff estimator, 
of the type: 
 
𝛿𝑖 = (𝑌𝑖,8 − 𝑌𝑗,8) − (𝑌𝑖,0 − 𝑌𝑗,0) 
                                                          
68 To reduce this likelihood, we excluded small countries (population < 1 million) from our potential counterfactual sample 
in the baseline.  
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where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the level of the GDPpc growth index for accelerating country 𝑖 at time 𝑡69. In the spirit of a match-
and-regress approach (Stuart 2010; Stuart and Rubin 2008), we then used 𝛿𝑖 as the dependent variable in a 
standard OLS regression with robust standard errors, and tested a set of potential explanators in multiple 
specifications. The main results are displayed in Table 1170. Appendix 10 contains further regression 
specifications. 
Three sets of interesting findings emerge. The first one regards the role of different (sub-)theories and their 
respective variables’ breaks. No one specific theory seems to prevail on the others in determining growth 
strength. This is evident by the fact that none of the coefficients associated with individual growth (sub-
)theories71 is significant (specifications 4 and 5). This remains true when all possible interactions between 
theories are accounted for (specification 6), and when their significance is tested jointly by means of an F-test. 
In Appendix 10 we test and confirm this claim also when using the different growth strategies identified by our 
hierarchical cluster analysis in Section III. This finding strongly resonates with a key principle of growth 
diagnostics, namely the fact that there is no silver bullet to foster growth in all countries, but rather that careful 
tailoring to local conditions will be needed.   
 
                                                          
69 As has previously emerged throughout the paper, our time-horizon of analysis ends at t+8 due to the way in which 
growth accelerations are identified in Kar et al (2013). Namely, this is the only time horizon over which we are confident 
that another structural break (acceleration or deceleration) could not be detected. 
70 Table 7 in Section III showed how 97% of acceleration instances displays less than 4 simultaneous breaks. To ensure 
broad homogeneity among break groups, in most regression specifications we therefore exclude break outliers so defined. 
This restriction is far from crucial for our results. 
71 Due to perfect multi-collinearity, we had to exclude investment as a (sub-)theory.  
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Table 11. Regression output for acceleration strength  
 
The second class of findings relates to the number of breaks. Interestingly, there seems to be evidence 
suggesting a concave relationship between number of breaks and strength of the acceleration (see specifications 
2-7, and Appendix 9). This seems particularly true when zooming in on Latin America (specification 8) and 
remains true when including geographical dummies (specification 3) or controlling for the depth of the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Counterfactual method baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline SCM
# of breaks 0.399 16.04 19.73 24.64* 24.27 25.15 25.11** 21.61**
(0.901) (0.149) (0.116) (0.090) (0.105) (0.189) (0.050) (0.031)
# of breaks^2 -5.767* -6.538* -7.458** -7.526* -7.262* -7.090** -7.829***
(0.080) (0.075) (0.050) (0.050) (0.071) (0.028) (0.010)
Income quartile 8.713** 7.521** 10.76* 11.35** 11.02** 10.10***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.051) (0.013) (0.030) (0.008)
Human Capital Index -11.56 -9.558 -9.814 11.57 -4.393
(0.238) (0.294) (0.275) (0.299) (0.405)
East Asia & Pacific -7.819
(0.397)
Europe & Central Asia -11.29
(0.429)
Latin America & Caribbean 4.903
(0.566)
Middle East & North Africa -8.260
(0.703)
South Asia -20.19*
(0.065)
Demand policies -1.187 -0.113 -8.920
(0.903) (0.992) (0.557)
Endowments 0.767 1.730 -9.357
(0.944) (0.882) (0.668)
Institutions 5.827 7.276 13.833
(0.702) (0.650) (0.767)
Luck -4.019 -2.730 18.530
(0.783) (0.861) (0.526)
Supply policies -10.03 -9.333 -19.102
(0.417) (0.457) (0.287)
Recession depth -0.0670 -0.646* -0.234
(0.786) (0.051) (0.128)
Constant 7.013 4.477 17.67 12.10 13.62 -0.653 2.265 26.32***
(0.507) (0.673) (0.253) (0.409) (0.417) (0.956) (0.920) (0.010)
p-value of F-test on break type - - - 0.946 0.943 - - -
N 111 106 101 101 101 111 32 93
R-sq 0.049 0.073 0.120 0.097 0.099 0.303 0.317 0.106
LatAm only No No No No No No Yes No
Incl all break interactions No No No No No Yes No No
Excl break outliers No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Note: Acceleration strength computed based on geographical and production proximity (baseline) and Syntetic Control Method (SCM). Post-
matching OLS regression coefficients, p-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10  ** p<0.05 * p<0.10. Interaction 
coefficients omitted. See text for further details
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recession at t0 (specification 6). This result was quantitatively similar but even more significant when using 
SCM-generated counterfactuals (specification 8). This resonates with another key principle of growth 
diagnostics, namely that it is better to focus on few key binding constraints (Rodrik 2009). Interactions between 
constraints in the economy imply that relaxing multiple constraints at the same time might actually produce 
sub-optimal results.  
 
The third and final class of finding relates to the role of income level. All specifications show a positive 
relationship between the strength of the acceleration and income per capita72. Reading this finding through the 
eyes of the literature, a way to rationalise this result relates to the fact that income per capita is proxying for the 
quality of institutions. Theoretically, Rodrik (2004) explains how sustaining a growth acceleration will crucially 
depend on this variable, much more than igniting one. Empirically, Jerzmanowski (2006) shows in a Markov 
Switching Model how “weak institutions do not rule out growth take-offs but limit their sustainability”. In principle, a 
second way to interpret this finding relates to the dynamics illustrated by our case studies in Section II: Finland. 
In that instance, country-specific experts underlined how the country’s high education levels allowed it to 
capitalise on the leap forward in ICT, which was at the heart of Finland’s structural growth change. Generalising 
this principle, we could suppose that income per capita is proxying for education levels, which in turn, once a 
growth acceleration was sparked, determines whether a country is capable of capitalising on it and making it 
sustainable. However, this hypothesis does not stand confirmed once we control for human capital73 in our 
OLS regression (Specifications 3-5, 7 and 8).  
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
Setting a country’s structural growth rate on a higher path, i.e. sparking and sustaining a growth acceleration 
can have quantitatively huge implications for national income and, more broadly, for people’s wellbeing. 
Pritchett et al (2016) estimate that the top 20 accelerations in the past six decades had a net present value of 30 
trillion dollars: twice the size of US GDP. Two subsequent growth accelerations in China alone contributed to 
98% of the reduction in global poverty between 1981-2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2010).  
In this paper, we developed a novel statistical framework to improve our understanding of the 135 acceleration 
processes that took place between 1962-2002 worldwide, and contribute to develop some key principles aimed 
at helping countries devise successful acceleration strategies. We illustrate how growth accelerations are 
generally preceded by disproportionate changes in standard growth determinants, in particular sharp economic 
policy changes. After various counterfactual analyses, we reach three general conclusions.  
                                                          
72 This is equally true whether we use income quartiles, as in Table 11, or log GDPpc, as in Appendix 10.   
73 Human Capital Index as defined in the Penn World Tables, based on years of schooling and returns to education. 
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First, looking at the effectiveness of individual determinants, or their combinations, we find no strictly dominant 
strategy to ignite a growth acceleration. Likewise, no one specific growth theory seems to prevail on the others 
in determining acceleration strength. Second, we find that the most successful growth accelerations follow the 
relaxation of few binding constraints in key dimensions, rather than jointly unlocking several growth channels. 
We therefore conclude that a successful acceleration strategy should not contain off-the-shelf approaches or 
necessarily all-encompassing ‘shock therapy’ solutions. On the other hand, it will call for a careful tailoring to 
local conditions. Third, our quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that institutions have a potential role 
to play in making the most of accelerations, once these have been ignited.  
At the same time, we note how growth accelerations are extremely hard to engineer with a high degree of 
certainty. While the growth levers of standard theories seem relevant in contributing to spark accelerations, in 
roughly 9 out of 10 instances pulling them failed to ignite a take-off. These findings and figures resonate with 
another highly sought-after seismic growth event: successful start-ups. The management literature and business 
angel community are well aware of the characteristics that successful start-ups share, including access to seed 
funding, human and technical capital, access to professional networks, and so on. However, even among start-
ups that were scrutinised for these characteristics and received venture capital, three out of four fail74. Just like 
in this instance, increasing the predictability of these growth acceleration events will surely remain a profitable 
research venue for the years to come. 
  
                                                          
74 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190 
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Appendix 1. Two case studies on country-specific breaks 
In this Appendix, we aim to show how the identification of our country-specific breaks works in practice. To 
do so, we focus on two growth determinants (inflation and export demand) for the two acceleration countries 
that displayed the smallest pre-acceleration breaks in absolute terms. These were South Africa, where we 
categorised as break a yearly downward change in inflation of -4.2 p.p.; and Portugal, where +18 p.p. is the 
smallest export demand break preceding a growth acceleration episode. We begin with the analysis of South 
Africa’s inflation track record. Figure 1 shows how, by emerging market standards, the country displays a 
relatively moderate high inflation profile. In particular, inflation grew above double-digit level in the 70s and 
80s but was interestingly brought significantly down just ahead of the growth acceleration of 1993 (dotted line).   
Figure 1. Inflation rate, South Africa  
 
We cross-check our findings with expert studies on South Africa. Studying the relationship between inflation 
and growth in South Africa, Nell (2000) searches for the optimal inflation rate bracket and concludes there is 
strong evidence to support the contention that double-digit inflation (and in particular levels above 10%) should 
be avoided. Moreover, studying the country’s growth pickup in the early 1990s, an IBRD/World Bank report 
suggests that “macroeconomic stability has been a key factor in encouraging foreign capital, stimulating more investment, 
innovation, technological progress, and growth in TFP” (Faulkner Christopher Loewald 2008, p. 31). This goes crucially 
in line with our argument that shifts in private sector expectations, on which the success of policy measures 
hinges, are highly country-specific.  
Moving on to Portugal, Figure 2 shows our indicator of export demand. This variable displays a high level of 
volatility. However, on a closer look, we note how it tracks well US recessions as the well-known 1973-75 oil 
crisis or the 2009 Great Recession. It also captures the 1980 recession due to the Fed’s sharp interest rate 
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increase, and 1981/92 recession following the Iranian revolution and subsequent oil crisis. Our SDF approach 
flags the global economic recovery that preceded Portugal’s 1985 growth acceleration (dotted line).  
Figure 2. Export demand, % change, Portugal 
 
Country-specific reports confirm this finding. Nunes (2015, p. 20) notes in particular how the international 
recovery created a positive background, which “contributed to the second most important period of Portuguese real 
convergence to the European standards of living”. 
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Appendix 2. Diagnostics table 
 
 
 
# country year war fh infl reer ref 1 ref 2 ref 3 ref 4 ref 5 ref 6 nat resources ToT X demand inv
1 GTM 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 KOR 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 MWI 1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 PRT 1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 GHA 1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 BGD 1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
7 BRA 1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 COL 1967 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 IDN 1967 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
10 CHN 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
11 DOM 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
12 GAB 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 NGA 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 SGP 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
15 ZWE 1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 ECU 1970 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 HND 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
18 LSO 1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
19 MYS 1970 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
20 BFA 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
21 DZA 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 MUS 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 PRY 1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
24 HTI 1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 LKA 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
26 SEN 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 JOR 1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
28 MLI 1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
29 CYP 1975 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
30 CHL 1976 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
31 CMR 1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 COG 1976 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
33 EGY 1976 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
34 CHN 1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 BEN 1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Solow-SwanLuckInstitutions
Demand side Supply side
Policy
Endowment
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# country year war fh infl reer ref 1 ref 2 ref 3 ref 4 ref 5 ref 6 nat resources ToT X demand inv
36 LAO 1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 TCD 1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 UGA 1980 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
39 GBR 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
40 GNB 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
41 BGD 1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
42 BWA 1982 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
43 KHM 1982 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
44 KOR 1982 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
45 LBN 1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
46 GHA 1983 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
47 NPL 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
48 ZMB 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
49 PNG 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 ARG 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 NAM 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
52 PHL 1985 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
53 PRT 1985 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
54 URY 1985 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
55 VEN 1985 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
56 BOL 1986 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
57 CHL 1986 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 JAM 1986 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
59 LSO 1986 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 MOZ 1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
61 GAB 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 IRL 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
63 MYS 1987 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
64 NER 1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 NGA 1987 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
66 SLV 1987 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 THA 1987 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
68 FJI 1988 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
69 GTM 1988 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
70 IRN 1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 UGA 1988 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 MEX 1989 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Policy
Endowment Luck Solow-Swan
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# country year war fh infl reer ref 1 ref 2 ref 3 ref 4 ref 5 ref 6 nat resources ToT X demand inv
73 SYR 1989 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
74 TTO 1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
75 VNM 1989 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
76 GUY 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 CHN 1991 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 CRI 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
79 DOM 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
80 IRQ 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
81 JOR 1991 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
82 POL 1991 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
83 ALB 1992 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
84 ETH 1992 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 PER 1992 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
86 AGO 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
87 FIN 1993 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
88 IND 1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
89 MNG 1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 TGO 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 ZAF 1993 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 AFG 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 BEN 1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
94 CMR 1994 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 COG 1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
96 DZA 1994 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
97 HTI 1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
98 LBR 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
99 RWA 1994 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
100 ZMB 1994 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
101 CUB 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
102 GMB 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
103 MAR 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
104 MOZ 1995 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
105 NIC 1995 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
106 BGD 1996 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
107 CAF 1996 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
108 SDN 1996 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
109 BGR 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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# country year war fh infl reer ref 1 ref 2 ref 3 ref 4 ref 5 ref 6 nat resources ToT X demand inv
110 KHM 1998 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
111 ECU 1999 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
112 SLE 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
113 BDI 2000 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
114 TCD 2000 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
115 TZA 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
116 AGO 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
117 ARG 2002 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
118 BRA 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
119 COL 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 ETH 2002 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 GHA 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
122 GIN 2002 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
123 HKG 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
124 IND 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
125 LAO 2002 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
126 MDG 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
127 MRT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
128 MWI 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
129 NAM 2002 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
130 PAN 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
131 PRY 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 RWA 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
133 TTO 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
134 URY 2002 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
135 VEN 2002 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Institutions
Policy
Endowment Luck Solow-Swan
Demand side Supply side
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Appendix 3. Global thresholds in break identification 
Although, as we discussed in Appendix 1, even the smallest breaks seem to be confirmed in their relevance 
based on country-specific expert reports, in this Appendix we aim to introduce a more robust quantitative stress 
testing of our results. In particular, for continuous variables that feed into the SDF, we compute the global 
distribution of uni-directional changes. We then compute the 75th percentile level (see Table 1).   
Table 1. SDF variables and global thresholds 
 
We then impose that a break must fulfil two conditions: a relative one, namely (i) to be in the top 5th percentile 
of a country’s time series, but also (ii) to fall in the top quartile of global changes in that variable. As a practical 
example, a large inflation reduction must then be larger than 75% of the 3591 inflation reduction episodes that 
ever took place globally (i.e. larger than 5.72 p.p.), natural resource extraction rent must increase by at least 3.19 
p.p. of GDP to be considered a break, and so on.  
Table 2 replicates incidence and effectiveness as in the baseline, and then benchmarks it against this new 
specification. Clearly, as the conditions to be classified as a break have increased, incidence could only be smaller 
or equal than the baseline. However, even for the theories where a reduction is observed, this is minimal and 
the rank order of sub-theories is preserved. When looking at effectiveness, the baseline results are practically 
unaltered. This result should not surprise: as small changes occur mainly in advanced economies, and in our 
baseline computation of the effectiveness denominator only acceleration countries are considered, both 
numerator and denominator are minimally affected by our new absolute thresholds.  
Theory Sub-theory Variable Direction
75th pct 
worldwide
Freedom House Index + n.a.
Conflict (domestic/external) - n.a.
Inflation - -5.72
Effective Exchange Rate - -8.78
Agriculture market liberalisation + n.a.
Product market liberalisation + n.a.
Trade liberalisation + n.a.
Capital account liberalisation + n.a.
Current account liberalisation + n.a.
Domestic financial liberalisation + n.a.
Endowments Natural resource rent + 3.19
Terms of Trade + 6.25
Export demand + 35.34
Solow-Swan Investment (public and private) + 2.83
Notes : 75th percentile values are computed over the world changes in the variable, in the direction of interest. 
Dichotomic or categorical variables are excluded. See text for further details.
Institutions
Economic Policy
Demand-side
Supply-side
Luck
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Table 2. Incidence and effectiveness, baseline and robustness check 
  
baseline
baseline + 
absolute 
thresholds
baseline
baseline + 
absolute 
thresholds
Supply 0.452 0.452 Endowments 0.124 0.136
Demand 0.400 0.370 Demand 0.114 0.115
Luck 0.274 0.237 Supply 0.109 0.109
Endowments 0.230 0.170 Institutions 0.107 0.107
Institutions 0.133 0.133 Luck 0.070 0.071
Investment 0.096 0.074 Investment 0.056 0.049
Unexplained 0.200 0.222
incidence effectiveness
Notes : Absolute thresholds impose that the breaks belong to the top world quartile of changes in that variable. 
Incidence indicates the share of growth acceleration episodes displaying that (sub-)theory break. Effectiveness is 
computed as the ratio between the number of growth accelerations preceeded by a specific break, and the 
number of times such a break occured over the whole time series. See text for further details.
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Appendix 4. Effectiveness by combination of (sub-)theories 
 
 
  
prob. of GA
Demand-side 
policy
Endowments Institutions Luck Investment
Supply-side 
policy
Demand-side policy 2.50 6.11 2.27 2.03 3.25 6.34
Endowments 6.37 0.00 2.33 1.58 2.53 7.75
Institutions 3.33 6.98 1.07 1.00 0.00 4.50
Luck 2.87 2.13 1.10 0.63 1.44 3.69
Investment 3.15 0.00 2.33 2.19 0.24 2.89
Supply-side policy 7.84 7.22 6.90 3.00 2.22 2.30
Second stage
F
ir
st
 s
ta
ge
Note : Table displays effectiveness probability values, computed as the ratio between the number of growth accelerations preceeded by specific 
break combinations, and the number of times such a break occured over the whole cross section. Diagonal axis implies two breaks within the 
same dimension occurred in sequence. Top-5 growth strategies in bold. See text for further details.
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Appendix 5. Counterfactuals based on export-shares 
 
 
 
# country year counterfactual region
1 AGO 1993 GIN Sub-Saharan Africa
2 AGO 2001 NER Sub-Saharan Africa
3 ALB 1992 TUR Europe & Central Asia
4 ARG 1985 ECU Latin America & Caribbean
5 ARG 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
6 BDI 2000 UGA Sub-Saharan Africa
7 BEN 1978 SDN Sub-Saharan Africa
8 BEN 1994 TCD Sub-Saharan Africa
9 BFA 1971 NER Sub-Saharan Africa
10 BGD 1982 PAK South Asia
11 BGD 1996 LKA South Asia
12 BGR 1997 DNK Europe & Central Asia
13 BOL 1986 COL Latin America & Caribbean
14 BRA 1967 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
15 BRA 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
16 CAF 1996 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
17 CHL 1976 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
18 CHL 1986 PER Latin America & Caribbean
19 CHN 1968 HKG East Asia & Pacific
20 CHN 1977 VNM East Asia & Pacific
21 CHN 1991 IDN East Asia & Pacific
22 CMR 1976 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
23 CMR 1994 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
24 COG 1976 AGO Sub-Saharan Africa
25 COG 1994 MRT Sub-Saharan Africa
26 COL 1967 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
27 COL 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
28 CRI 1991 COL Latin America & Caribbean
29 CYP 1975 ITA Europe & Central Asia
30 DOM 1968 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
31 DOM 1991 COL Latin America & Caribbean
32 DZA 1971 IRN Middle East & North Africa
33 DZA 1994 SAU Middle East & North Africa
34 ECU 1970 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
35 ECU 1999 BOL Latin America & Caribbean
36 EGY 1976 SAU Middle East & North Africa
37 ETH 1992 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
38 ETH 2002 UGA Sub-Saharan Africa
39 FIN 1993 SWE Europe & Central Asia
40 FJI 1988 AUS East Asia & Pacific
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# country year counterfactual region
41 GAB 1968 TCD Sub-Saharan Africa
42 GAB 1987 AGO Sub-Saharan Africa
43 GBR 1981 NOR Europe & Central Asia
44 GHA 1966 RWA Sub-Saharan Africa
45 GHA 1983 RWA Sub-Saharan Africa
46 GHA 2002 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
47 GIN 2002 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
48 GMB 1995 SEN Sub-Saharan Africa
49 GNB 1981 LBR Sub-Saharan Africa
50 GTM 1988 COL Latin America & Caribbean
51 HKG 2002 JPN East Asia & Pacific
52 HND 1970 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
53 HTI 1972 SLV Latin America & Caribbean
54 HTI 1994 COL Latin America & Caribbean
55 IDN 1967 THA East Asia & Pacific
56 IND 1993 LKA South Asia
57 IND 2002 LKA South Asia
58 IRL 1987 BEL Europe & Central Asia
59 IRN 1988 SAU Middle East & North Africa
60 IRQ 1991 SAU Middle East & North Africa
61 JAM 1986 COL Latin America & Caribbean
62 JOR 1974 ISR Middle East & North Africa
63 JOR 1991 TUN Middle East & North Africa
64 KHM 1982 MNG East Asia & Pacific
65 KHM 1998 IDN East Asia & Pacific
66 KOR 1982 VNM East Asia & Pacific
67 LAO 1979 VNM East Asia & Pacific
68 LAO 2002 VNM East Asia & Pacific
69 LBN 1982 SAU Middle East & North Africa
70 LBR 1994 MRT Sub-Saharan Africa
71 LKA 1973 PAK South Asia
72 MAR 1995 LBN Middle East & North Africa
73 MDG 2002 UGA Sub-Saharan Africa
74 MEX 1989 ECU Latin America & Caribbean
75 MLI 1974 TCD Sub-Saharan Africa
76 MNG 1993 LAO East Asia & Pacific
77 MOZ 1986 AGO Sub-Saharan Africa
78 MOZ 1995 BFA Sub-Saharan Africa
79 MRT 2002 SEN Sub-Saharan Africa
80 MUS 1971 MOZ Sub-Saharan Africa
81 MWI 2002 ZWE Sub-Saharan Africa
82 MYS 1970 THA East Asia & Pacific
83 MYS 1987 IDN East Asia & Pacific
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# country year counterfactual region
84 NAM 2002 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
85 NER 1987 AGO Sub-Saharan Africa
86 NGA 1968 NER Sub-Saharan Africa
87 NGA 1987 AGO Sub-Saharan Africa
88 NIC 1995 COL Latin America & Caribbean
89 NPL 1983 PAK South Asia
90 PAN 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
91 PER 1992 COL Latin America & Caribbean
92 PHL 1985 SGP East Asia & Pacific
93 POL 1991 BGR Europe & Central Asia
94 PRT 1985 ITA Europe & Central Asia
95 PRY 1971 URY Latin America & Caribbean
96 PRY 2002 BOL Latin America & Caribbean
97 RWA 1994 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
98 RWA 2002 NER Sub-Saharan Africa
99 SDN 1996 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
100 SEN 1973 TGO Sub-Saharan Africa
101 SGP 1968 THA East Asia & Pacific
102 SLE 1999 NER Sub-Saharan Africa
103 SLV 1987 COL Latin America & Caribbean
104 SYR 1989 SAU Middle East & North Africa
105 TCD 1980 CAF Sub-Saharan Africa
106 TCD 2000 MLI Sub-Saharan Africa
107 TGO 1993 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
108 THA 1987 IDN East Asia & Pacific
109 TTO 1989 ECU Latin America & Caribbean
110 TTO 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
111 TZA 2000 UGA Sub-Saharan Africa
112 UGA 1980 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
113 UGA 1988 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
114 URY 1985 NIC Latin America & Caribbean
115 URY 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
116 VEN 1985 ECU Latin America & Caribbean
117 VEN 2002 MEX Latin America & Caribbean
118 VNM 1989 IDN East Asia & Pacific
119 ZAF 1993 BDI Sub-Saharan Africa
120 ZMB 1983 MWI Sub-Saharan Africa
121 ZMB 1994 TCD Sub-Saharan Africa
122 ZWE 1968 MDG Sub-Saharan Africa
Note : Counterfactuals displaying maximum correlation with the trade share vector of 
the growth acceleration episode at t-3. See text for further details
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Appendix 6. Characterisation of the acceleration process, by episode 
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Appendix 7. Difference between accelerations and counterfactual growth rates 
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Appendix 8. Alternative counterfactuals based on the Synthetic Control Method 
 
In order to show that our baseline results are not the product of choosing the export share vector as primary 
metric to build our counterfactuals, we calibrated the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) discussed at length 
in Marrazzo and Terzi (2017b).  The SCM creates counterfactuals that replicate not only a country’s pre-
acceleration GDP performance, but also the country’s investment rate, education levels, population growth, 
trade openness, and industry share. We chose however not to use this methodology as our baseline as it 
has some key drawbacks: a wider set of covariates is more demanding on our data and forces us to drop 
some acceleration episodes. Moreover, the fact that each counterfactual is composed by a linear 
combination of countries makes it impossible to run our standard statistical tests to show the lack of 
comparable breaks.  
 
Table 1 shows that the SCM achieves a very good covariate balance, and a standard t-test constantly fails 
to reject equality between the growth accelerations and their synthetic control.  
 
Table 1. Covariates balance 
 
Table 2 compares average growth rates for the counterfactuals built in the baseline and using the SCM. As 
can be seen, for each year between t-8 and t+8 we fail to reject that there is any difference between the two 
at the 5% level. The only exception is t+2 where the SCM suggests a better performance of the 
counterfactual vis-à-vis the baseline. However, an overall t-test of difference across all time periods again 
fails to reject any significant difference at the 5% level.  
Real Synth diff p-value
GDPpc level 3676.4 3521.5 154.9 0.773
Investment rate 21.2 21.7 -0.5 0.680
Industry share 28.4 25.9 2.5 0.128
Trade openness 62.1 57.8 4.3 0.387
Population growth 2.2 2.4 -0.2 0.212
Secondary education 6.8 6.9 -0.1 0.936
Tertiaty education 2.4 2.4 0.0 0.895
Notes : Covariates averaged over the period [t-8,t-1] and then averaged across growth 
acceleration episodes in the first column. The second column averages across synthetic 
counterfactuals. Third column displays the difference between the two. The fourth shows 
the p-value of the difference being statistically different from zero.
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Table 2. Comparison between baseline and SCM counterfactuals 
 
  
Baseline SCM diff p-value
t-8 2.532 1.510 1.022 0.270
t-7 0.426 1.309 -0.883 0.263
t-6 0.823 1.393 -0.570 0.564
t-5 1.376 2.013 -0.636 0.433
t-4 2.032 0.726 1.306 0.087
t-3 1.797 1.103 0.694 0.296
t-2 1.263 1.645 -0.382 0.589
t-1 0.467 0.692 -0.225 0.738
t 0.958 0.920 0.039 0.961
t+1 0.937 1.868 -0.932 0.241
t+2 1.305 2.737 -1.431 0.044
t+3 2.171 2.323 -0.152 0.849
t+4 0.894 2.128 -1.234 0.111
t+5 1.602 2.701 -1.099 0.158
t+6 0.347 1.818 -1.471 0.077
t+7 0.353 0.631 -0.279 0.763
t+8 1.899 1.862 0.037 0.963
total 1.246 1.611 -0.820 0.057
Matching method
Note : Table displaying average growth rate for the growth 
acceleration counterfactual generated using the baseline method, and 
the synthetic control method (SCM). P-values for a standard t-test, 
H0: diff=0. Bold indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 9. Relationship between number of breaks and acceleration strength 
 
In this Appendix, we want to visualise the relationship between acceleration strength and the number of 
breaks. To do so, Figure 1 shows the relationship between our strength indicator and the number of breaks, 
up to 3. As discussed in Section III, this covers 96% of accelerations. Figure 1 shows how the strength of 
the acceleration increases in the number of breaks, peaks at break=1, and is reduced thereafter.       
 
Figure 1. Relationship between growth acceleration strength and number of breaks 
 
We also ran a local polynomial smoothening algorithm dissecting our data based on the number of breaks. 
Figure 2 below aims only to visually complement OLS regression results discussed in Section IVb, and 
shows the growth path for each of the break numbers.      
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Figure 2. Relationship between growth acceleration strength and number of breaks 
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Appendix 10. Alternative OLS regression specifications 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Counterfactual method baseline baseline baseline SCM baseline
# of breaks 23.75 25.14 14.47 26.03*
(0.101) (0.192) (0.210) (0.078)
# of breaks^2 -7.359* -7.506* -6.954** -7.871**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.025) (0.048)
Income quartile 11.36** 12.40** 11.14**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014)
Human Capital Index -11.46 -7.134 -55.63
(0.182) (0.465) (0.368)
Human Capital Index^2 12.14
(0.429)
Log GDPpc 7.739**
(0.044)
Cluster 1 22.39
(0.179)
Cluster 2 8.279
(0.437)
Cluster 3 -0.249
(0.990)
Cluster 4 12.60
(0.354)
Cluster 5 9.655
(0.377)
Cluster 6 8.568
(0.439)
Demand policies -2.101 7.124 0.668
(0.827) (0.477) (0.945)
Endowments 2.402 6.603 -0.240
(0.826) (0.512) (0.982)
Institutions 6.222 18.12 5.288
(0.672) (0.211) (0.734)
Luck -2.545 4.006 -4.439
(0.862) (0.696) (0.753)
Supply policies -8.633 0.872 -9.878
(0.473) (0.933) (0.406)
Recession depth -0.192
(0.214)
Constant 14.00 6.812 -43.38 16.75** 51.63
(0.313) (0.678) (0.191) (0.028) (0.346)
p-value of F-test on break type - 0.945 - 0.869 0.960
N 101 97 111 98 101
R-sq 0.073 0.105 0.282 0.102 0.104
Excl Adv economies No Yes No No No
Incl all break interactions No No Yes No No
Excl break outliers Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Acceleration strength computed based on geographical and production proximity (baseline) and 
Syntetic Control Method (SCM). Post-matching OLS regression coefficients, p-values based on robust 
standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10  ** p<0.05 * p<0.10. Interaction coefficients omitted. See text 
for further details
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